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Abstract 
This thesis is centered on the labour market fortunes of women with intermittent 
participation. We examine whether there are earnings losses associated with time out of 
work, the role of disjoint employment histories in the explanation of the gender wage 
gap, and the duration structure of intermittent participation. 
The first Chapter presents an introduction to the issues. Chapter 2 documents the main 
labour market events that concern women over the last twenty-five years in order to 
motivate the empirical work. Chapter 3 gives details of the principal data sets used, 
whilst Chapter 4 surveys the main theoretical developments of female labour supply and 
earnings determination. 
Chapter 5 analyses the effect of work interruptions on earnings. We show that use of 
potential experience in wage equations may seriously overestimate the returns to work 
experience. The average wage gain to actual work experience is between 1 to 2 per cent 
a year and is confined to women with full-time work experience. Time spent out of 
work has a negative effect on re-entry wages. The average earnings loss is around 2 per 
cent a year. The magnitude of the earnings penalty varies with the type of out of work 
spell. Those who are unemployed suffer the highest earnings penalty. These results 
hold in the presence of controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Chapter 6 presents a new decomposition of the gender pay gap using panel information 
on employment transitions and wages. On initial entry into the labour market, the 
earnings of men and women are very similar. As earnings growth while in continuous 
employment shows no significant gender differences, male and female earnings will 
follow each other. Differences start to emerge once there are breaks in work. On re- 
entry to the labour market, both men and women obtain lower wages than before, but 
men return at higher wages than women: with the re-entry gender pay gap rising with 
age. This, combined with the fact that women are more likely to have breaks, is the 
explanation of why women's pay increasingly falls behind the pay of men over the life 
cycle. 
Chapter 7 models the duration of time spent in childcare in detail. We show that the 
relative propensity to return to part-time work rises with the age of the mother. Women 
who take childcare breaks relatively early in their careers spend less time out of work 
and are more likely to re-enter to full-time work. The age and number of children 
appear to be the most important factors behind this observation. Women are more likely 
to return to full-time work the fewer the number of children they have and the older the 
children are. There seems to be little evidence that women in the age range analysed use 
part-time work as a stepping stone to full-time work. 
Chapter 8 concludes by considering the implications of these results. 
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In 1999, the European Union issued a set of guidelines aimed at tackling the gender gaps in 
employment and earnings and to improve policies to reconcile work and family life. 
Equality of opportunity across genders is a fundamental starting point put firmly on the 
European agenda at the Luxembourg Jobs Summit in November 1997.1 How far are such 
movements based on brave rhetoric, and to what extent is there economic evidence that the 
alignment of child-rearing and working life is a harmonious one? This thesis provides a 
detailed assessment of these issues and presents fresh insight into some of the forces at 
play. Essentially, it is concerned with three issues. First, it investigates the economic 
fortunes of those women with intermittent labour force participation, specifically the effect 
of time out of work on earnings. Second, it examines the duration structure of intermittent 
participation, and, third, it explains the role of disjoint employment histories in the 
explanation of the gender wage gap. 
Female labour force participation has been rising in most of the Western world since the 
late nineteenth century. To attribute all of this increase in supply as a response to higher 
female real wages overlooks the huge changes in policies and attitudes that have taken 
place. Most recently, the provision of equal pay acts and maternity leave legislation have 
had a significant impact on the capacity of women to balance market and domestic work. 
The European Union's guidelines explicitly recognise that a large contribution to this 
objective can be made through policy. The pattern of female labour force participation has 
changed dramatically over the post-war period. In the UK, more women in the 25-45 age 
group are to be found economically active than ever before. However, significant numbers 
of women still experience discontinuities in their employment history at the- time of 
childbirth and various models exist which attempt to account for this observable feature. 
1 See Employment and Social Affairs Unit (1999) 
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During this time period, real wages have increased (see Juhn and Murphy (1996), for 
example). This has made the opportunity to stay at home throughout the childbearing 
period an affordable option for large numbers of women, thereby reducing female labour 
supply. However, this negative effect on supply has been moderated through an increase in 
the opportunity costs of female nonparticipation. Additionally, an increase in real female 
wages has made the purchase of quality childcare affordable for some women. Given an 
expansion in post-war female job possibilities, the proportion of female entrants to the 
labour market has also risen. 
An increase in job opportunities has occurred alongside an increase in educational 
possibilities for women and these have been subsequently rewarded in the market. Medical 
advances have led to far greater female control over fertility. Technological progress has 
seen the advent of a huge array of labour saving devices in the average household. These 
factors, too, have led to increases in the labour supply of women. 
The theoretical underpinnings throughout this thesis lie within the framework of the theory 
of human capital. According to the basic theory, workers continue to invest in human 
capital up until the point where the internal rate of return on such acquisitions equals the 
market rate of interest. The underlying implication of this is that engaging in extra years of 
education, say, is somehow recognised in a higher future income stream once post- 
compulsory education is complete. Greater amounts of education feed into higher worker 
productivity and justify the payment of additional earnings such that the wage is equal to 
the marginal revenue product in a perfectly competitive market. Rates of return to 
schooling vary depending upon the level of education and gender. It can be shown that 
intermittent workers (who are usually female) receive lower returns to human capital than 
continuous workers and an explanation of this phenomenon is required. If it is understood 
that intermittent workers somehow lose the effects of education and training during periods 
spent outside the labour force, then their pre-interruption acquisition of such human capital 
needs to be justified another way. Failing this, the acquisition represents a waste of scarce 
societal resources and misspent time. 
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Gronau (1988) maintains that intermittent workers alter their behaviour as a result of the 
lower returns which they perceive due to their discontinuous work patterns. Such workers 
are less likely to enter and remain in the labour force due to their prediction of low lifetime 
earnings as a result of intermittent supply. It is obviously a difficult task to ascertain what 
level of wages this group would earn if they had not taken time away from employment and 
this area is fraught with the self-selectivity problems highlighted by Heckman (1979). It 
can be argued that workers are less likely to engage in human capital investment during an 
interruption and as such withdrawal indicates lost productive potential. The empirical 
section of this research deals with these issues more fully. 
The problems of misallocation of labour into various areas of employment are further 
compounded in today's economic climate. The move to more flexible working patterns, 
especially in the tertiary sector, has been effective in reducing both the duration and the 
frequency of periods spent outside the labour force (Employment Gazette (1994)). 
However, a penalty in terms of lower post-interruption earnings still exists. If workers 
continue to assume that reduced post-interruption earnings prevail then this imperfect 
information will result in economic inefficiency. For these reasons, it is important to 
estimate the size of the reduced post-interruption wage for economies such as that of the 
United Kingdom. 
1.2 Scope of the Analysis 
In order to deal with the issues set out above, the structure of this thesis is as follows. In the 
following chapter, an overview of the British labour market in the last 25 years is given. In 
particular, we analyse the labour market participation and earnings patterns of men and 
different groups of women. These trends provide the justification for further empirical 
analysis of the issues involving intermittent workers. 
This thesis is largely an empirical work. The issues it examines cannot be dealt with 
through the use of one sole data set. Chapter 3, therefore, provides a survey of the different 
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data sets used. We also give a detailed and in-depth account of the problems experienced 
with the data, our data cleaning procedures, and the construction of key variables. 
The introductory section of Chapter 4 sets out the existing knowledge of labour supply and 
human capital theory on which this thesis is predicated. The latter half of the Chapter looks 
in detail at two human capital models of intermittent participation developed in the US and 
in the Netherlands. These models, explaining how and why earnings may be affected by 
time spent out of employment, form the basis of the empirical work in Chapter' 5. Here, we 
use regression analysis to analyse the determinants of earnings and to estimate wage 
equations for female workers who experience absence from the labour market. The 
analysis, using the National Child Development Study, produces two key findings. First, it 
establishes that there is a wage penalty associated with taking a break from continuous 
employment. Second, the wage penalty is seen to vary with the nature of the break. With 
respect to the determinants of female participation in spells of domestic activity, we single 
out the effects of education and family characteristics. It transpires that, even allowing for 
selectivity effects that may be associated with differing tastes for work, female workers who 
have time away from the labour market still experience a negative impact upon their re- 
entry wages. 
Most studies of the gender pay gap use cross-section earnings functions to apply a Oaxaca 
decomposition to the contributions of differences in characteristics and coefficients. 
However, the accounts that these studies provide of the gender pay gap are often hard to 
relate to the more informal stories told about the sources of women's disadvantage in the 
labour market. In Chapter 6, a panel data set is used to decompose average earnings into 
the contribution of the average starting wage for workers entering paid work from non- 
employment, average wage growth for those in continuous employment and the fraction 
of workers entering employment. This decomposition is used to identify, first, the source 
of the pay gap between men and women, and, second, the gap between women in full- 
and part-time work using data drawn from the British Household Panel Survey. 
Comparing men and women, we find no significant differences in wage growth on the job 
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so that the source of the gender pay gap comes from the entrant pay gap and the share of 
entrants. Looking at long-run changes suggests that we would expect to see a further 
narrowing of the pay gap in the future. 
Given all the above processes at work, much interest has been generated in the modelling of 
female labour supply, both in the static and dynamic framework. In general, the longer the 
time out of work, the heavier the wage penalty. Chapter 7 focuses on the principle features 
of the duration of time out and the nature of the subsequent re-entry, in order to establish 
the principle factors determining the length of time out. Using duration analysis, the 
Chapter shows that the relative propensity to return to part-time work rises with the age of 
the mother. Women who end childcare breaks relatively early in their careers spend less 
time out of work and are more likely to re-enter to full-time work. The age and number of 
children appear to be the most important factors behind this observation. Women are more 
likely to return to full-time work, the fewer the number of children they have and the older 
the children are. 
Chapter 8 concludes by giving an overview of the main findings of the thesis, scope for 
future work and possible policy implications. 
5 
Chapter 2 
Recent Developments in the Female Labour Market in Britain 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the economic fortunes of women. We begin, 
therefore, with an overview of the key events regarding women that have shaped the 
labour market over the last two decades. One of the most notable features has been the 
advancement of women at the workplace relative to men. The improved prospects of 
women are apparent in both employment and earnings. Economists, demographers and 
labour market policy-makers have all cited reasons for the recent developments, with 
varying degrees of emphasis on fertility, labour supply and demand. (summarised in 
Ferber (1998)). Declining fertility rates, marital dissolution, changing attitudes toward 
women in the workplace, improvements in household labour-saving technology and the 
facilitation of the involvement of women in the world of work through maternity leave 
and the state provision of in-work benefits (such as Family Credit and its replacement 
the Working Families Tax Credit), have all contributed to the increase in female labour 
market participation (see amongst others Joshi and Owen (1985), and Joshi and Paci 
(1999)). However, casual observation would suggest that, whilst female labour market 
participation has increased, this has not been of the same order across all groups of 
women with different family status. For example, there has traditionally been a strong 
negative correlation between the presence. of young children in the household and 
female labour supply (see Nakamura and Nakamura (1981)). The impact of children 
also affects the participation of women across the life cycle. 
Similar progress in women's wages may be observed over the same time period. 
Increased educational attainment and work experience (partly influenced by the same 
factors which facilitated increased participation) are cited as reasons for the narrowing 
of the gender pay gap, (Harkness (1996)). Here again, we may expect these influences 
to vary across groups of women and to affect the pay gap in varying degrees. For 
example, differences in educational attainment or on-the-job training may mean that pay 
for older women may lag behind, if younger cohorts are more educated or receive more 
training. Further, whether women work full- or part-time may also influence earnings, if 
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there are pay penalties to working part-time. Differences in part-time working across 
age groups will then affect the life-cycle earnings profile. Moreover, since the majority 
of part-time workers are women, any part-time pay penalty will influence the gender pay 
gap. 
This Chapter uses General Household Survey (GHS) data to summarise the changes in 
the economic performance of women (as measured by earnings and employment), 
relative to men since 1975. The GHS is the only British data set that provides 
continuous information on employment and earnings for this period. We also focus our 
discussion on the years covered by the other data sets used in this thesis. ' Thus, the data 
incorporate the time span from when our sample of women in Chapter 5 have passed 
compulsory school-leaving age (1975), to the end year for our panel of women in 
Chapter 6 (1995). Throughout this time window, both the Sex Discrimination and the 
Equal Pay Acts were in place, which may have had a bearing on events. The Equal Pay 
Act of 1970 made the process of offering different wages to men and women illegal. 
This was later extended in 1983 to cover equal pay to work of equal value. The Sex 
Discrimination Act implemented in 1975 prohibited gender discrimination in hiring. 
The subsequent Employment Protection Act, introduced in 1979, established the right to 
have maternity leave. The GHS data cannot allow us to observe earnings or 
employment before these Acts. This Chapter therefore goes on to assess the labour 
market performance of different groups of women in the light of these events. 
2.2 Economic Activity Rates 
Historically, women in Britain have had lower unemployment rates than men. This is in 
part because women have tended to withdraw from the labour force when not in work in 
much greater numbers than men do. The means-tested component of the unemployment 
benefit system offers no incentive for many women to register as unemployed, if a 
partner, if present, is in full-time work. This thesis relies on household survey data. It 
may be, however, that the information contained in survey data will also suffer from a 
similar distortion if there is a correlation between registering to receive unemployment 
benefit and satisfying the active job search criteria in a survey. A more complete guide 
1 1991, for example, is a relevant year for the NCDS data set. 
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to relative economic performance is therefore to divide the labour market into three 
states (employment, unemployment and inactivity), and then to look at differences in 
employment and participation rates by gender. 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 confirm that more women than ever are now in work. The 
employment rate for women rose from 0.61 in 1975 to 0.67 in 1995. By contrast, the 
employment rate for men has fallen by around 14 percentage points over the same 
period, from 0.90 in 1975 to 0.76 in 1995. As a result of rising employment amongst 
women and falling employment amongst men, the gender employment-rate gap 
narrowed from 0.29 to 0.10 over the period. These two opposing trends are not yet 
equal and opposite in magnitude. The total employment rate was still 4.5 percentage 
points lower in 1995 than in 1975. Moreover, Figure 2.1 shows that female 
employment rates rose most during the economic boom of the late 1980's. Male 
employment rates fell most in the recessions of the early 1980's and early 1990's. By 
contrast, female employment rates were hardly affected during the last recession. These 
cyclical movements suggest that the gender employment gap may well be equalised 
during the next economic downturn. 
The information on employment rates in Table 2.1 tells us little of the variety of 
experience between members of the gender groups. Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 give 
employment rates conditional on age from the beginning to the end of the sample 
period. The figures portray three-year averages, in order to boost the sample sizes 
within each age group. One of the notable features of Figure 2.2 is the fall in 
employment for women in their mid-twenties to early thirties. Hitherto, women seemed 
to stop working in their childbearing years: this is now less prevalent. Figure 2.2 shows 
that in 1975, female employment rates exhibited the characteristic double-peak pattern. 
By 1995, this shape was no longer so clearly discernible. Indeed, the pattern in this year 
is very similar to that of male rates. Male employment rates have fallen at every age: 
more so for those under 24 and those over 50 years of age. This reflects rises in the 
staying-on rates for higher education and the movement into inactivity of men over 50. 
Again, the trends for men and women act to narrow the employment gaps by age. By 
1991, young male 16 year-olds enjoyed similar economic activity patterns to females of 
the same age, (compare the 49 per cent rate for females with the 46 per cent rate 
for 
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males in Table 2.2). However, females aged 25 in 1991 still had lower economic 
activity rates than males (62 per cent for females compared to 81 per cent for males). 
The employment gap had narrowed most by 1991 for male and females over fifty, 
(compare the 73 per cent rate for females and the 82 per cent rate for males in 1991 with 
the rates of 68 per cent and 94 per cent in 1975). These trends have continued into the 
mid-1990s. In passing, we note that Figure 2.2 suggests a move of women as a group to 
postpone the birth and rearing of children (the dip in age-specific employment rate 
moves to the right) or the fact that the frequency and length of time out is becoming 
smaller (the dip becomes shallower). Whilst the graph of the employment rate is 
smoother than before, the drop in rate now occurs at a higher age. Despite clear health 
disincentives, 2 the trend seems to be in this direction. The traditional pattern of 
discontinuous economic activity throughout their early twenties until mid-thirties is in 
stark contrast to patterns observed in mainland Europe (in countries such as France, 
say). It would seem that French women fall into two separate groups: those who work 
continuously without career breaks and those who are permanently out of the labour 
force (Dex, Walters and Alden (1994)). However, the enforcement of comparatively 
recent European maternity rights3 has meant that increasing numbers of British women 
are now able to retain a foothold in the labour market through their childbearing years. 
A sizable proportion of these women return to, and then remain with, their pre-break 
employer. The data above cannot however confirm whether the women return to the 
same employer. Since the employment rate is a product of the inflow rate and the 
average duration of employment, the evidence of higher employment rates (in the age 
range 26 to 35 years) can arise from any of the following. A rise in the average 
duration, or a rise in the inflow rate, or a combination of both these factors. The inflow 
rate may reflect child-rearing experiences for this age range that in turn may indicate 
both fertility rates and the speed of return to work. For a given inflow rate, the higher 
employment rates suggest a longer duration at work, consistent with shorter breaks (or 
no breaks at all). 
2 For example, the well-publicised association between some forms of cancer and the delay of the birth of 
a first-born child to after the age of thirty. 
3 The 1993 amendments brought down the qualification period of maternity leave to 1 year from 2 years 
for full-time workers and to I year from 5 years for part-time workers. 
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Historically, during childbearing years, women were likely to be found in the out-of-the- 
labour force state. Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3 show how employment rates across the 
genders vary with the age of the youngest child present in the household. 4 Figure 2.3 
demonstrates how the absence of young children in the household leads to a pattern of 
female employment rates which most closely mimics the total employment rate of men. 
We witness that for women with no children, the employment rate over the fifteen year 
period has remained relatively constant. Employment rates for women with children are 
lower than for women with no dependent children. One explanation of the constraining 
force of the presence of young children on female labour supply is that young children 
have high costs in terms of time and thereby raise the reservation wage of being in work 
(Becker (1964)). As the age of the youngest child rises, the decision to participate and 
thereby the employment rates of women are affected less and less. This is what we 
observe from the data. Female employment rates rise with the age of the youngest child. 
Figure 2.3 also shows how the employment rate has risen most amongst women with 
very young children in the last decade. Women with young children are currently in 
employment in greater numbers than ever before. In 1995,41 per cent of women with a 
child under one were in work, in contrast to just 17 per cent in 1981, (see Table 2.3). 
Note that there is no association between employment rates and the age of youngest 
child for men. 
2.3 Earnings 
Whilst the differences in employment rates between men and women are easily visible, 
what can be said about the differences in earnings? In 1995, the typical woman could 
expect to be paid an average of £ 6.63 an hour. However, a man could expect to earn 
£8.98 an hour, (in January 1998 prices), so that, in 1995, women earned, on average, 
some 73 per cent of the average male hourly wage. That the gender pay gap had started 
to narrow over time since the early 1970's (particularly after the implementation of the 
Equal Pay Act) is well documented, (see Joshi and Paci (1998)). Table 2.4 shows that 
the female earnings relative to male rose by 10 points from . 64 to . 74 
between 1975 and 
1995. Of course, wages differ considerably with full- and part-time work status, as 
Table 2.4 and Figure 2.6 indicates. The average full-time job pays around 20 per cent 
° Information on the age of youngest child is only available from 1980. 
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more than the average part-time job. This may be because part-time workers receive 
lower returns to human capital characteristics, such as education and work experience, 
than their full-time counterparts (Harkness (1996)), or because they have less human 
capital. This issue is further explored in Chapters 5 and 6. Note that the gap5 between 
female full-time wages and male wages has narrowed more than the gap between female 
part-time and male wages (Figure 2.7 and Table 2.4). In 1975, a woman in full-time 
work could expect to earn around 63 per cent of the average male wage. By 1995, a 
woman in part-time work could earn around 66 per cent of the average male wage, 
whilst full-timers were earning 80 per cent of the average male wage. Why might part- 
time jobs now carry a wage penalty whereas up until the mid-1970s they proffered a 
wage premium? One possible explanation is outlined in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.8 which 
show that the distribution of part-time work has moved sharply toward younger workers 
and those over fifty. It may be that the low relative hourly wage for part-time work in 
the 1990's results because part-time work consists more of younger workers (who have 
little in the way of work experience) than in the past (compare 37 per cent of sixteen 
year-olds in part-time work in 1975 with 82 per cent in 1995). Figure 2.9 confirms that 
the share of part-time work accounted for by younger female workers is rising over time. 
Around 8 per cent of part-time jobs are now accounted for by teenagers compared with 
around 4 per cent twenty years ago. 
Given this pattern of participation in the UK, what can be said about the financial cost 
of taking a break in employment? What impact is there on stocks of human capital 
when a worker experiences an interruption? The GHS provides no information on 
actual work experience, but an initial insight may be obtained by examining the wage 
gained by women conditional on the age of the youngest child. Table 2.6 illustrates 
wages by age of youngest child. In 1995, a woman with a youngest child aged less than 
one in part-time work was earning £7.50 an hour, some £2.25 more than a woman 
locked into part-time work by the time her youngest child was aged six. It is notable 
that in the early part of our time window, childless women in part-time work suffered a 
wage penalty in contrast to part-time working mothers with young child(ren). However, 
this effect lessened over the period: as part-time work moved into the domain of young 
female workers. Table 2.7 provides two snapshots of the distribution of female part- 
The gap used here means the ratio of female to male earnings. 
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time work by age of youngest child in the household. In the early period of our sample, 
1980-82, the share of women in part-time work is some . 09 percentage points higher on 
average across women with youngest child over six than in the 1993-95 period. 
However, amongst childless women, the occurrence of part-time work was slightly 
higher in the later period. It would seem that whereas once, part-time work was 
associated with women with young children, it has lately been chosen as a long-term 
option for women without children. 
2.4 Summary 
The evidence presented in this overview of the labour market events in Britain over the 
last two decades suggest that women have experienced improvements in workplace 
fortunes, as measured by rising employment rates and wages. More women are in work 
than ever before and their wages have improved both in real terms and relative to men. 
Women also seem to be returning to work after childbirth much sooner than before, as 
evidenced by the rise in employment rates in the principle childbearing ages. However, 
it is clear that not all women have benefited equally from these changes. It seems that 
women in part-time work have not enjoyed relative wage gains to the same extent as 
their full-time counterparts and that the part-time work has shifted toward younger 
women. 
The remainder of this thesis is concerned with the analysis of these issues in more detail 
within the general framework of a human capital approach, trying to sort out the 
microeconomic behavioural links between these facts. Models developed in the United 
States and in the Netherlands offer guides to the nature of the wage returns to work 
experience and the depreciation of human capital which may take place when workers 
are out of the labour force. It is these issues with which the thesis is primarily 
concerned. Chapter 5 analyses the impact of career breaks on wages for a British cohort 
of women. Chapter 6 provides a fresh insight into the forces at work, which contribute 
to the gender pay gap. Chapter 7 examines the factors that drive the length of time out 
and the subsequent return to work. Before then, Chapter 3 describes the principal data 
sources used throughout the thesis and Chapter 4 gives an introduction to the main 
theoretical developments in these areas. 
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Figure 2.1 Employment Rates by Gender 
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Table 2.1 Employment Rates by Gender 
Year Male Female Total Difference 
male-female 
1975 . 902 . 611 . 761 +. 291 
1981 . 798 . 572 . 687 +. 
226 
1986 . 793 . 629 . 714 +. 164 
1991 . 784 . 659 . 723 +. 
125 
1995 . 764 . 666 . 716 +. 
098 
Source: General Household Survey 
Table 2.2 Female Employment Rates by Age and Year 
Age Female Employment Rate Male Employment Rate 
1975 1981 1986 1991 1995 1975 1981 1986 1991 1995 
16 . 504 . 
363 . 486 . 491 . 444 . 511 . 305 . 519 . 457 . 
438 
25 . 554 . 
479 . 597 . 
616 . 599 . 912 . 812 . 855 . 
814 . 784 
35 . 601 . 
566 . 613 . 701 . 643 . 948 . 866 . 904 . 880 . 
846 
40 . 671 . 
702 . 713 . 712 . 714 . 938 . 902 . 925 . 
879 . 862 
45 . 700 . 
688 . 758 . 752 . 725 . 935 . 861 . 885 . 861 . 
867 
50 . 676 . 
661 . 697 . 726 . 75 . 937 . 877 . 837 . 
821 . 811 
55 . 581 . 
551 . 583 . 571 . 562 - . 911 . 807 . 795 . 744 . 
743 
Source: General Household Survey 
Table 2.3 Female Employment Rates by Gender and Age of Youngest Child 
Female Employment Rate 
No Children 




1981 1986 1991 1995 
. 
689 . 725 . 721 . 730 
. 170 . 
235 
. 330 . 410 
. 288 . 
415 
. 559 . 512 
. 522 . 
554 
. 648 . 512 
Source: General Household Survey 
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Table 2.4 Mean Real Hourly Wages by Gender and Year 
Mean Hourly Earnings 
Year Male Female Female Female Female/ FT/Male PT/Male 
FT PT Male Gap Gap 
Gap 
1975 6.20 3.98 3.88 4.10 . 64 . 63 . 66 
1980 7.00 4.36 4.61 4.02 . 62 . 66 . 57 
1981 7.18 4.53 4.78 4.22 . 63 . 67 . 59 
1986 7.89 5.28 5.49 4.98 
. 67 . 70 . 63 
1991 8.97 6.31 6.83 5.87 . 70 . 76 . 65 
1995 8.98 6.63 7.15 5.94 
. 74 . 80 . 66 
Source: General Household Survey. 
Table 2.5. Share of Part-Time Work Among Female Employees by Age, 1975-95 
Age 
Total 16 20 30 40 50 55 
Female 
1975/77 . 41 . 
37 . 05 . 58 . 55 . 43 . 
43 
1993/95 . 42 . 
82 . 27 . 41 . 46 . 44 . 53 
Share in 
Total 
1975/77 100 . 018 . 004 . 031 . 031 . 027 . 
021 
1993/97 100 . 024 . 011 . 030 . 025 . 025 . 
018 
Source: General Household Survey. 
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Table 2.6 Female Mean Real Hourly Earnings by Age of Youngest Child 
Ho 
All Women 
Child under 1 
Child under 4 




Child under 1 
Child under 4 
Child under 6 
0 Children 
1980 1981 1986 1991 1995 
4.80 4.86 7.10 6.87 7.97 
3.98 4.94 5.47 5.19 6.51 
3.67 4.01 5.39 5.37 5.92 
4.56 4.76 5.31 6.73 7.04 
4.86 4.82 6.82 6.22 7.50 
3.81 4.73 5.14 4.80 5.70 
3.61 3.90 5.50 4.87 5.25 
4.06 4.36 4.86 6.32 6.55 
Source: General Household Survey. 
Table 2.7 Share of Female Part-time Jobs by Age of Youngest Child 
Year Share of Part-Time Jobs 
Age of Child 
No children 146 
1980/82 . 27 . 54 . 78 . 77 
1993/95 . 28 . 48 . 67 . 68 
Source: General Household Survey. 
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Chapter 3 
Guide to the Principal Data Sets Used in this Thesis 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis is primarily an empirical investigation of the changing position of women in 
the British labour market. In order to pursue these issues, we draw on a variety of 
household level data sets. This is because there does not exist one single data set that 
can satisfactorily cover all the aspects that we wish to study. This Chapter provides a 
brief overview of the data sets, their strengths and limitations, and the construction of 
the key variables used in subsequent chapters. 
3.2 The National Child Development Study Data 
Introduction 
The data we use in Chapters 5 and 7 draw heavily upon the information contained in the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS). The NCDS is a longitudinal cohort survey 
of all children who were born in Britain between 3 and 9 March in the year 1958. There 
has subsequently been the addition of all those children who were born in the same 
week outside the country, but who entered Britain before the age of 16. Respondents 
were then surveyed at the ages of 7,11,16,23 and 33 years. The NCDS has its origins 
in the study on perinatal mortality (PMS) in 1958. However, the five subsequent NCDS 
sweeps have taken a more general investigative line. In 1978, information on the 
performance of cohort members in various public examinations was obtained via 
contact made with the schools and colleges at which the individual had attended 
(labelled the EXAMS study. ) The survey provides the rare opportunity to study the 
forces that influence the lives of over 17,000 individuals. The main strength of the 
study for our purposes is that it contains a detailed break down of each individual's 
labour market history, from which it is possible to construct measures of actual in-work 
and out-of-work experience. These can then be matched with each individual's wage 
performance at the ages of 23 and 33. 
Table 3.1 shows the precise sample size in each of the five sweeps and indicates the 
various sources of information about the cohort member. Notice that in the last sweep 
in 1991, the children of the cohort members were also drawn into the study. 
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The Sweep 4 survey involved extensive use of the cohort members themselves as a 
source of information. The individual was consulted by a research interviewer and the 
work was merged with information obtained in the 1971 and 1981 Censuses. Sweep 5 
followed a similar procedure, whereby use was made of an interviewer and self- 
completion questionnaires for each cohort member, their partner and children. Sweep 5 
forms the main source of the data we utilise and an outline of the survey content are 
contained below. In any survey of this kind, the issue of how representative the sample 
is, and questions on the response rates, arise. The response rates of Sweep 5 are 
contained in Table 3.2. From Table 3.2, we can see that the actual sample of individuals 
available from the Cohort Member interview for analysis in Chapters 5 and 7 is 11,407 
individuals, of which around 6,700 are women. Chapters 5 and 7 use only the sample of 
women. 
The "Your life since 1974" section of Sweeps 4 and 5 included a self-completion 
questionnaire which generates the event and state history data with respect to 
cohabitation, children, labour market history and housing for the cohort member. The 
cohort member's partner was given a similar questionnaire. Individuals were asked to 
state the beginning and end date in years and months of every in-work and out-of-work 
spell together with the nature of the spell. Thus, it is theoretically possible to say 
whether any spell of employment was full-time, part-time or self-employed. It is also 
possible to identify whether any out-of-work spell was spent in unemployment, 
education or training, sickness, domestic duties or an "other" unspecified category. 
From the diaries, economic activity variables could potentially be derived for each of the 
maximum of 216 months during which an individual might have been economically 
active between 1974 and 1991. This information was then integrated with each 
individual's pay data, in order to provide the foundation for model estimation in 
Chapters 5 and 7. Part of the computer program used to undertake this task is given in 
the Appendix to this Chapter. 
However, this task was complicated by the fact that some of the Sweep 5 data was not 
completely clean before it was deposited with the ESRC Data Archive. During the self- 
completion work histories, some individuals made errors in the entry of various start and 
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end dates. Following Joshi and Hinde (1993), missing and inconsistent dates were dealt 
with by the insertion of the "correct" date. For example, for each job duration, the 
individual was asked to write the start month and start year of the job followed by the 
finish month and finish year. Frequently the months were entered in the wrong order, or 
the complete year and month information was inadvertently swapped round, or the 
month or year was simply missing. 
Such cases were flagged in the data and then a case-by-case investigation of these 
observations was carried out. By cross-referencing the in-work periods with the not-in- 
work periods, it was often obvious where mistakes in data entry had occurred (a total of 
373 cases). Indubitably, some consistent errors in the self-completion data remain 
undetected and form part of the measurement error associated with this type of work. It 
is obvious that the possibility of making an error in the self-completion section was 
more likely for those individuals that experienced many alternating labour force states. 
Where the possibility of making an error is greater for those individuals who have 
experienced transitions between different labour force states, there is the unfortunate 
result that this group may have reduced representation. This is a serious limitation in 
the use of this data set. 
For the remaining sample, a total work experience variable was computed that was the 
sum of each individual work spell across the entire history. All total spells exceeding 
the maximum possible potential work experience length at age 33 (that is those 
exceeding the value of age minus age left school), were removed. A similar exercise 
was performed to construct the total length of spell spent out of work. The NCDS 
comes complete with a variable which indicates the total number of jobs held by a 
cohort member by the year 1991. However, no such variable exists for the total number 
of non-work spells. We computed a tally by deriving which non-work end date was the 
latest. Having pinpointed the date of the last non-work spell, we were then in a position 
to calculate the total length of work time both before and after the associated spell. In 
order to ensure consistency of these before and after break work spell variables, we 
restricted our post-break work spell variable to be equal to the difference between the 
total work spell and the pre-break work spell, (following the recommendation of Brown 
and Light (1992)). Those women with no spells out of work were gathered into the pre- 
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break category. In a similar procedure, given the information on whether the job as full- 
or part-time, the total amount of full- and part-time work experience before and after a 
non-work spell were constructed. 
In the "Your Life" section of NCDS Sweep 5, individuals were asked to give 
information on their usual take home pay (after tax and other deductions, but including 
overtime and bonuses). They were subsequently asked to say for which time period this 
wage was paid and whether this was their usual hours for a typical week. From this, we 
have calculated the gross weekly and hourly wage variable and we indexed this to 
January 1992 prices to create the real variables used throughout study. ' In the pay data 
section, some cohort members may have recorded an incorrect wage or incorrect pay 
period. We remove all those earning less than 50 pence and greater than £150 an hour. 
The final sample of women who have complete information on wages, job history and 
other characteristics used in the analysis is around 4,700. 
The cohort member interview was designed to obtain in-depth information about both 
the individual's and their partner's jobs, unemployment, education and training, 
qualifications, cohabitation, children, housing, health, income and citizenship. The 
NCDS enables us to calculate the calendar time when events such as educational 
qualifications, birth and marriage occurred. This information is then used to provide the 
vector of characteristics of the women at the point of re-entry to work as used in Chapter 
7. 
One in three cohort member families was given a mother and child survey which 
consisted of an interview carried out with the mother figure and the child of the family. 
During the mother interview, questions on health and the schooling experience were 
aimed at the relevant female. In the child-orientated section of the mother interview, 
questions were geared to the all-round development of the child of the family. During 
the child interview, the interviewers carried out nine age-specific child assessments. 
Tests to assess the performance in reading, mathematics and English of the cohort 
member at the ages of seven and eleven were also been obtained in Sweeps 2 and 3. We 
use the results of these tests in Chapter 5. 
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To conclude, the NCDS data set provides the largest and probably the most detailed 
source of labour market history on a sample of British women. As such, it is a useful 
starting point to examine the issues in this thesis. 
3.3 British Household Panel Survey Data 
Chapter 6 uses the first five waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
covering the years 1991-95. This covers a period of recession in which unemployment 
peaked in 1993 followed by a period of recovery. The BHPS is a household-based panel 
survey consisting initially of some 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals drawn from 
250 different areas of Britain who are interviewed every autumn. To date, eight waves 
of the survey have taken place with the fieldwork for the data having been sub- 
contracted by the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change (at the University of 
Essex) to a research agency. When this thesis was written, only the first five waves were 
available. The geographical area for the survey incorporates areas of England and 
Wales and areas of Scotland south of the Caledonian Canal. The Postcode Address File 
was used to generate the sample, which coves all non-institutional residences. The 
continuing representativeness of the survey is ensured (and loss of panel members 
minimised) by following panel members wherever they move in the UK and including 
in the panel the new members of households formed by original panel members, (see 
Table 3.3). All children are interviewed when they reach the age of sixteen. 
The special nature of the BHPS lies in its development as a panel study, which enables 
researchers to analyse the dynamic effects of socio-economic changes. One of the 
closest cross-sectional data sets to the BHPS is the General Household Survey (see 
below), but in addition to the panel aspect, the BHPS is superior to the GHS in its 
incorporation of questions on intra-household decision-making and attitudinal values. 
However, the sample size of the BHPS has meant that the level of disaggregation has 
not been as extensive as some of the other national surveys. The questionnaire is split 
into five sections. Namely, the household composition component and the household, 
the individual, the self-completion and the proxy sections. We have used information 
derived from the individual questionnaire encompassed in the section entitled "Current 
All wage variables are deflated throughout this thesis as we carry out various longitudinal analyses. 
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Employment". This section asks about wages currently received and wages gained last 
year. Details on labour market status and other characteristics are recorded around a 
reference point of September Ist in each year along with wage data for every new spell 
in the 12 months between September last and the current interview date. In Wave 2 of 
the survey, a retrospective history of marriage (and cohabitation), fertility and 
employment transitions (in the "Employment History" section) were collected. Wave 3 
provided a more detailed lifetime job history which could have, in principle, been 
developed to provide a comprehensive work experience measure similar to the one we 
derived for the NCDS. However, our main aim in using the BHPS was to focus on the 
issue of labour market entrants and wage growth. Thus it was sufficient for our needs to 
pinpoint whether a woman had re-entered the labour market within the previous twelve 
months. 
In Chapter 6, we restrict our attention to employees and use average hourly wages 
including overtime as our wage measure. In the "Living in Britain" Individual 
Questionnaire of BHPS, individuals were asked to give information on their take-home 
pay (after tax, National Insurance, pensions and union dues) for the last time they were 
paid. They were subsequently asked to say for which time period this wage was paid 
and whether this was their usual take-home pay. From this, we have constructed hourly 
wages. These hourly wages were deflated using the average weekly earnings and 
weekly hours indices, so that the average wage on our measure should be constant over 
time. To be part of the computation of wages an individual must have been in 
employment either now or previously but the decomposition of average wages which we 
use also requires the availability of other information which further restricts our sample. 
The definition of part-time work was derived if the individual had a working week of 
less than 30 hours a week. In conclusion, we note that the overriding strength of the 
BHPS is its panel aspect, a point which we exploit fully in Chapter 6. 
3.4 General Household Survey 
The General Household Survey is now a biennial survey carried out in every month of 
the year by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, based on a sample of the 
population living in private (post-coded) households. 
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The Survey began in 1971 and, until 1996/97, it was carried out annually. It covers 
around 10,000 households. Each member aged 16 and over in the household is 
interviewed. The survey has around a 66 per cent response rate. Certain subjects are 
only covered from time to time and the GHS Annual Reports include a summary of the 
main topics covered for that year. The GHS is the only nationally representative data set 
which contains, amongst the other information that we require, wage data over a 
consecutive twenty-two year period. However, as with the BHPS, the earnings data 
sample is comparatively small, at around 8,000 men and women each year. 
The GHS provides us with the data necessary to estimate the potential entry wage of our 
sample of NCDS women between the years 1981' and 1991 in Chapter 7, and the entry 
wage pay gap in Chapter 6. Between 1979 and 1991, the GHS contained retrospective 
data on the individual's labour market status one year prior to sampling. A woman is 
pinpointed as an entrant if she was in work at the time of interview but she was not 
previously in work according to the retrospective question. This information is then 
matched to the women in the NCDS sample who are identified as returning to work 
after having time out. The GHS further served our need for an introductory overview of 
labour market developments in Chapter 2. As with both the NCDS and the BHPS, the 
wage variable was derived from the responses individuals gave on questions on their 
usual take home pay (after tax and other deductions but including overtime and 
bonuses). They were subsequently asked to say for which time period this wage was 
paid and whether this was their usual hours for a typical week. From this, we have 
calculated the gross weekly and hourly wage variable and indexed this to April 1998 
prices to create the real variables used in Chapter 2. The GHS was also used to generate 
information on part- and full-time earnings where the definition of part-time work was 
derived from a working week of less than 30 hours a week. 
3.5 Labour Force Survey 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) provides the most comprehensive source of labour 
market information in the UK. It is a nationally representative sample of around 60,000 





has been carried out on a quarterly basis since 1992 and households are kept in the 
survey for five consecutive quarters. There was no information on pay before 1992. 
Pay information is collected in the fifth (and last) wave of a household's participation. 
The very first interview takes place with an interviewer but subsequent interviews are 
usually carried out by telephone. 
Earnings information from the LFS are sometimes less accurate than employer-based 
information, such as the New Earnings Survey, especially where responses are obtained 
from proxy respondents (some 30 per cent of responses), but the LFS is much larger 
than any other corresponding British household data set. Hourly pay estimates from the 
LFS can only be derived from questions relating to the last usual pay amount and the 
relevant pay period. Workers in the low wage sectors who do not regularly receive a 
pay slip tend to understate pay levels and this limitation is exacerbated by the omission 
of any bonus payments in the LFS. Further, there exists disparities between employer 
and employee estimates of the number of hours worked. We use the LFS to provide the 
estimates of the change in the entrant shares amongst employees over time in Chapter 6. 
Here, entrants are defined, as with the GHS, on the basis of a retrospective labour 
market status question. 
3.6 New Earnings Survey 
The New Earnings Survey (NES) was conceived in 1970 with the objective of being the 
primary source of earnings information for employees in employment in the UK. The 
data is derived from employer payroll information for around 160,000 cases and the 
survey has been carried out in April of each year since 1970. The richness of the data 
set comes from its ability to provide information on fine degrees of occupational, 
industrial and regional breakdowns. 
The survey is based on a1 per cent sample of employees, where the sample is obtained 
from workers whose National Insurance (NI) number ends with a specific pair of digits. 
Around 90 per cent of the sample is identified by the Inland Revenue who are able to 
pinpoint the relevant employer once the NI number has been selected. Therefore, a 
condition of selection is that pay-as-you-earn records exist for the individuals. The rest 
of the sample is obtained straight from large employers who incorporate employees with 
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the relevant NI numbers in their organisation. This enables some workers to be 
included in the sample whose earnings are below the tax threshold. At the time of 
origin, part-time employment played a far less significant part in the UK labour market. 
However, the NES is known to be deficient in five main areas. First, small firms (less 
than 50 employees) are under-represented. Small businesses have a higher mortality 
rate than larger ones and this, coupled with the tendency to follow up non-response in 
firms with large number of employees, contributes to the lack of representativeness of 
the data. Second, the NES data provides only a small amount of demographic 
information. Third, there exists the obvious under-coverage of employees below the 
pay-as-you-earn thresholds. The bulk of those that are missed are workers in part-time 
employment. Fourth, workers who have recently moved jobs are far more likely to be 
omitted from the data. Chapter 6 focuses in part on this group of people and so this 
qualification should be borne in mind. Lastly, the use of hourly wages in the NES data 
can only occur if information is given on the hours of work for those who were present 
in the sampling period. For the most part, we use the NES to provide an insight into the 
behaviour of low-paid part-time men and women in contrast to their full-time 
counterparts, and there is some evidence that the former are under-represented in the 
NES. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion to this Chapter on data, we note that access to these data sets has been 
facilitated by the existence of the national on-line service at Manchester University and 
the increased flexibility of new software packages such as STATA© on which most of 
the subsequent analysis was undertaken. Finally, we note that Table 3.4 summarises the 
use of the various data sets in this thesis, along with their major advantages for our 
purposes. 
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Age Birth 7 11 16 20 23 33 
Target 17 733 16 883 16 835 16 915 16 906 16 457 15 600 
sample 
Source of Parents Parents Parents Parents 
information School School School School 
tests Tests Tests 
Medical Medical Medical Medical 
Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort 
member member member member 
Census Census Partner 
Children 
Actual sample 17 414 15 468 15 503 14 761 14 370 12 537 11 400 
Source: NCDS5: A Brief Outline by the Social Statistics Research Unit (1995) City University 
Table 3.2 NCDS Sweep 5 Response Rates 
Survey instrument Target Traced Obtained Percentage 
response 
rate 
Cohort Member 15 666 13 444 11 407 85 
Interview 
Cohort Member 15 666 13 444 11 175 83 
Your Life Section 
Cohort Member 15 666 13 444 10 898 81 
What Do You Think 
Section 
Partner Interview 9 138 7 126 82 
Your Life 
Mother Interview 2 556 2 524 99 
Mother Interview 5 067 5 012 99 
Your Child Section 
Child Interview 3 575 3 467 97 
Tests Section 
Source: Social Statistics Research Unit (1995) 
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Table 3.3 British Household Panel Survey Sample Sizes 
Wave One Two Three Four Five Six Seven 
Number of full /proxy 
/telephone interviews 
Number of households 
Wave on wave re- 
interview rate (%) 
10,264 9,845 9,600 9,481 9,249 9,440 9,373 
5,538 5,227 5,228 5,125 5,034 5,066 5,025 
NA 87.7 90.3 94.9 94.8 97.6 97.4 
Note: Wave 7 was subjected to the addition of 950 households drawn from the European Community 
Household Panel which took the number of co-operating households to 5,975. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of Survey Data Sets 









sample size prevents 
disaggregated analysis. 
Only available since 
1991. 
Estimation of the 
dynamics of the pay 
gaps in Chapter 6 
Detailed source of 
labour market history 
Detailed background 





on individuals over 
longest consecutive 
period of time 
Much larger than any 
other British household 
data set. Detailed 
information on 
individual and firm 
characteristics 
Panel element since 
1992 
Large sample 
Much finer level of 
disaggregation 
Job history data 
required much cleaning 
Cohort data set 
Relatively small 
sample size 
Less information on 
workers' characteristics 
Earnings data self- 
reported and less 
accurate than 
employer-based data 
such as the NES 
Wage equations in 
Chapter 5 
Survival analysis in 
Chapter 7 
Overview of labour 
market in Chapter 2 
Entry wage pay gap in 
Chapter 6 
Potential entry wage in 
Chapter 7 
Change in entrant 
shares in Chapter 6 
Under-representative of Long run wage growth 
small firms in Chapter 6 




workers who earn less 






Example of Part of the Data Cleaning Process 
************************************** 
This deals with quirky job*spells 
before they become totspells 
************************************** 
*1 
replace jlOmfi_5=6 if serial=="093238M" 
replace njlyfi_5=91 if serial=="093238M" 
replace njlyst_5=91 if serial=="093238M" 
replace njlmst_5=6 if serial=="093238M" 
replace nj2mst_5=. if serial=="093238M" 
replace nj2yst_5=. if serial=="093238M" 
replace nj2mfi_5=. if serial=="093238M" 
replace nj2yfi_5=. if serial=="093238M" 

























replace nj3mfi_5=8 if serial=="149001L" 
replace nj4yfi_5=88 if serial=="200098N" 
replace nj6yfi_5=83 if serial=="287141A" 
replace njlmfi_5=7 if serial=="330024J" 
replace jimfi_5=10 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace jlyfi_5=76 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace j2mst_5=6 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace j2yst_5=80 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace j2mfi_5=6 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace j2yfi_5=84 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace j3mfi_5=3 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace j3yfi_5=85 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace j6yfi_5=91 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace nj3mst_5=6 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace nj3mfi_5=10 if serial=="423032Z" 
replace nj4mfi_5=11 if serial=="481031A" 
replace nj2yst_5=90 if serial=="500487X" 
replace nj4mst_5=3 if serial=="550323X" 
replace nj3yfi_5=81 if serial=="565061B" 
replace nj2mst_5=9 if serial=="620138R" 
replace nj2yfi_5=82 if serial=="620138R" 
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replace njlyfi_5=75 if serial=="740022R" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="740022R" 
replace j5mfi_5=7 if serial=="740022R" 
replace njlyfi_5=88 if serial=="750140D" 
replace njlyst_5=74 if serial=="982062F" 
replace j4yst_5=88 if serial=="985045X" 
replace njlyst_5=86 if serial=="985045X" 
replace njlyfi_5=88 if serial=="985045X" 
replace njlyst_5=74 if serial=="987074R" 
replace njlyfi_5=91 if serial=="987074R" 
replace nj4yfi_5=91 if serial=="X67013W" 
replace nj7mfi_5=8 if serial=="X80054M" 
replace jlmfi_5=12 if serial=="050070F" 
replace nj2yfi_5=83 if serial=="093257R" 
replace j6mfi_5=6 if serial=="514155Y" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace jimfi_5=8 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j2mst_5=8 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j2yst_5=73 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j2mfi_5=1 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j6yst_5=82 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j6yfi5=84 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j7yfi_5=86 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j8yst_5=86 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j8yfi_5=88 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j9yst_5=88 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j9yfi_5=90 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace jlOyst_5=90 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace jlOyfi_5=91 if serial=="581010Z" 
replace j7yst_5=84 if serial=="581010Z" 
and so on. 
*************************************** 
THIS PART DEALS WITH QUIRKY NO JOB* SPELLS 
*************************************** 
replace njlyfi_5=75 if serial=="0480275" 
replace jlyst_5=75 if serial=="087006D" 
replace njlyfi_5=75 if serial=="087006D" 
replace j2yfi_5=90 if serial=="1101705" 
replace j3yfi_5=90 if serial=="110170S" 
replace njimst_5=2 if serial=="110170S" 
replace njlyfi_5=82 if serial=="384013H" 
replace nj2yst_5=82 if serial=="384013H" 


















































































replace nj5yfi_5=90 if serial=="041006V" 
and so on. 
1* 
******************************************** 
This deals with months and year missings 
******************************************** 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="010183U" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="046024Z" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="083054U" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="088019U" 
replace j2yst_5=73 if serial=="088019U" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="092110C" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="120106? " 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="130005? " 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="181022B" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="182047Z" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="187028X" 
replace j3mfi_5=6 if serial=="187028X" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="200046S" 
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replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="213006B" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="220003L" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="230017D" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="280031E" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="284020W" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="380013L" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="381099E" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="384024N" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="400051Z" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="422049N" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="465018T" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="511036Y" 
replace jlmfi_5=1 if serial=="228003D" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="228003D" 
replace jlmst_5=6 if serial=="228003D" 
replace j3mfi_5=6 if serial=="228003D" 
replace jlmfi_5=6 if serial=="450009J" 
replace jlmst_5=6 if serial=="510167K" 
replace jlyst_5=73 if serial=="510167K" 
replace jlmfi_5=12 if serial=="510167K" 
replace jlmst_5=6 if serial=="513127N" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="513127N" 
replace jlmfi_5=1 if serial=="513127N" 
replace jlyfi_5=79 if serial=="092283M" 
replace jlyst_5=74 if serial=="092283M" 
replace j2yst_5=79 if serial=="092283M" 
replace j2yst_5=90 if serial=="211011J" 
replace jlmfi_5=11 if serial=="431026A" 
replace jlyfi_5=79 if serial=="431026A" 
replace j2mst_5=2 if serial=="431026A" 
replace j2yst_5=80 if serial=="431026A" 
replace j3mfi_5=6 if serial=="047026K" 
replace j3mfi5=6 if serial=="055065R" 
replace j3mfi_5=6 if serial=="280054T" 




















































This deals more quirky totspells and splits tot and out into parts 
0 
gen uout=l if njlun_5>0 & njlun_5-=.; 
J 
replace uout=0 if njlun_5==0 I njlun_5==.; 
lab var uout "unemployed out dummy" 
replace stayers=0 if uout==1 
replace njl_5=0 if njl_5==. ; 
replace nj2l=O if njl_5-=. & nj2l==. 
gen preout=totspell-postosp if totspell-=. & postosp-=.; 
replace preout=0 if totspell==0 
g preout22=preout*preout 
gen ggrsswk4=N4269*365/52 if N4267==1; 
replace ggrsswk4=N4269 if N4267==2; 
replace ggrsswk4=N4269*26/52 if N4267==3; 
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replace ggrsswk4=N4269*12/52 if N4267==4; 
replace ggrsswk4=N4269*4/52 if N4267==5; 
replace ggrsswk4=N4269*2/52 if N4267==6; 
replace ggrsswk4=N4269/52 if N4267==7; 
lab var ggrsswk4 "Gross weekly cur pay wave 4"; 
g rw4=ggrsswk4/rpis4; 
replace rw4=. if rw4<5; 
replace rw4=. if rw4>10000 & rw4-=.; 
g rhw4=rw4/hours4; 
replace rhw4=. if hours4==99; 
gen ggrsswk5=N500543 if N500549==l; 
replace ggrsswk5=N500543*26/52 if N500549==2; 
replace ggrsswk5=N500543*13/52 if N500549==3; 
replace ggrsswk5=N500543*12/52 if N500549==4; 
replace ggrsswk5=N500543/52 if N500549==5; 
lab var ggrsswk5 "Gross weekly cur pay wave 5"; 
g rw5=ggrsswk5/rpi92; 
replace rw5=. if rw5<5; 
replace rw5=. if rw5>10000 & rw5-=.; 
g rhw5=rw5/hrsc_5; 
g pweek5=gypayc_5/52 /* converts annual gross into weekly gross 
g rw5=pweek5/rpi92 /* converts weekly into real weekly jan 92 prices 
g rhw5=rw5/hrsc_5 /* hourly pay */; 
g rw4=rhw4*hours4 ; 
lab var rw4 "real gross weekly pay wave 4 "; 
gen logw5=log(rhw5) 
label var logw5 "Log hourly real wage wave5" ; 
/* drop outliers */ 
drop if rhw5>200 & rhw5-=.; 
drop if totspell>20 & totspell-=.; 
gen exp2=totspell*totspell 
lab var exp2 "Experience squared" 
gen preout2=preoutsp*preoutsp 
lab var preout2 "Preout squared" 
gen postosp2=postosp*postosp 
lab var postosp2 "Postout squared" 
/* sort out odd totspells on case by case inspection*/ 
replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell if totspell==0 & jlspell==. & 
j2spell-=. &j3spell-=.; 
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replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell+j4spel1 if totspell==O & jlspell==. & 
j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell-=.; 
replace totspell=j4spell+j5spell+j6spel1 if totspell==0 & jlspell==. & 
j6spell-=. &j5spell-=. &j4spell-. =.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spel1 
+j7spell+j8spell+j9spell+jlOspell+jllspell+jl2spel1 
if totspell==O & jnall_5>12 & jnall_5-=. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell-=. & jlspell-=. &j5spell-=. &j6spell-=. 
& j7spell-=. &j8spell-=. &j9spell-=. 
& jlOspell-=. &jllspell-=. &jl2spell-=.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spell 
+j7spell+j8spell+j9spell+j10spell+jllspell+jl2spell 
if totspell==O & jnall_5==. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-= &j4spe11-=. & jlspell-=. &j5spell-=. &j6spell-=. 
& j7spell-=. &j8spell-=. &j9spell-=. 
& jlOspell-=. &jllspell'-=. &jl2spell- =.; 
replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spel1 
+j7spell+j8spell+j9spell 
if totspell==O & jlspell==. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell-. =. &j5spell-=. &j6spell-=. 
& j7spell-=. &j8spell-=. &j9spell-=.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spel1 
+j7spell+j8spell+j9spell 
if totspell==0 & jlspell-=. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell-=. &j5spell-=. &j6spell-=. 
& j7spell-=. &j8spell-=. &j9spell-=. & jnall_5==.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spel1 
+j7spell 
if totspell==O & jlspell-=. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell--=. &j5spell-=. &j6spell-=. 
& jnall_5==8 & j7spell==.; 
replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spell 
+j7spell+j8spell 
if totspell==O & jlspell==. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell-=. &j5spell-=. &j6spell-=. 
& j7spell-=. &j8spell-=.; 
replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell+jlspell if totspell==O & j4spell==. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &jlspell-=.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell if totspell==O & j3spell==. 
& jlspell-=. &j2spell- .; 
replace totspell=j5spell if totspell==O & jlspell==. 
& j5spell-=.; 
replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spel1 if 
totspell==O & jlspell==. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell-=. & j5spell-=. &j6spell-=.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spel1 if 
totspell==O & jlspell-=. 
& j2spell-=. &j3spe11-=. &j4spell-=. & j5spel1-=. &j6spel1==.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spe11 if 
totspell==O & jnall_5==12 
& jlspell-=. &j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. & j4spell-=. &j5spe11. =. &j6spell-=.; 
replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spe11 if totspell==0 & 
jlspell==. 
& j2spel1-=. &j3spell-=. & j4spell-=. &j5spell-=.; 
replace totspell=j2spell if totspell==O & jlspell==. & j2spell- .; 
replace totspell=jlspell if totspell==O & j2spell==. & jlspell-=.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spe11 if 
totspell==0 & j6spell==. 
& jlspell-=. &j2spell--. &j3spell-=. & j4spell-=. &j5spel1. =.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spe11 if totspell==0 & 
j5spell==. 
41 
& j2spell-=. &j3spell-=. &j4spell-=. &jlspell-. =.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spell 
+j7spell+j8spell+j9spell+jlOspell 
if totspell==O & jllspell==. 
& jlspell-=. & j2spell-=. &j3spell--=. &j4spell-=. &j5spell-=. &j6spell-=. 
& j7spel1-=. &j8spe11-=. &j9spell-=. & jlOspell-=.; 
replace totspell=jlspell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spell+j7spell if 
serial=="986137J"; 





+jlOspell+jllspell if serial=="380064D"; 
replace totspell=j2spell+j4spell+j5spell if serial=="513128Q"; 
















+jlOspell+jllspell+jl2spell if serial=="Y30233N"; 
replace totspell=j2spell+j3spell+j4spell+j5spell+j6spell+j7spel1 







/* fix up out spells replace start month with interview month if 
missing (random month assignment)*/ 
log using fixup. log, replace ; 
replace njlmst=intmth_5 if njlmst==O; 
replace nj2mst=intmth_5 if nj2mst==0; 
replace nj3mst=intmth_5 if nj3mst==0; 
replace nj4mst=intmth_5 if nj4mst==O; 
replace nj5mst=intmth_5 if nj5mst==0; 
replace nj6mst=intmth_5 if nj6mst==O; 
replace nj7mst=intmth_5 if nj7mst==0; 
replace nj8mst=intmth_5 if nj8mst==0; 
replace nj9mst=intmth_5 if nj9mst==O; 
replace njlümst=intmth_5 if njlOmst==O; 
replace njilmst=intmth_5 if njllmst==O; 
replace njl2mst=intmth_5 if njl2mst==0; 
replace njlmfi-intmth_5 if njlmfi==0; 
replace nj2mfi=intmth_5 if nj2mfi==0; 
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replace nj3mfi=intmth5 if nj3mfi==O; 
replace nj4mfi=intmth5 if nj4mfi==0; 
replace nj5mfi=intmth5 if nj5mfi==O; 
replace nj6mfi=intmth_5 if nj6mfi==O; 
replace nj7mfi=intmth5 if nj7mfi==O; 
replace nj8mfi=intmth__5 if nj8mfi==O; 
replace nj9mfi=intmth_5 if nj9mfi==0; 
replace njlOmfi=intmth5 if njlOmfi==O; 
replace njllmfi=intmth_5 if njllmfi==0; 
replace njl2mfi=intmth_5 if njl2mfi==O; 
replace njlyst=91 if njlyst==O; 
replace nj2yst=91 if nj2yst==O; 
replace nj3yst=91 if nj3yst==O; 
replace nj4yst=91 if nj4yst==O; 
replace nj5yst=91 if nj5yst==0; 
replace nj6yst=91 if nj6yst==O; 
replace nj7yst=91 if nj7yst==O; 
replace nj8yst=91 if nj8yst==0; 
replace nj9yst=91 if nj9yst==O; 
replace njlOyst=91 if njlOyst==0; 
replace njllyst=91 if njllyst==O; 
replace njl2yst=91 if njl2yst==O; 
replace njlyfi=91 if njlyfi==O; 
replace nj2yfi=91 if nj2yfi==O; 
replace nj3yfi=91 if nj3yfi==O; 
replace nj4yfi=91 if nj4yfi==O; 
replace nj5yfi=91 if nj5yfi==O; 
replace nj6yfi=91 if nj6yfi==O; 
replace nj7yfi=91 if nj7yfi==O; 
replace nj8yfi=91 if nj8yfi==0; 
replace nj9yfi=91 if nj9yfi==0; 
replace njlOyfi=91 if njlOyfi==0; 
replace njllyfi=91 if njllyfi==0; 
replace njl2yfi=91 if njl2yfi==O; 
replace njl2spel=(njl2yfi_+njl2mfi _/12)-(njl2yst _+njl2mst_/12) 
if 
njl2yst_-=. 
& njl2yfi_-=. & njl2spel==. & njl2int-= .& njl2int>O; 
replace nj11spel=(njllyfi_+njllmfi _/12)-(njllyst _+njllmst_/12) 
if 
njllyst_-=. 
& njllyfi_-=. & njllspel==. & njllint-=. & njllint>o; 
replace njlOspel=(njlOyfi_+njlOmfi _/12)-(njlOyst _+njlOmst_/12) 
if 
njlOyst_-=. 
& njlOyfi_-=. & njlOspel==. & njlOint-=. & njlOint>0; 
replace nj9spell=(nj9yfi_5+nj9mfi_ 5/12)-(nj9yst_ 5+nj9mst_5/12) if 
nj9yst_5-=. 
& nj9yfi_5-=. & nj9spell==. & nj9int-=. & nj9int>O; 
replace nj8spell=(nj8yfi_5+nj8mfi_ 5/12)-(nj8yst_ 5+nj8mst_5/12) if 
nj8yst_5-=. 
& nj8yfi_5-=. & nj8spell =. & nj8int-=. & nj8int>O; 
replace nj7spell=(nj7yfi_5+nj7mfi_ 5/12)-(nj7yst_ 5+nj7mst_5/12) if 
nj7yst_5-=. 
& nj7yfi_5-. & nj7spell==. & nj7int-=. & nj7int>0; 
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replace nj6spell=(nj6yfi_5+nj6mfi_5/12)-(nj6yst_5+nj6mst 5/12) if 
nj6yst_5-=. 
& nj6yfi_5-=. & nj6spell==. & nj6int-=. & nj6int>O; 
replace nj5spell=(nj5yfi_5+nj5mfi_5/12)-(nj5yst_5+nj5mst_5/12) if 
nj5yst_5-=. 
& nj5yfi_5-=. & nj5spell==. & nj5int-=. & nj5int>O; 
replace nj4spell=(nj4yfi_5+nj4mfi_5/12)-(nj4yst 5+nj4mst_5/12) if 
nj4yst_5-=. 
& nj4yfi_5-=. & nj4spell==. & nj4int-=. & nj4int>O; 
replace nj3spell=(nj3yfi_5+nj3mfi 5/12)-(nj3yst_5+nj3mst 5/12) if 
nj3yst_5-=. 
& nj3yfi_5-=. & nj3spell==. & nj3int-=. & nj3int>O; 
replace nj2spell=(nj2yfi_5+nj2mfi 5/12)-(nj2yst_5+nj2mst 5/12) if 
nj2yst_5-=. 
& nj2yfi_5-=. & nj2spell==. & nj2int-=. & nj2int>O; 
replace njlspell=(njlyfi_5+njlmfi_5/12)-(njlyst_5+njlmst_5/12) if 
njlyst_5-=. 
& njlyfi_5-=. & njlspell==. & njlint-=. & njlint>0; 
log close; 
/* fix up outliers */ 
replace njno_5=2 if serial=="Y30202A"; 
replace njlspell=(njlyfi_5+njlmfi_5/12)-(njlyst 5+njlmst 5/12) if 
serial=="Y30202A"; 
replace nj2spell=(nj2yfi_5+nj2mfi_5/12)-(nj2yst_5+nj2mst_5/12) if 
serial=="Y30202A"; 
replace njl_5=nj2spell if serial=="Y30202A"; 
replace njlspell=0.083 if serial=="Y00290F11; 
replace nj2spell=0.083 if serial=="093239P"; 
replace njlspell=0.166 if serial=="550141R"; 
replace nj2spell=0.083 if serial=="093240X"; 
replace nj2spell=0.083 if serial=="425038Y"; 
replace njno_5=6 if serial=="092121)"; 
replace njlspell=(njlyfi_5+njlmfi_5/12)-(njlyst 5+njlmst_5/12) if 
serial=="YO101OB"; 
replace njl_5=njlspell if serial=="YOlOlOB"; 
replace njno_5=1 if serial=="610026X"; 
replace njlspell=(njlyfi_5+njlmfi_5/12)-(njlyst 5+njlmst_5/12) if 
serial=="610026X"; 
replace njl_5=njlspell if serial=="610026X"; 
g outspell=O if njlspell==.; 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell+nj5spell+nj6spell 
+nj7spel1+nj8spell+nj9spell+njlOspel+njllspel+njl2spel if njno_5==12; 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell+nj5spell+nj6spell 
+nj7spell+nj8spell+nj9spell+njlOspel+njllspel if njno_5==11; 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell+nj5spell+nj6spell 
+nj7spell+nj8spell+nj9spell+njlOspel if njno5==10; 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell+nj5spell+nj6spell 
+nj7spell+nj8spell+nj9spell if njno_5==9; 
replace outspell-njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell+nj5spell+nj6spell 
+nj7spell+nj8spell if njno_5==8; 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell+nj5spell+nj6spell 
44 









replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell if njno_5==2; 
replace outspell=njlspell if njno_5==l; 
/* fix up those with incomplete njspell info */ 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell if njno_5==. 
& njlspell-=. &nj2spell-=. &nj3spell-=. &nj4spell-=. &outspell==.; 
replace outspell=nj6spell+nj5spell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell if 
njno_5==6 
&nj6spell-=. & nj5spell-=. &nj2spell-=. &nj3spell-=. &nj4spell-=. & 




&nj6spell-=. & nj5spell-=. &nj2spell-=. &nj3spell-=. &nj4spell-=. & 
&nj7spell-=. & nj8spell-=. &nj9spell-=. &njlOspel-=. & 




&nj6spell-=. & nj5spell-=. &nj2spell-=. &nj3spell. =. &nj4spell. =. & 
&nj7spell-=. & nj8spell-=. &nj9spell-=. &njlüspel-=. &njllspel & 
njlspell==. & outspell==.; 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell+nj3spell+nj4spell if njno_5==5 
&njlspell-=. &nj2spell-=. &nj3spell-=. &nj4spell-=. & 
nj5spell==. & outspell==.; 
replace outspell=nj2spell if njno_5==2 
& njlspell==. & outspell==.; 
replace outspell=njlspell+nj2spell if njno_5==3 
& njlspell-=. & outspell==.; 
replace outspell=njlspell if njno_5==2 
& nj2spell==. & outspell==. & serial-="500231K"; 
replace nj9spell=(91+(intmth_5/12))-jlfidat if serial=="683079H"; 
replace outspell-njlspell+nj5spell+nj6spell+nj8spell+nj9spel1 if 
serial=="683079H"; 
g out2=outspell*outspell; 
/* to create actual experience by ft/pt status 
replace j4spell=. 083 if -. l<=j4spell & j4spell<O; 
g ftspell=0; 
g ftspelll=jlspell if jlft-=l & jlee==1 ; 
45 
replace ftspelll=O if ftspelll==.; 
g ftspell2=j2spell if j2ft==l & j2ee==l 
replace ftspell2=0 if ftspell2==.; 
g ftspell3=j3spell if j3ft==1 & j3ee==1 
replace ftspell3=0 if ftspell3==.; 
g ftspell4=j4spell if j4ft==l & j4ee==1 ; 
replace ftspell4=0 if ftspell4==.; 
g ftspell5=j5spell if j5ft==l & j5ee==l 
replace ftspell5=0 if ftspell5==.; 
g ftspell6=j6spell if j6ft==1 & j6ee==1 ; 
replace ftspell6=0 if ftspell6==.; 
g ftspell7=j7spell if j7ft==l & j7ee==l 
replace ftspell7=0 if ftspell7==.; 
g ftspell8=j8spell if j8ft==1 & j8ee==1 
replace ftspell8=0 if ftspell8==.; 
g ftspell9=j9spell if j9ft==1 & j9ee==1 ; 
replace ftspell9=0 if ftspell9==.; 
g ftsplllO=jlOspell if j10ft==l & jlOee==l 
replace ftsplllO=O if ftsplllO==.; 
g ftspllll=jllspell if j11ft==1 & jllee==l 
replace ftspllll=O if ftspllll==.; 
g ftsplll2=jl2spell if j12ft==l & jl2ee==l 






























replace ftspell=totspell if ftspell>totspell & ftspell'-=. & 
totspell-=.; 
/* now define part-time work exp 
g ptspell=0; 
g ptspelll=jlspell if jlft==0 & jlee==1 ; 
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replace ptspelll=O if ptspelll==.; 
g ptspell2=j2spell if j2ft==O & j2ee==1 
replace ptspell2=0 if ptspell2==.; 
g ptspell3=j3spell if j3ft==O & j3ee==l ; 
replace ptspell3=0 if ptspell3==.; 
g ptspell4=j4spell if j4ft==O & j4ee==l 
replace ptspell4=0 if ptspell4==.; 
g ptspell5=j5spell if j5ft==O & j5ee==1 
replace ptspell5=0 if ptspell5==.; 
g ptspell6=j6spell if j6ft==0 & j6ee==l ; 
replace ptspell6=0 if ptspell6==.; 
g ptspell7=j7spell if j7ft==O & j7ee==l ; 
replace ptspell7=0 if ptspell7==.; 
g ptspell8=j8spell if j8ft==0 & j8ee==1 
replace ptspell8=0 if ptspell8==.; 
g ptspell9=j9spell if j9ft==0 & j9ee==l 
replace ptspell9=0 if ptspell9==.; 
g ptspll10=jlOspell if j10ft==0 & jlOee==l 
replace ptsplllO=O if ptsplllO==.; 
g ptspllll=jllspell if jllft==0 & jllee==l 
replace ptspllll=O if ptspllll==.; 
g ptsplll2=jl2spell if jl2ft==0 & jl2ee==l 




g ptspell=totspell-ftspell ; 
replace ptspell=0 if ptspell<O; 
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g nl2ot=njl2int==O I njl2int==2; 
/* total unemp experience 
g nuspell=O; 
g nuspelll=njlspell if nlun==l 
replace nuspelll=O if nuspelll==.; 
g nuspell2=nj2spell if n2un==1 ; 
replace nuspell2=0 if nuspell2==.; 
g nuspell3=nj3spell if n3un==1 ; 
replace nuspell3=0 if nuspell3==.; 
g nuspell4=nj4spell if n4un==1 ; 
replace nuspell4=0 if nuspell4==.; 
g nuspell5=nj5spell if n5un==1 ; 
replace nuspell5=0 if nuspell5==.; 
g nuspell6=nj6spell if n6un==l ; 
replace nuspell6=0 if nuspell6==.; 
g nuspell7=nj7spell if n7un==l ; 
replace nuspell7=0 if nuspell7==.; 
g nuspell8=nj8spell if n8un==1 ; 
replace nuspell8=0 if nuspell8==.; 
g nuspell9=nj9spell if n9un==l ; 
replace nuspell9=0 if nuspell9==.; 
g nusplllO=nj10spel if n10un==1 ; 
replace nusplllO=0 if nusplllO==.; 
g nusplll1=nji1spel if nllun==1 ; 
replace nuspllll O if nuspllll==.; 
g nusplll2=njl2spel if nl2un==1 ; 




/* total child experience 
g ncspell=O; 
g ncspelll=njlspell if nlch==1 
replace ncspelll=O if ncspelll==.; 
g ncspell2=nj2spell if n2ch==1 ; 
replace ncspell2=0 if ncspell2==.; 
g ncspell3=nj3spell if n3ch==l ; 
replace ncspell3=0 if ncspell3==.; 
g ncspell4=nj4spell if n4ch==1 ; 
replace ncspell4=0 if ncspell4==.; 
g ncspell5=nj5spell if n5ch==l ; 
replace ncspell5=0 if ncspell5==.; 
g ncspell6=nj6spell if n6ch==1 ; 
replace ncspell6=0 if ncspell6==.; 
g ncspell7=nj7spell if n7ch==l ; 
replace ncspell7=0 if ncspell7==.; 
g ncspell8=nj8spell if n8ch==1 ; 
replace ncspell8=0 if ncspell8==.; 
g ncspell9=nj9spell if n9ch==1 ; 
replace ncspell9=0 if ncspell9==.; 
g ncsplllO=njlOspel if nlOch==1 ; 
replace ncsplllO=O if ncsplllO==.; 
g ncspllll=njllspel if nllch==1 ; 
replace ncspllll=O if ncspllll==.; 
g ncsplll2=njl2spel if nl2ch==1 ; 




/* total ed experience 
g nespell=0; 
g nespelll=njlspell if nled==1 
replace nespelll=O if nespelll==.; 
g nespell2=nj2spell if n2ed==1 ; 
replace nespell2=0 if nespell2==.; 
g nespell3=nj3spell if n3ed==l ; 
replace nespell3=0 if nespell3==.; 
g nespell4=nj4spell if n4ed==1 ; 
replace nespell4=0 if nespell4==.; 
g nespell5=nj5spell if n5ed==l ; 
replace nespell5=0 if nespell5==.; 
g nespell6=nj6spell if n6ed==1 ; 
replace nespell6=0 if nespell6==.; 
g nespell7=nj7spell if n7ed==l ; 
replace nespell7=0 if nespell7==.; 
g nespell8=nj8spell if n8ed==l ; 
replace nespell8=0 if nespell8==.; 
g nespell9=nj9spell if n9ed==l ; 
replace nespell9=0 if nespell9==.; 
g nesplllO=njlOspel if nlOed==1 ; 
replace nesplllO O if nespll10==,; 
g nespllll=njilspel if nlled==l ; 
replace nespllll=0 if nespllll==,; 
g nesplll2=njl2spel if nl2ed==l ; 





































if n5ot==1 ; 
if nospell5==.; 




if n8ot==1 ; 
if nospell8==.; 
if n9ot==1 ; 
if nospell9==.; 
if nlOot==1 ; 
if nosplllO==.; 
if nllot==1 ; 
if nospllll==.; 
if nl2ot==1 ; 
if nosp1112==.; 
/* other out experience */ 
g nospell=outspell-nespell-ncspell-nuspell; 
drop if totspell>20 & totspell-=.; 
drop if outspell>20 & outspell-=.; 
g neverout=outspe11==0 ; 
g neverin=totspe11==0 ; 
g nlfdat=(njlyfi_5 +(njlmfi_5/12) 
g n2sdat=(nj2yst_5 +(nj2mst_5/12) ); 
g n2fdat=(nj2yfi_5 +(nj2mfi_5/12) ); 
g n3sdat=(nj3yst_5 +(nj3mst_5/12) ); 
g oneout=njispe11-=0 & ((njlspell-=. 
& nj2spe11-=0 & n2sdat-=. )); 
g twoout=njlspell-=0 & njlspell-=. & 
n2sdat-=nlfdat; 
g throut=njlspe11-=0 & njlspell-=. & 
nj3spell-=0 & nj3spe11-=. 
& n2sdat-=nlfdat & n3sdat-=nlfdat & 
& nj2spell==. ) I (n2sdat==nlfdat 
nj2spe11-=0 & nj2spell-=. & 
nj2spe11-=0 & nj2spell- .& 
n2sdat-=.; 
/* aligns preoutSP for all those with non zero post and pre 
replace preoutsp=totsp-postosp if (preoutsp+postosp<totspell) 
& (preoutsp>O & postosp>O & totspell-=. & totspell-. =0); 
replace postosp=(91+(intmth_5/12))-njlfidat if postosp==0 & totspell>O 
& totspell-=.; 
replace postosp=totspell if postosp>totspell & postosp-=. & 
totspell-=. & totspell>O; 
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replace preoutsp=totspell-postosp if preoutsp==O & totspell>O & 
totspell-=. & njno>O & njno-=.; 
replace preoutsp=totspell if durtype==l; /* continuous pre=totspell 
replace postosp=O if durtype==1; 
replace postosp2=0 if durtype==l; 
replace preoutsp=totspell-postosp if serial=="287035B"; 
replace outspell=(91+(intmth_5/12))-jlfidat if outspell==O & 5<=lfstc 
& lfstc<99; 
/* now try for post ft and post pt */ 
g postft=ftspelll+ftspell2+ftspell3+ftspell4+ftspell5+ftspell6 
+ftspell7+ftspell8+ftspell9+ftsplllO+ftspllll+ftsp1112 
if jlft==l & jlee==l & jlst_5>=njlfidat & jlst-=.; 
replace postft=ftspell2+ftspell3+ftspell4+ftspell5+ftspell6 
+ftspell7+ftspell8+ftspell9+ftsplllO+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j2ft==l & j2ee==l & j2st_5>=njlfidat & j2st_5-. =. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell3+ftspell4+ftspell5+ftspell6 
+ftspell7+ftspell8+ftspell9+ftsplll0+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j3ft==l & j3ee==l & j3st_5>=njlfidat & j3st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell4+ftspell5+ftspell6 
+ftspell7+ftspell8+ftspell9+ftsplllO+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j4ft==l & j4ee==1 & j4st_5>=njlfidat & j4st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell5+ftspell6 
+ftspell7+ftspell8+ftspell9+ftsplllO+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j5ft==l & j5ee==l & j5st_5>=njlfidat & j5st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell6 
+ftspell7+ftspell8+ftspell9+ftsplllO+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j6ft==l & j6ee==l & j6st_5>=njlfidat & j6st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell7+ftspell8+ftspell9+ftspll10+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j7ft==l & j7ee==l & j7st_5>=njlfidat & j7st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell8+ftspell9+ftspll10+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j8ft==l & j8ee==l & j8st_5>=njlfidat & j8st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell9+ftsplllO+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j9ft==l & j9ee==l & j9st_5>=njlfidat & j9st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftsp1110+ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if j10ft==l & j10ee==l & jlOst_5>=njlfidat & j10st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspllll+ftsplll2 
if jllft==l & jllee==l & jllst_5>=njlfidat & jllst-. =. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftsplll2 
if jl2ft==l & jl2ee==l & jl2st_5>=njlfidat & jl2st-=. & postft==.; 
replace postft=ftspell2+ftspell3+ftspell4 if serial=="287035B"; 
replace postft=O if outspell==O I neverout==l; 
replace postft=0 if Postft==. & ftspell-. =.; 
replace postft=. if totspell==O; 
g postpt=postosp-postft; 
replace postpt=0 if postosp<=0; 
replace postpt=0.083 if -0.1<postpt & postpt<0; 
replace postpt=00 if ptspell==0; 
g preft=ftspell-postft; 
replace preft=0 if ftspell==O; 
g prept=ptspell-postet; 
replace prept=0 if ptspell==O; 
replace prept=0 if prept<O; 
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Chapter 4 
Literature Review of the Theories of Human Capital and Labour Supply 
4.1 Introduction 
The fact that women have been more likely to interrupt their work careers than men is well 
known (see, for example, Becker (1965) or Mincer (1974)). The reasons why this has come 
to pass has largely been ascribed to the various physiological and biological characteristics 
of women associated with the birth and rearing of children and to arguments centred upon 
the sexual division of labour. However, following the increase in female labour market 
participation after the Second World War, especially in part-time working (see Hakim 
(1993), and Chapter 2), it has become far more usual to witness continuous female 
employment throughout the childrearing years. Some women, however, do continue to 
have breaks in employment and some women have longer periods out of work than others. 
It is interesting, therefore, to investigate whether the time spent out of work or the length of 
time spent out of work affects subsequent earnings. This Chapter discusses the main 
theoretical and empirical work relating to this thesis. The first section deals with the 
evolution of human capital theory and earnings determination, Section 4.3 deals with the 
interaction of human capital theory and labour supply, while Section 4.4 looks at the 
literature that deals explicitly with the effects of intermittent participation in work and 
subsequent effects on earnings. Section 4.5 concludes by setting the scene for our own 
analysis in subsequent Chapters. 
4.2 Theory of Human Capital and Lifetime Earnings 
There have been many varied statements about the workings of the labour market proffered 
by non-economists. Typically, such explanations as to why and how women interrupt their 
work careers are focused upon the separation of women into two distinct groups. Women 
are seen to enter the labour market at relatively low wages and are then witnessed to either 
participate continuously (whereby wage growth is positive and significant), or to work for a 
few years and then to withdraw for a period of time after the birth of the first child. 
Usually, the non-economist (see the review in Folbre (1994), for example) would label the 
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former group as career-minded, male-like workers, whilst the latter are seen to form the 
group of women returners. The career-minded female minimises the amount of labour 
market withdrawal following a change in family status, whilst the intermittent worker will 
be out of the labour market for several years. On the return to the labour market, the 
intermittent female is far more likely to be employed on a part-time basis than before her 
interruption. 
To the non-economist, the splitting of women into two groups enables a logical explanation 
to be given as to why some female workers command high salaries whilst others are sucked 
into the poverty trap. This categorisation also offers an explanation as to how some labour 
market re-entrants are destined for a lifetime of part-time participation and low relative 
wages (see the evidence in Chapter 2). It is commonly thought that low re-entry wages are 
influenced by a number of factors. First, wages tend to increase with work experience. 
This experience may be separated into firm specific and general experience. Women with 
career breaks have thereby accumulated less work experience. Second, time away from the 
labour market may lead to the atrophy of vital work skills, so that re-entry wages are 
necessarily lower. Finally, those females who anticipate career breaks may have a low 
propensity to, engage in training whilst in work and are thereby characterised by flatter 
earnings-experience profiles. 
An economist might explain the observable wage differences in terms of accumulated 
human capital or in terms of the whether participation is part- or full-time. ' In its broadest 
form, human capital theory is concerned with the acquisition of skills and the subsequent 
rewards to that investment. Time away from the labour market might be expected to lead 
to a depreciation of the skills gained before the break. This could then explain the lower 
wages obtained by female returners compared with continuous workers. Alternatively, 
employers may interpret time out as a signal of less committed workers (see Spence (1974), 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)) and employers may therefore offer low wages in the 
absence of other information about a worker's productivity. However, women who expect 
t Various economists shed doubt on the robustness of some of these conclusions. Joshi and Paci (1998) 
recognise that low pay associated with female part-time work is a peculiarly British phenomenon. 
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to take breaks in employment could be viewed as making a conscious decision to acquire 
less human capital before the separation, which, if true, would be associated with lower 
subsequent wages and less attachment to the labour force in the future. This decision could 
be based on factors that are observable to the economist, namely age and existing 
education, or it may be influenced by factors that are unobserved, such as a "taste for 
work. " It is important to try and distinguish between the former depreciation effect and the 
latter, labour supply orientated, explanation of the negative wage effect of breaks and to try 
to take account of the unobserved heterogeneity. The focus of Chapter 5 is to unravel these 
competing explanations. 
The study of human capital has its origins in work that can be traced back to Smith (1776) 
who noted that the rewards to education would compensate for the expense of the 
education. 2 That the monetary value of lifetime earnings should at least be equal to the cost 
of acquiring such earnings (in terms of the cost of education and maintenance) has long 
been a centrally held view. From such beginnings, Becker's (1965) model grew and gave 
rise to the proliferation of human capital studies present today. Indeed, work in the 1970's 
sought to offer estimates of the rates of return to human capital for all countries that could 
provide reasonable data (see Psacharopoulos (1973,1979)). The remainder of this section 
serves as a brief introduction to human capital theory and suggests reasons for its 
widespread adoption by economists. 
Expenditure by individuals falls into two distinct categories: spending on those purchases 
which yield immediate utility (consumption), and those which generate future income by 
increasing productive capacity (investment expenditure). Human capital theory focuses on 
a specific type of investment by workers: the investment in skills that thereby increases the 
productivity of an individual. Such a process of accumulation of units of human capital is 
carried out through education and training. 
The basic methodology of the human capital approach may be illustrated by the 
examination of the relationship between wages and education. In a perfectly competitive 
2 This is highlighted in Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993), page 69. 
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market, it is assumed that additional years of education increase the productivity of a 
worker, so that wages may be seen to be equal to the size of the marginal revenue product, 
or their present value over the life cycle. The amount of human capital accumulated varies 
between individuals and, assuming initially that workers are homogeneous with respect to 
age, sex, and race, the differences in earnings will reflect the various amounts of human 
capital acquired. 
In the absence of uncertainty, a wealth maximising individual contemplates the benefit of 
additional education (in terms of increased productivity later to be rewarded in the labour 
market) and the cost of such education (both the direct cost of books and tuition fees and 
the opportunity cost of time spent not in the labour market). The incentive to engage in 
education is a result of the higher future income stream from the increased productive 
capacity which results from extra schooling. This productivity is assumed to be rewarded 
throughout the individual's working life. 
The rational individual with perfect information will calculate the return from the 
investment expenditure on education in a manner analogous to the entrepreneur who 
computes the return to physical capital. That is, the individual considers the net present 
value of the earnings gain from additional, non-compulsory schooling that lasts p periods as 
Ep -E 
(l + i)' 
(4.1) 
where T-p represents the working life of the individual who has invested an extra p years in 
education, Ep is earnings after the investment, Epo is earnings in the absence of the 
investment and i is the market discount rate. The present value of the gain is then 
compared to the cost of acquiring such education in terms of the opportunity cost of the ph 
period, 
Epo + DCp (4.2) 
where DCp are the direct costs of schooling. An individual will continue to acquire p 
additional years of education for as long as (4.1) is greater than (4.2). 
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Equivalently, the rational individual may contemplate the internal rate of return, r, on 
investing in the additional years of schooling and compare this with the market rate of 
interest, i. If the value of r which equates 
Ep -E 
(l+r)'o 
Epo +DCp (4.3) 
is greater than the value of i, the individual has an incentive to acquire more schooling. 
Thus r is the rate of return to acquiring p extra years of education. 
If we simplify the above to consider an individual with an assumed infinite time horizon 





= Ep0 , which gives an internal rate of return of r=E 
Ep0 
, or the 
p0 
proportionate change in earnings resulting from the investment in education. 
The algebra above provides a rationale for human capital acquisition in the form of extra 
years of schooling. The theory may be extended to incorporate other forms of human 
capital investment, such as training. It is similar to physical capital investment appraisal. 
Mincer (1974) developed this approach in a way that further added to its popularity and it is 
this extension which forms the basis of Section 4.3. 
4.3 Human Capital and the Theory of Labour Supply 
The theory of human capital investment can also be made to rest within the theory of 
dynamic labour supply. This attempts to explain the pattern of age-employment profiles 
observed in Chapter 2 in terms of optimising behaviour by individuals (see Section 5.5 of 
Killingsworth (1983) for an elaboration of this point). In the static model of labour supply, 
an individual's labour force participation decision depends only on current wages, prices 
and income. These static models assume that wages are at each point in time exogenous. 
Any change in wage rates then generates income and relative price (substitution) effects 
which affect the number of hours supplied. If wages rise then the income effect is to reduce 
hours supplied, and the substitution effect will always generate a rise in desired hours, as 
individuals move away from relatively more expensive leisure. The evidence of rising 
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female participation over time observed in Chapter 2 is then consistent with the dominance 
of the substitution effect over the income effect. 
Dynamic Labour Supply 
In dynamic models, individuals can use saving, or borrowing, to transfer earnings from one 
period to another and adjust their labour supply accordingly, knowing that a decision today 
will affect choices for tomorrow. Again, simple dynamic models assume that wages, prices 
and income are exogenous in each period. However, if wages are essentially determined as 
a function of the level of human capital, and this in turn depends on the amounts of time 
spent investing in the acquisition of human capital, then wages, the decision to enter work 
and the amount of investment in human capital are all endogenously determined. 
Killingsworth (1983) notes that there are several versions of the human capital model of 
dynamic labour supply. In one version, used by Blinder and Weiss (1976), individuals 
divide their time between work and leisure and choose between jobs providing different 
opportunities for training. So individuals invest in different amounts of human capital by 
deciding on which type of job to take. The stock of human capital at any point is 
K(t) = K(t-1) +k(t) - 8K(t-1) (4.4) 
where k(t) is the amount of new gross investment in human capital and 8 is the rate of 
depreciation of the existing human capital stock in each period. The amount of human 
capital acquired in any time period, k(t), depends on the amount of time spent at work, H(t), 
the existing stock of human capital, K(t) and the level of "training" that goes with the job, 
T(t). Thus 
k(t) =k[ H(t), K(t), T(t)] k'j>0 j=H, K, T (4.5) 
Inclusion of the stock of human capital in the human capital production function means that 
acquiring skills is easier, the more skills an individual already possesses. Here, T(t) is an 
index ranging from 0 (no training) to 1 (all training), so that K(t)T(t) is then a measure of 
the amount of market productivity devoted to accumulating human capital rather than 
market work, and H(t)K(t)T(t) is the total amount of investment in human capital in any 
period. Productivity is related to the stock of human capital at that point, P(t) = O[K(t)J . 
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Wages depend positively on productivity, but negatively on the amount of training involved 
in the job (assuming that the individual bears some of the costs of training), so 
W(t) = g[F(t)]P(t) 9 '>0 (4.6) 
Hence when a worker invests in human capital her current wage is lower than her actual 
market productivity, but there is a trade off between lower current earnings and higher 
future earnings through the realisation of further human capital investment. 
These models proceed with an attempt to evaluate the lifetime present values of the 
investment in human capital and non-investment options. The general implication for age 
earnings profiles is that human capital investment will take place when the opportunity 
costs of training are low, that is, when current earnings are low when individuals are young, 
so that there is a long period of time to recoup the costs of any investment. The higher 
current productivity as a result of past investments, the higher the current wage and the 
greater the opportunity cost of further investment. This gives rise to the familiar n-shaped 
age earnings profile, with depreciation and lack of further investment in human capital 
explaining the downturn in the profile. However, if the rate of depreciation is large, it may 
be that investment in training will be spread over the life cycle. Likewise since lifetime 
labour supply depends on an evaluation of the in and out of work costs and benefits, then 
individuals will generally supply fewer hours when the opportunity costs, primarily wages, 
are low. Net of any offsetting discount rate effects, which may create a preference for 
income now and leisure later, this will generate an n-shaped age employment profile. The 
flatter the age earnings profile, the flatter the age employment profile. 
However, as Killingsworth (1983) indicates, the estimation of endogenous wage, dynamic 
labour supply models has many difficulties. The principal variables of interest can 
sometimes not be observed and few variables in the simultaneous system are exogenous. 
Further, the principal data set used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 covers only a single age 
cohort and not women at each stage of the life cycle. For these reasons, we choose only to 
note the contribution to the literature of dynamic models and address the potential 
endogeneity of wages, human capital and labour supply in other ways that are highlighted 
in Section 4.4. 
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Household Labour Supply 
It is also reasonable to believe that individual decisions to work are not undertaken without 
regard to the attitudes and labour market circumstances of other household members. 
Labour supply theory deals with this issue in a number of different ways. The simplest way 
is to assume that partner's status and earnings are exogenous, so that non-labour income 
can include any partner's earnings. 3 Any change in partner's earnings shifts the budget 
constraint up or down, generating a pure income effect on labour supply. 
One alternative to this is to try to develop a family or household aggregate utility function 
where the objects of choice are the level of household consumption, G, and the individual 
amounts of leisure time, L, (see Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974)). The household is 
assumed to pool its total income so that household utility is then maximised subject to a 
family budget constraint. However, with the specification of a family utility function U=U 
(G, Ll, L2, ..., L, ), 
(where L; is the non-market hours consumed by the ith member), there 
are two types of substitution effects arising from wage changes. Each adult now has an 
own-substitution effect (which represents that member's labour supply response to a 
change in their own wage). In addition, there exist cross-substitution effects, reflecting the 
member's labour supply response to a change in the wage rate of the other family member. 
The sign of these latter effects may be positive (if leisure time of household members are 
substitutes) or negative (if leisure times are complementary). One consequence of the 
family utility function is that the cross-substitution effects of a change in one adult's wage 
rate on the other's labour supply must be equal to any change in the latter's wage rate on 
the other member's labour supply. However, since the income effects may not be equal, 
the total effect on labour supply need not be the same. 
These models again impose rather tight restrictions on the structural form. Their principal 
influence on this thesis, which deals mainly with reduced forms, is the recognition that 
household variables may affect female labour supply decisions through changes in the 
3 Since these models are often applied to female labour supply they are sometimes termed "male chauvinist" 
models. 
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reservation wage and wage offer criteria, and, where possible, we take account of 
household variables in the Chapters that follow. 
Time Allocation Models 
Although the specification of a family utility function is an obvious improvement in the 
literature, the early household production models of, say, Mincer (1962) and Becker (1965), 
tended to emphasise the simple responses to changes in market wage rates, incomes and 
technologies that influenced the production function for home commodities. Becker 
acknowledged that virtually all commodities require a time input in their consumption, such 
that any consumption activity requires the summation of a market price and the value of 
time required to produce and or to consume it. The advent of the allocation of time models, 
(see Gronau (1973), (1977)), suggests that the household's supply of market hours is jointly 
determined with consumption activity. This thereby sees the disappearance of the straight 
labour-leisure trade off. 
In this group of models, households maximise utility, U= U (Zl, Z2, ..., Z,,, 
), subject to a 
budget constraint. Here, the Z's represent more basic commodities than the G's above. 
Households produce these commodities by combining time and market goods as defined by 
a household production function Zj = Z; (G,, t; ) for i=1, ..., m, where G; and t; are goods 
and time inputs to this process. The household production function is often assumed to be 
of the fixed coefficient type, Z, = GI-a; and Z, = t/b;, where a; and b, are units of goods 
and units of time per unit of the associated activity. The models also operate under the 




where H is the number of hours worked, together with a money income constraint: 
m 
E PG, G; =PAH +V (4.7). 
If T=H, such that the individual is subject to the full income constraint, we have 
2: PG; G; +PLYt; = PLT+V (4.8 
i=l i=l 
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Substituting GI-a; and t/b; into (4.8) yields 
m 
IPG. Z; a; +PLEZ; b; =yn; Z; (4.9) 
where 'c = PG; a; + PLb; for i=1, ..., m and 7c represents the full cost of consuming or 
producing the basic commodity Z; . 
Maximising the utility function subject to the full income constraint yields 
au / az; 
__ 
Mu; n; 
aU/aZi MUi n; 
for activities i, j = 1, ..., M. 
(4.10) 
So, within this class of models, an individual consumes or produces basic commodities i 
and j until the marginal rate of substitution between any two activities just equals the ratio 
of their full costs. Full costs here include the value of time. Women deciding whether to 
have children will then compare the costs and benefits of this decision with all other 
alternatives. 
Killingsworth (1983) concludes that the most valuable contribution of this class of models 
is that they provide a convenient framework for analysing the division of non-market time 
into different components, (childrearing, leisure, housework and so on), that is ignored by 
standard labour supply theory. However, he believes that the determinants of labour 
supply, (prices, income and wages), are essentially the same as in other labour supply 
models and, as such, time allocation models give few new insights about labour supply 
behaviour. In the following Chapters, we do implicitly acknowledge the contribution of 
this field by dividing non-work into separate components, unemployment and economic 
inactivity, dividing the latter into home production, education and other categories. 
Fixed Costs of Labour Supply 
One potentially important impediment to the return to work for many women with children 
is the cost of childcare. If women enter work then they incur direct costs of childcare that 
would not arise if they remained at home to look after their child. This observation belongs 
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to the literature on fixed costs of labour supply popularised by Cogan (1981). The effect of 
incurring childcare costs is to shift down the budget constraint by an amount equal to the 
cost of childcare if and only if the individual decides to work. There is a pure (negative) 
income effect only if a woman works. If non-market time is a normal good, then hours 
worked and labour market participation will fall. The implications for labour supply are 
very intriguing. Since individuals will not participate unless they recoup their fixed costs, 
then we may expect to observe large discrete jumps in hours supplied when the hourly 
wage exceeds the reservation wage. There is an interesting literature on whether 
subsidising childcare leads to an increase in labour supply (see Connelly (1992) and 
Anderson and Levine (1999) for recent studies). The rise in female labour force 
participation observed in Chapter 2, and recent changes to the benefit system (notably, the 
Working Families Tax Credit) have brought the issue to the forefront of public debate. 
However, in the absence of information on childcare costs in our data sets, we leave this 
extension to future work. In the Chapters that follow, dummy variables on the presence 
and age of young children will capture potential childcare costs (see Nakamura and 
Nakamura (1992) for a summary of the effects of children on female labour supply). 
4.4 Measuring the Impact of Intermittent Participation on Earnings 
The unifying theme of recent work on human capital theory is the adoption of the standard 
Mincerian methodology. Mincer (1974) addresses the central issue of earnings inequality. 
First, it is assumed that earnings increase over the lifecycle at a decreasing rate and, second, 
that earnings rise with the amount of education undertaken. Such an approach works well 
for all agents whose investment in human capital is a monotonically declining function of 
age and who remain in work almost continuously. Card (1998) finds the rate of return of 
one extra year of education on hourly earnings to be around 10 per cent in the United 
States. This return has grown between 35 and 50 per cent since the early 1980's. However, 
the stylised lifetime earnings profile which is continuous with a single-peak is clearly 
inappropriate for groups of workers who have time out of the labour market. This may be 
the case where a large proportion of workers in the labour force are female. 
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Workers who anticipate small amounts of lifetime labour market participation due to 
repeated breaks may engage in less formal education and less training before and after any 
work break. This will produce a different (flatter), age-earnings profile from women who 
continuously invest in human capital. Conversely, some women, upon completion of time 
outside the labour market, may have strong incentives to (re-)invest in the acquisition of 
skills if those skills have depreciated during a spell out of work. For those who do have 
career breaks, earnings may take some time to regain their pre-break level depending on the 
size of any depreciation effect and the rate of re-investment in human capital. This will 
again be reflected in the shape of the age-earnings profile. The need to encompass these 
differences has recently been recognised in the literature. 
Mincer and Polachek (1974) provides the first formal attempt to model the effect of taking 
time out of employment not spent in unemployment. One of the aims of their work is to 
interpret work histories within the context of past expectations and family life (whether 
current or prospective). This section begins with an introduction to this work and then 
extends to a coverage of Mincer's later co-authored work in the same field. 
Let earnings at time t equal last year's earnings plus, C1-l, the amount invested in human 
capital in the t-1 fl' period multiplied by the return on that investment, r, 
Et=Et-1+rCt-1 (4.11) 
If time out of work leads to the atrophy of skills then the stock of human capital may well 
be reduced during a career break. Mincer and Polachek define 6t as the depreciation in 
human capital in period t, such that, including depreciation: 
Et=Et- 1 +rC, *-1-6t-1 Et-1 (4.12) 
where C, *_, represents gross investment in human capital in period t-1. Gross investments 
are split into net investments and depreciation where terms marked with an asterisk indicate 
gross variables. 
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where s; _, 
is the gross investment ratio (Ct. l* / Et-1 Or, in net terms (4.13) yields 
Et /Et-1=1+rst-1 (4.14) 
By recursion, Et = Eo(1+rso) (1+rs1) (1+rs2) +... (1+rst. 1) (4.15) 
For period t, the return on gross investment is, 
rst=rst*-St (4.16) 
Substituting (4.16) into the logarithmic equivalent of (4.14) gives 
f-1 
1nEt=1nEo+l: 1n(1 + rs) (4.17) 
1=o 
which reduce to 
r-t 
1nEt=lnEO+ I (rs; * - S; ) (4.18) 
1=o 
since ln(1 +rs j- rs;. 
Mincer and Polachek adapt (4.18) to calculate the current earnings of workers with 
consecutive segments of participation and non-participation. Thus, 
1nEt=1nEp+(rS-S, )+(rs; -S 1)e 1+(rs;, -Sh)h+(rs 2 -52)e2+(rs 3 -83)e3 (4.19) 
Here, el and e2 represent market work completed between school and first child and 
between the first child and the current job, h is the period of home time in the period 
between first child and return to work, and e3 are years on the current job. 4 This 
specification allows for different returns to experience before and after any career break, 
together with differing amounts of depreciation on the human capital stock in those periods, 
and an additional effect, presumably negative, of time out. Using ordinary least squares 
estimation on 993 white married women with children from the 1967 US National 
Longitudinal Survey of Work Experience, Mincer and Polachek conclude that the post- 
4 As in the authors' appendix on Page S108. 
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interruption investment in skills is greater than the pre-interruption investment (as the 
coefficient on e3> coefficient on el). 
Perhaps more interestingly, they find a net depreciation effect during the home time period 
of 1.5 per cent (via (hl+h2)100). The length of the home time periods are quite small 
enabling the home time intervals to be analysed either separately or together with negligible 
difference in terms of results. Mincer and Polachek choose to drop the usual experience 
squared term for simplicity. 
Mincer and Polachek present one of the earliest assessments of the size of the depreciation 
effect of human capital resulting from home time and they provoke further debate on the 
optimum method of modelling such an effect. However, they fail to focus on the 
possibility of intensive restoration of human capital which takes place on re-entry. This 
becomes the subject of their subsequent work and it is the central theme for what follows. 
4.4.1 The Mincer and Ofek (1982) Restoration Model 
The subsequent work of Mincer and Ofek (1982) builds upon previous research and 
contributes significantly to the literature through the modelling of the rebound period: that 
period of time in which restoration of human capital may take place upon re-entry. Using 
cross-sectional retrospective data on a sample of women taken from the 1967 National 
Longitudinal Survey (NLS), Mincer and Ofek (1982) utilise a standard Mincerian wage 
equation to analyse these effects by incorporating a variable that measures the length of 
time out of the labour force as an explanatory variable (h). They distinguish four distinct 
effects of a break in a worker's employment. First, the normal growth in human capital 
acquisition (through work experience) is abruptly terminated. They state that real wages 
are firstly affected by the forfeit of human capital during the break in employment, as it is 
impossible to engage in the normal accumulation of work-centred human capital whilst a 
worker is out of the labour market. Second, non-participation causes skills to depreciate or 
atrophy. For as long as work skills are not being used, these skills waste away and this 
impacts negatively upon real wages. Third, significant investment in human capital takes 
place upon re-entry in the rebound phase. Real wages rise substantially due to the heavy 
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investment in human capital which the worker carries out. Fourth, the normal growth rate 
is resumed once pre-interruption level of earnings are achieved and this takes place in line 
with that experienced by the continuously employed worker. Thus, the natural logarithm of 
the real hourly wage (in ff) is regressed, as below 
1nW=rSS+ß2e0+ß3eo2 +ßaei+ßsho+ß6h1+ß7V (4.20) 
where S are years of schooling, eo are years of experience prior to the most recent spell of 
nonparticipation, el are years of experience after the most recent spell of nonparticipation, 
ho are years of nonparticipation prior to most recent spell of employment, h1 are years of 
nonparticipation after the most recent spell of employment, and V represents a vector of 
other individual-specific variables that incorporate the effect of various life events and the 
impact that they have on the work interruption period hj. Thus, V includes years of last job 
tenure and dummies for whether the individual married, divorced or had a baby during or 
immediately before having a career break. 
Mincer and Ofek claim that the coefficient on eo captures the long run returns to experience 
and that the coefficient on el captures the more immediate, short run returns to experience. 
Similarly, the coefficient on ho represents the long run effect of nonparticipation whilst the 
coefficient on h1 is the short run effect of nonparticipation. 
The NLS data is able to provide estimates of the wage equation for US women at the point 
of their re-entry into the labour market. At this point, the individuals have just terminated 
their period out of the labour force (hi), and their years of work experience after the most 
recent spell of nonparticipation (el) is equal to zero. The estimated return to one additional 
year of education is around 4.5 per cent for all women and is 3.7 per cent for women with 
intermittent participation. This is less than that found for British continuous female 
workers of around 7 per cent (Harmon and Walker (1995). More importantly for the 
purposes of Chapter 5, Mincer and Ofek find that there is a negative and significant impact 
of engaging in a period out of the labour force on wages. Moreover, the decline in re-entry 
wages is larger, the more severe the interruption. This indicates a process at work which 
amounts to more than the simple accumulation of the losses of general and job-specific 
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skills through lower levels of work experience (see also Table A. 4.1 in the Appendix to this 
Chapter). 
Mincer and Ofek (1982) awakened a great deal of interest in the depreciation issue 
following their publication. From Table A. 4.2 in the Appendix to this Chapter, it can be 
seen that there is evidence of a depreciation effect as a result of a career break in all studies 
that followed in spite of differences in the nature of the data sets and the difference in time 
periods analysed. Mincer and Ofek show that despite the rebound period, female returners 
never achieve the continuous worker earnings profile. The effect of the intermittent 
participation has a permanent impact on subsequent earnings. Before we are in a position 
to offer a commentary on the nature of the gender wage gap in Britain, it would seem 
reasonable to investigate more fully the nature of differences in pay between women with 
different labour market histories. This we do in Chapter 5. The next section examines in 
detail another theoretical perspective on female labour market interruptions which uses the 
foundations highlighted here. 
4.4.2 The Groot and van Ours (1994) Transitory and Permanent Effects Model 
Groot and van Ours (1994) build on the existing literature on work interruptions using a 
1986 data set from the Netherlands containing retrospective information on labour market 
history together with details of current earnings. Their contribution is mainly an empirical 
one, but it does shift the focus to whether the effects of interruptions are permanent or 
transitory, much in the spirit of Ruhm (1991). They are interested in comparing the effects 
of having time out from work in unemployment in contrast to spells out of the labour force. 
They acknowledge various factors that affect the stock of human capital over the life cycle. 
For example, workers switch occupations, lose jobs because they quit or are fired, and re- 
engage in education. Groot and van Ours (1994) wish to disentangle career interruptions of 
different natures in order to draw conclusions about the possibility of different transitory 
and permanent effects. They utilise the Mincer and Polachek (1974) separate time periods 
distinction and stress the importance of a rebound effect in work following time out, during 
which all the re-investment in human capital is assumed to take place. They estimate their 
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model separately for males and females and separate returners according to the state in 
which they were present prior to returning to work. 
The following work experience equation is developed 
Xi Emi+R3Ui+ß40i+R5Ru, i+ß6Ro, i+ß7(Ti-Ru, i-Ro, i) (4.21) 
where X is the total amount of work experience, Em is work experience before job loss or 
in the current job for those without an interruption, U is the length of the last 
unemployment spell, 0 the length of an out of labour force spell, Ru the rebound period in 
work following unemployment, Ro the rebound period in work following time out of labour 
force and T is tenure in the current job net of the rebound period. 5 It is expected that the 
coefficients on the unemployment and inactivity terms, /33 and 64 respectively, will be 
smaller than/i7, (the coefficient on job tenure adjusted for the rebound period). This would 
indicate that human capital formation during the period of unemployment is less than that 
acquired on-the-job. If ß. i3 is negative, then this would indicate that destruction of human 
capital takes place during unemployment spells. If j3. is negative it would again indicate 
the destruction of human capital, but this time, as a result of time spent out of the labour 
force. Evidence of any permanent negative long-term wage effect of an interruption 
requires not only the negative effect of atrophy from time out, but also a sufficiently large 
negative effect to offset any earnings gains made during the rebound period. Groot and van 
Ours (1994) motivate this comparison by investigating the adjusted coefficients ß3, ß4, JS, 
and ß6 as follows. They envisage two workers, j and k. Worker j has a period out of the 
labour force and then recommences work, such that Oý+Tj describes her work pattern. 
Worker k has an identical previous history to j but begins a new job at the start of the time 
period in which j begins her Oj. Thus, 
OJ+Ti-=Tk (4.22). 
It is assumed that the length of the rebound period is equal to twenty-four months, 6 so that 
s All time periods are measured in months. 
6 This was chosen arbitrarily to coincide with the length of time of the probation period for a new worker in 
the Netherlands. 
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Emd+(340 +(3624+(37(Tj-24) = Emk+ß7Tk (4.23) 






In the absence of any long-term wage effects, f6 would equal zero given current tenure in 
excess of twenty-four months. Let 







so that a long term wage effect as a result of a spell out of the labour force shows up in ß6' 
This expression may be intuitively understood from rearranging as follows: 
(ß6 -PO-(ß'24R4)Oj =0 (4.26) 
This holds when there is no long-term wage impact. In effect, this is saying that the 
positive contribution due to rebound (j6) adjusted for the smaller tenure coefficient 
(, 67) will be greater than zero (that is, A07 > 0). However, when the impact of Oj exactly 
counteracts this effect, the whole expression will equal zero. A priori, it is expected that 
taking time out of the labour force incurs long-term costs such that the positive amount 
resulting from ß6-ß7 is overshadowed by a740, and the expression becomes negative. 24 
Groot and van Ours investigate whether or not the expression for /i is indeed negative. If 
this is so, then it is indicative of a negative long-term effect on wages as a result of 
intermittent participation. 
Groot and van Ours (1994) draw the following conclusions. There are no long-term 
negative wage effects following either type of interruption for male workers, because 
A5*=ß6*-0. Further, there are no long term wage effects for a period of unemployment for 
females, as ßs * is not significantly different from zero. 
However, they find that there is a permanent long term wage effect following a period out 
of the labour force for females, (that is ßi6*<p). Groot and van ours (1994) point out that 
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the average length of interruption due to a period out of the labour force is 4.5 years, whilst 
the typical length of an unemployment spell is 4 to 5 months. They suggest that when a 
break occurs, if the interruption is short, then the earnings effect will be transitory. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Despite over two decades of theoretical and empirical work mainly in the United States, the 
empirical evidence on the interaction of human capital, earnings and labour supply in 
Britain is still comparatively rare. The following Chapters seek to rectify this deficiency. 
The theoretical literature would seem to suggest that time spent out of the labour force has 
negative consequences for subsequent earnings, after controlling for both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. The existence of any wage effects from time 
out will have direct implications for the gender pay gap. It is also notable that household 
factors, such as the presence of children, would be expected to influence labour supply 
decisions. This is an issue to which we turn in Chapter 7. 
The Groot and van Ours (1994) approach has the following advantages. First, it allows for 
two different types of interruption to be analysed contemporaneously (namely, 
unemployment and time out of the labour force). Second, the model enables the 
investigation of both short and long term wage effects. The Groot and van Ours framework 
contributes to our understanding of the impact of career interruptions for workers in the 
Netherlands. The use of British data enables the evaluation of similar effects in another 
European country. 
This whole area provokes exciting research questions. It would seem that the depreciation 
effect may not be the whole explanation for the low re-entry wage. Indeed, there might be 
some role for a signalling mechanism within the framework. In other disciplines, issues 
involving the signalling of commitment to the workplace through continuous participation 
has received much attention. It would also be interesting to incorporate the impact of the 
part-time and full-time work decision into the analysis, as in Jones and Long (1979). 
Chapters 5 and 6 present new empirical evidence on the issues of work interruption and 
earnings, while Chapter 7 takes analyses the return to work decision in more detail. 
70 
Appendix 4 
Table A 4.1 Withdrawal and Re-entry Wage Rates by the length of the Interruption 
Period 
Years of Non- artici ation 
<1 1-2 3-4 5-6 
Withdrawal hourly wage rates ($) 2.27 1.92 1.70 1.73 
Re-entry hourly wage rates ($) 2.35 1.75 1.46 1.27 
No. of observations 931 128 141 104 
Rates are at 1967 prices. Data from the NLS for married women (ages 30-44 in 1967) 
Source: Mincer and Ofek (1982), page 7. 
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Table A 4.2 Empirical Studies on the Wage Effects of Intermittent Participation 






Mincer & Polachek (1974) NLS USA1967 993 1.5 no 
Sandell & Shapiro (1980) NLS USA1967 969 < 0.5 no 
Corcoran & Duncan (1979) PSID USA1975 1326 0.5 no 
Mincer & Ofek (1982) NLS USA1967 1015 7.6 yes 
Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza PSID USA1969 821 3.3 yes 
(1983) 




Interrupted Work Careers and Earnings: Some New British Evidence 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we catalogued the changing patterns of female participation and wages in 
Britain. We indicated that there were substantial differences in employment rates 
amongst women and highlighted the importance of family status, in particular the age of 
the youngest child, in influencing these rates. Despite the rapid increase in employment 
rates for women with young children over the past twenty years, it remains the case that 
women with young children are still nearly 50 per cent less likely to be in work than 
other women. Moreover, the wages of those women with young children who are in 
work seem to be lower than for other women. It is important, therefore, to investigate 
the relationship between labour market participation and wages in more detail. Since 
the General Household Survey, (GHS), used in Chapter 2 does not contain any detailed 
information on an individual respondent's labour market history, this Chapter examines 
this theme using evidence from another British data set which does contain relevant 
information: the National Child Development Survey, (NCDS). 
Waldfogel (1993) demonstrates how much of the gender pay gap is attributable to 
family status, principally the presence of young children, through use of both the NCDS 
and the GHS. Her work provides some support for the conventional human capital 
explanation of wage differentials between the genders, whereby the lower wages earned 
by working mothers relative to men are linked to their lower levels of work experience. 
Moreover, she finds that the mothers in her sample are subject to a small wage penalty 
whether or not they have a career break longer than that afforded by statutory maternity 
leave. The work in this Chapter builds on this foundation looking at the wage 
differences between women, rather than across gender, conditional on work experience 
in more detail. Further, we emphasise the importance of allowing for differences in the 
nature of the non-work spells in the impact on earnings. 
In Section 5.2, we first investigate the average spell lengths in and out of work for the 
NCDS cohort and examine how this differs across sub-groups of women. We then split 
time spent in work into full-time and part-time spells and time out of work into time 
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spent in home production, unemployment, education and a residual category. In Section 
5.3, we estimate the impact of a withdrawal on the wages of these women. Further, we 
assess how various lengths and types of home time affect the wage impact of 
withdrawal and how this links to the levels of the intensity of participation. One 
advantage of the NCDS data set is that we can use precise measures of female labour 
market experience, both in work and out, (and forego the usual approximation of 
potential experience frequently used in earnings equations) in order to offer insight on 
the rate of return per year of realised work experience. We are also able to analyse how 
spending time in domestic responsibilities compares with other non-work activities, as 
valued by the subsequent re-entry wage, in a bid to determine the depreciation effect of 
human capital. If we can associate different wage penalties to the various types of break 
for the same duration of out spell, this would suggest that a simple human capital 
depreciation story is not the full explanation. Therefore, in Section 5.4, we concentrate 
on issues of selectivity in an attempt to assess whether the observed penalties to time out 
vary when potentially endogenous selection into the labour force is accounted for. We 
use the basic Heckman (1979) selectivity correction technique applied to the case of 
endogenous dummy variables and the Lee (1983) extension (which allows for multiple 
selection outcomes). Section 5.5 includes first difference estimation in order to control 
for any unobserved heterogeneity that may otherwise bias any observed time out 
penalties. Section 5.6 concludes by throwing light on the differences between various 
groups of women found in the Chapter and sets the scene for the analysis of how the 
groups of continuous and intermittent workers may be subsequently compared across 
the genders in Chapter 6. 
5.2 British Evidence on Labour Market Histories 
We now present our own, new evidence for Britain of the effect of labour market 
interruptions on subsequent earnings using the NCDS data set. The NCDS data follows 
a cohort over time. Within the cohort it is likely that there will be variations in the 
number of interruptions, the length and timing of interruptions and in the type of 
interruption. Some women may have held only one job throughout their career, others 
may have had multiple jobs. Time out of work might have been spent in 
unemployment, home production, education or some other activity. Note that the 
NCDS encourages mothers to include any maternity leave as part of a continuous spell 
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of employment. Time in employment may have been in either part-time or full-time 
work. The relative importance of these different spell types is still not well known. This 
section begins, therefore, with an examination of the distribution of these interruptions 
across our sample of women and across selected sub-groups. 
Table 5.1 shows that the mean number of jobs held by the NCDS cohort since leaving 
full-time education is 4.2. There seems to be some difference in work history patterns 
according to whether women are in work in 1991 or not. The average number of jobs 
held by women in work is slightly higher at 4.5 jobs. For the whole sample, just 1 per 
cent have never had a job by the age of thirty-three. For the sample in work, when split 
by marital status and the presence of children at the age of 33, lone parents, on average, 
have held the largest number of jobs, (a mean of 5.1 for those in work), whereas married 
women have held the least (a mean of 4.3 for those in work). The spread for working 
women is rather large: just over 12 per cent have had 8 or more jobs by the age of thirty- 
three whilst a similar number have had only one job. For the sample of women as a 
whole, the lack of a partner is associated with more jobs. However, for the sub-sample 
of women in work in 1991, this correlation is not so strong. There are no obvious 
differences between married women with and without children or single childless 
women. Only lone parents in work in 1991 have held more jobs than the average. 
Table 5.2 summarises the work history patterns by duration of each spell type for those 
women in work in 1991. We present the frequency distribution of non-work spells 
alongside the mean duration of spells spent in work (in both full- and part-time work), 
the mean duration spent out of work since leaving education, and the duration spent in 
work before and after the most recent break. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. The duration calculation covers all spells from leaving full-time education 
to the time of interview and so include all completed spells together with the most 
recent spell of work or non-work in progress. Since the women in the NCDS sample are 
all of the same age, the differences in the time spent in and out of work will be partly 
accounted for by differences in the age at which the women left full-time education. 
There may also be differences in labour market experiences after leaving full-time 
education which will also contribute towards duration heterogeneity in the sample. 
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Table 5.2 shows that approximately 38 per cent of women have worked continuously 
since leaving full-time education, with a mean duration of 14.4 years. The majority of 
women, however, have experienced some interruption to their work career by the age of 
thirty-three. Around 33 per cent of those in work record just one spell out of a job and 
nearly 12 per cent record three or more out spells. These figures are similar to the 
findings of Stewart and Greenhalgh (1984) for a cohort of women aged between 25 and 
34 years of age observed in 1976. For example, they found that around 34 per cent of 
their cohort had worked continuously. 
The mean duration of work experience falls with the number of periods spent out of 
work, from 14.4 to 10.7 years between the 0 and 3 plus non-work spells categories, 
(column II). The majority of work experience consists of full-time work (column VI), 
but this relative dominance tends to fall with the number of spells out of work. Indeed, 
part-time work experience increases with the number of non-work spells, (column VII). 
This suggests that full time work is a closer substitute for time out than part time work. 
Table 5.2 shows that the mean duration of non-work rises by approximately one year for 
each additional out of work spell (column IV). The mean duration spent in full-time 
work falls by approximately one year, confirming that time out of work takes the place 
of full- rather than part-time work. Even so, the mean duration of all spells of part-time 
work experienced by the age of 33 is around 2.5 years, around a quarter of the total 
amount of full-time work experience at the same age. 
Not surprisingly, the mean duration of time out also increases with the number of non- 
work spells, from 3.4 to 5.3 years between the 1 and 3 plus non-work spells categories, 
(column IV). We also divide total work experience into the time spent in work before 
and after the most recent outspell. The division of these spells is reasonably even so 
that the last break occurs approximately halfway through the women's work history up 
to 1991. The average duration of work experience since the last non-work spell, 
(column V), falls with the number of non-work spells. 
Table 5.3 examines the employment histories of those women out of work in 1991. Just 
2 per cent of non-working women have never worked by the age of 33, whilst 44 per 
cent have had one continuous spell out of employment with an average duration of 6.4 
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years (column IV). Around one quarter have experienced three or more non-work 
spells. Thus, women who were not in work in 1991 are more likely to have had 
multiple non-work spells than women in work, and, for each given number of breaks, 
the duration of non-work is longer. It could be the case, therefore, that these women are 
systematically different from those in work in 1991. We return to this issue in Section 
5.5. 
The majority of time spent out of work, as shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, is spent in home 
production, (around 64 per cent of the total). By the age of 33, the average duration 
spent in home production is around 1.6 years for working women and 6.8 years for 
women not in work in 1991. Women in work in 1991 had experienced an average 4 
months unemployed and 6 months in further education (or training) since leaving full- 
time education. The shares of time spent in education and unemployment do however 
rise with the number of spells out of work. This suggests that multiple spells are more 
likely to consist of a combination of these events. Women not in work in 1991 had 
experienced around twice as much unemployment over their lifetime as women in work. 
We now examine whether work history patterns vary across different groups of women. 
We distinguish by marital status and by full- and part-time status, for the sample of 
working women only. Not surprisingly, single, childless women are more likely to have 
worked continuously (48 per cent, against 36 per cent of married women and 34 per cent 
of lone parents), and to have had fewer interruptions (Tables 5.6 to 5.9). Moreover, any 
interruptions tend to be of a shorter duration for this group. Lone parents have the most 
interruptions and longer durations of spells out of work. Part-time work seems to be 
more common amongst lone parents and married mothers with children than the other 
groups. Married women with children, however, behave in a fashion that is very similar 
to the group of married women as a whole (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.10 (a) confirms that full-time work is much more likely to be associated with 
continuous work experience. Nearly 50 per cent of women in a full-time job in 1991 
have worked continuously (and most of this has been spent in full-time work) compared 
to less than one quarter of women in part-time work, for whom part-time work accounts 
for less than half of their work experience. Part-time work intensity seems to be 
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associated with more recent female returners for any given number of non-work spells 
(the post-break durations are shorter for part-timers compared to full-timers). Table 
5.10 (b) divides total work experience into the length of time spent in full-time and in 
part-time work, before and after the last break. The Table confirms that the majority of 
work experience by the age of 33 is spent in full-time work, (compare columns I and II), 
but that part-time working appears to be more common after time out, (compare 
columns IV and VI, particularly for those with one non-work spell). 
We have, then, for NCDS women, the general picture that by the age of 33, nearly 90 
per cent of women will have held at least 3 jobs, (Table 5.1) and more than 60 per cent 
of women will have had a spell out of work, most probably spent in home production, 
(Table 5.2). Their work history will consist of a combination of full-time and part-time 
work, with the majority of it spent in full-time work, but with part-time working 
becoming relatively more likely after a break and more likely the greater the number of 
spells out of work. Our main focus in this Chapter, however, is with the effect of work 
interruptions on the earnings of women. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
5.3 Employment, Interruptions and Earnings 
We begin with some summary statistics. For the sample of women in work in 1991, 
Table 5.11 gives mean real hourly and weekly wages conditional on the length of time 
not in work. The Table illustrates that hourly and weekly wages fall with the duration of 
interruption for both women in full- and in part-time work. For example, the average 
weekly wages of those who have had 4 years or more out of work by the age of thirty- 
three are some 52 per cent of those who have been in work continuously. Some of this 
weekly wage gap is fuelled by the differing incidence of full- and part-time work across 
the groups. The mean hourly wage gap is around 68 per cent. Around 22 per cent of 
continuous workers are part-time, whilst 60 per cent of those with a4 year plus out spell 
are part-time workers. It is apparent from the second and third panels of Table 5.11 that 
the wage penalty (weekly and hourly) from labour market interruptions is similar for 
full-time workers as for part-time ones. The mean hourly part-time wage for 4 year plus 
returners is some 84 per cent of the uninterrupted part-time wage. The mean hourly 
full-time wage for 4 year plus returners is also 84 per cent of the uninterrupted full-time 
wage. 
78 
Table 5.12 shows the wage variation by the number of withdrawals. Whilst the standard 
deviations for the panels are large, we observe that there is less of an average wage 
penalty from repeated spells out of work compared with the penalty to the length of time 
out. The length of time out of work has more of an impact on wages than the frequency 
of interruptions. 
Mincer and Ofek (1982) were the first to suggest the possibility of a rebound effect 
following re-entry to work after a break. They suggest that wages may grow faster 
relative to continuous workers after the subsequent return to work. This they attribute to 
the effect of attempts at restoration of previously eroded human capital. Table 5.13 
shows that there does appear to be evidence of a restoration effect following work 
interruption in the NCDS. sample. The Table compares the average weekly and hourly 
wages for women by the length of time since the last non-work spell. Average wages 
are much lower for those with less than two years back in work compared with 
continuous workers (see columns I and II). Mean hourly and weekly wages can then be 
seen to approach the earnings of those who work continuously after a duration of time 
spent back in work of approximately 6 years (compare columns I and V). This is a 
slightly longer duration than the five-year period noted by Mincer and Ofek (1982) and 
the two years assumed by Groot and van Ours (1994). This aggregate pattern is again 
influenced by the shares of full- and part-time work in the different duration groups. 
However, both the rebound period and the size of the relative earnings decline are 
similar for women both in full- and part-time work in 1991. Note that these results may 
of course, be affected by selectivity issues arising from women choosing to take time 
out - an issue to which we turn in Section 5.4. 
Table 5.14 repeats the above procedure, but focuses solely on those women whose last 
non-work spell was in domestic duties: where selection issues may be more relevant due 
to the possible voluntary nature of this state. The comparison of Tables 5.13 and 5.14 
illustrates that the effect on wages of a break spent in domestic responsibilities is much 
larger than for other types of break, particularly in the case of full-time workers 
(compare the maximum drop in hourly wages of 23 per cent and 47 per cent in the final 
row of Tables 5.13 and 5.14). Relative to those workers who remain in work, those 
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with a home break do not attain similar wage levels even after 6 years back in 
employment. Some of the aggregate differences appear to be driven by the move from 
full-time work into part-time work after a home time spell. However, even for those 
returning to full-time work, there exists a large average hourly pay gap (of around 40 per 
cent at the 6-year stage), relative to continuous full-time workers. 
The evidence above suggests that workers with intermittent participation receive wages 
that are lower than their continuous counterparts. This suggests two possible 
explanations. First, these women with time out are fundamentally different (perhaps as 
a function of lower human capital) and would always have commanded lower wages 
even with continuous participation. Second, time out affects wages negatively, either 
because of depreciation in human capital or because time out is interpreted as a signal 
for less committed workers by employers. The next section sets out a more rigorous 
investigation of this issue using regression analysis. 
5.3.1 Estimation 
Do women suffer wage penalties from taking a career break? Mincer and Ofek (1982) 
find a negative effect from time out in the United States of around 1.5 per cent a year on 
earnings. How does this figure compare with that for women in the UK? The next 
subsection provides regression estimates using information from Sweep 5 of the NCDS 
data set. The sample consists of 4574 observations on women who are in work at the 
time of Sweep 5 and who give current job wage information, of which around 1809 are 
continuous in their work history and some 2765 women have interrupted work histories. 
Women in self-employment are excluded, as are outliers observations from employees 
earning less than 5 pounds a week or more than 6 thousand pounds a week. Those with 
inconsistent job history information, that is, those with self-reported total work 
experience greater than the feasible maximum (of 18 years), or those with erroneous job 
start and finish dates in their histories are also excluded. (See Chapter 3 for more 
details. ) The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of the real hourly wage 
indexed to January 1992 prices. All specifications are therefore of the log-lin form. 
This means that the estimated coefficients may be interpreted as the percentage change 
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in wages (not log wages) given a unit change in the explanatory variable. ' Table 5.15 
gives the sample means of the variables used in the regressions, for the total sample, and 
for the subset of women who experience a spell in home production. The mean hourly 
wage for the whole sample is £6.95, which compares with a mean hourly wage for 
women with home time of £4.56. The mean number of weekly hours for all women in 
work in 1991 is around 32. Thirty five per cent of the sample are in part-time work. 
Those women with a spell of home time are more likely to be married, to have children 
and to have lower educational qualifications. They also tend to work in part-time, less 
skilled, non-manual and manual jobs in smaller, non-unionised firms. Since these 
factors are all associated with lower wages, they may help to explain the difference 
between the two wages. 
Potential and Actual `York Experience 
One of the advantages of working with longitudinal data is the ability to observe actual 
rather than potential work experience histories. 2 The NCDS contains retrospective job 
history information between successive sweeps. Whilst retrospective information may 
be subject to recall bias (Elias (1991)), the reported histories do allow us to assess the 
bias resulting from the use of potential experience in standard human capital models. 
Potential experience is typically calculated by subtracting the age at which the 
respondent left full-time education from the age at time of interview. The differences in 
the length of time spent in education would then give rise to a variation in potential 
experience in the sample. However, the use of potential experience is particularly 
problematic in our sample since there will be less variation in this variable, (because 
every female is the same age), compared to other data sets sampled across the 
population. From Table 5.15, it seems that the potential experience overestimates actual 
work experience by around 3 years (mean 15.8 years against mean 12.9 years in 1991). 
It is also clear from Table 5.16 that the use of potential experience biases the estimated 
returns to experience upward. One year of additional potential experience is associated 
with a return of 21 per cent. One year of additional actual work experience generates a 
return of 5 per cent. The cumulative effect of these different returns is that a woman 
' Strictly this percentage interpretation only applies to small coefficients. 
2 Johnson and Makepeace (1997) note the importance of lifetime histories, although their focus is the 
examination of lifetime earnings (rather than the analysis of current earnings). 
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with 17 years of experience, (near the maximum in our sample), will have earnings 64 
log points higher than a woman with 1 years experience on the actual measure, but 
earnings more than 87 log points higher when using the potential experience measure, 
other things equal. These estimates do not control for other characteristics. However, 
this is sufficient to highlight the danger of using potential experience in work of this 
kind and in the rest of what follows, we use actual work experience. 
5.3.2 Empirical Specifications 
We begin with a basic human capital specification with a quadratic in experience and 
dummy variables for the level of educational attainment, and then test for the robustness 
of the estimates to the addition of extra controls, and the functional form of experience. 
Unless otherwise specified, all statistical tests are carried out at the . 95 per cent 
confidence level. We use educational qualifications (degree, technical, `A' level, `O' 
level, low, and no qualifications (the default category)) rather than a measure of years of 
schooling, as the results in this section show that the returns to educational attainment 
are non-linear and rise in discrete steps. Due to the concerns raised over the issue of 
unobserved ability biasing the returns to education and experience, we include 
information on the cohort member's ranking in a test of reading skills at the age of 
seven4 to try and capture any ability effects. We include dummy variables for the 
presence of children and the presence of a child under the age of 4 years. Since the 
presence of children will reduce the amount of work experience accumulated, any effect 
from these two variables will capture the additional possible effect of children on 
reservation wages, having controlled for the effect of having children via lower work 
experience. We also include ten dummy variables for the region of residence (North, 
North-West, Yorkshire and the Humber, Wales, West Midlands, East Midlands, East 
Anglia, South West, Scotland, with London and the South East as the default category). 
Other controls include marital status, one-digit industry dummies and workplace 
controls for membership of a union (or staff association), part-time working, the private 
sector, and establishment size over 50 employees. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1997) 
highlight the importance of the use of computers in driving wage determination, 
' Compare . 234* 17 - . 
01 *(17)2 - (. 234*(1) -. 01 *(1)2 )_ . 866 using potential experience with . 054* 17 - 
. 0008*(17)2 -( . 
054*(1) -. 0008*(1)2) . 637 using actual experience coefficients in Table 5.16. 
4 Use of a similar ranking in mathematical ability at age seven did not prove significant. 
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possibly as a proxy for unobserved skill. We therefore include the use of a visual 
display unit at work amongst the set of controls. 
Table 5.17 shows that the estimated coefficients for the basic wage equation (column I) 
are consistent with those found in the literature. The addition of controls (columns II 
and III) halves the estimated returns to work experience from 5 to 2.5 per cent a year. 5 
The positive returns to educational attainment with respect to the reference category are 
similarly reduced. A graduate member of the cohort earns around 30 per cent more than 
an individual with no educational qualifications, (the default category). The inclusion of 
current job tenure, as an additional control for firm-specific capital, does not affect the 
general pattern of results. The estimated return to one extra year of job tenure is around 
0.7 per cent (column III) and the other coefficients are changed little. 6 
The remaining controls behave as expected. Wages are seen to be around 9 per cent 
higher for those in the unionised sector, whilst wages for part-time workers are around 
28 per cent lower, (in column III). Interestingly, the use of a visual display unit at work 
is associated with a 20 per cent pay reward. This could be indicative of unobservable 
skill differences for those workers who have the capacity to use new technology or it 
may simply reflect the lack of occupational controls. 7 The individuals in the bottom 
fifth of the reading ability distribution at the age of seven earn around 7 per cent less 
than their counterparts in the top fifth, other things equal. Women with children under 
four command earnings that are around 12 percent higher than the earnings of women 
with older children, but around 4 percent lower than the wages of women without 
children, (the sum of the coefficients on kids and young kid). This is almost certainly 
because only high-wage women can afford the high childcare costs of very young 
children (an issue which also arises in Chapter 6 using the BHPS data). 
s The F-test at a conventional 5 per cent level of significance for the validity of the inclusion of the extra 
variables given by 
F= [(RSS-URSS)/J] / URSS/(n-k) = [(1236.9-926.3)/31] / 926.3/(4574-38) -F (31,4536) = 50.1 
F95 (31,4536) = 1.46, is accepted. 
6 To the extent that the controls for ability and the use of computers do not capture fully the impact of 
unobservables, then the coefficient on job tenure may be biased. See Topel (1991) for an alternative 
method of dealing with this issue using panel data. The NCDS data set does not allow this because the 
wage at the start of the current job 
is not observed. 
The vdu result is robust to the inclusion of one-digit occupational controls, but we choose to work 
without such dummies due to concerns that their incorporation in a wage equation would be too 
deterministic. Knowledge of a woman's occupation will give a fair indication of that person's wage. 
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Table 5.18 first tests the functional form of experience by including first, higher order 
polynomials (column I), second, splines with knots at 12 and 16 years (column II), and 
finally, dummy variables for each year of experience (column III). The cubic 
specification suggests that the usual quadratic may not fully capture the relationship 
between experience and earnings. 8 The spline specification encapsulates the relationship 
in a slightly different form. It estimates the wage equation with three dummies to 
represent different levels of experience, and constrains the estimation to be continuous 
at the knots. The coefficients measure the change in slope from the preceding spline 
and are therefore additive. The spline function suggests that those individuals with 
intermediate amounts of experience (between 12 and 16 years) earn less than others. 
This is confirmed by the dummy variable specification of column III. Earnings are 
highest among those with eleven to twelve years of work experience. This may reflect 
the additional impact of a degree qualification that is not fully captured by the graduate 
dummy variable. Since these specifications are not nested, the dependent variable is the 
same, so we can look at the adjusted R2 to compare the goodness of fit. The 
specification that includes the experience dummies proves superior in fit, but the 
difference in the adjusted R2 is not large relative to the quadratic specification. We 
proceed with the latter in what follows. 
Full- and Part-time Experience 
The summary statistics in Table 5.11 and 5.12 suggest that part-time status reduce 
hourly earnings. Stratton (1995) suggests that failure to account for differences in 
earnings between full- and part-time jobs may bias upwards estimates of any 
depreciation in human capital resulting from time out of work, if part-time work carries 
a pay penalty, and more women return to part-time work after time out. The final 
column of Table 5.18, therefore, splits the total work experience into its full- and part- 
time components -9 The results 
indicate that all the returns to additional experience are 
confined to full-time work. Additional years of part-time work experience do not raise 
earnings. Later, Table 5.20 goes on to include the length of time not in work along with 
the split of total work experience into its full- and part-time components. Once more, 
8 Murphy and Welch (1990) arrive at a similar conclusion using U. S. data. 
9Part-time working is self-defined by respondents. 
84 
we witness that positive returns to work experience are only associated with a return to 
full-time work. 
5.3.3 The Restoration Model 
Tables 5.11 to 5.14 established the existence of the negative impact of a work 
interruption on wages. This section seeks to analyse the nature of the time out effect 
more closely. Initially, we follow the methodology set out in Mincer and Ofek (1982). 
Pre- and Post-gap Work Experience 
In our data, some of the women who have experienced a break from work in the past 
have been in their present job for some time. Mincer and Ofek suggest that renewed 
participation in paid employment triggers the restoration of skills lost while out of work. 
We would expect then that the negative effect of a withdrawal from the labour market 
on earnings is moderated by time spent back in work. However, whether the earnings of 
an intermittent participant catch up with those of a continuous worker is debatable. 
Later, in Chapter 5, we present additional evidence as to why earnings for those with a 
break do not reach the same level. Here, we begin to address this issue by splitting the 
total work experience term into pre-gap and post-gap work experience, where the gap 
referred to concerns the most recent break. Since total work experience (totspell) is the 
sum of pre-gap work experience (preout) and post-gap work experience (postout) we 
have totspell=preout+postout, such that the wage equation in Equation (4.20) can be 
rewritten as 
In W= ßo + (3i preout + ß2 Postout + P3 (preout + postout)2 +7V (5.1) 
Expansion of the term in parentheses leads to 
In W= Po + PI preout + P2 Postout + P3 preout2 + P4postout2 + 2ß5 prepost + yV 
(5.2) 
where prepost is the interaction term generated from multiplying pre- and post-gap work 
experience and V represents a vector of individual-specific variables. This specification 
suggests the possibility that the returns to work experience before and after the last 
break may vary. Table 5.19 (columns I and V) reports the results from replacing actual 
work experience in this way. 
The coefficients on the squared terms are not restricted to 
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be equal. The levels of work experience for those with no recorded gap are included in 
the pre-gap experience terms. The second set of results in the table, (columns V to 
VIII), are for the sub-sample of women who have experienced some spell out of work. 
The results confirm that the impact on wages of the most recent work experience 
obtained after a break (postout) is larger than that of the pre-gap work experience 
(preout) (for the sample of all female workers and the sample of all workers with a 
break, respectively). The coefficients on experience, their squares and the interaction 
term imply that the effect of one year's experience after a break increases earnings by 
around 3.1 per cent, whilst one year's experience before a break raises current wages by 
around . 008 per cent 
(column I), or by 5 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively (column 
V). Columns II and VI use total time out of work rather than total time in work as a 
proxy for experience. The results suggest that one year of time spent not in work 
reduces earnings by around 1 per cent. 
At the interview survey date for Sweep 5 in 1991, for our sample of working women, 
we have constructed the duration of the length of the most recent spell out of work (hi), 
the sum of the length of all other spells out of work (ho), years of work experience after 
the most recent spell of nonparticipation (el), together with current job tenure and years 
of work experience prior to the most recent break (ea) following the general form: 
1nW=rsS+ß2eo+ß3e1+ßaho+ßshi+ß6V (5.3) 
Columns III and VII of Table 5.19 demonstrate that the coefficient on years spent out of 
work is robust to the inclusion of pre- and post-gap experience. Post-gap experience 
continues to have more of a positive impact on earnings. Columns IV and VIII estimate 
Equation (5.3). The coefficient on the last interruption period, hi, is negative and 
significant, for the total sample of women and for the sub-sample of intermittent 
workers. In line with Mincer and Ofek (1982), we find that previous non-work spells do 
not have such a severe impact on earnings as the most recent period of non-work. The 
short run negative effect on wages of the last non-work period, hi, ranges between 1.6 
and 2.1 per cent a year depending on the sample. However, the negative effect on wages 
of the total duration of all previous non-work spells, ho, is estimated to range from 0.3 to 
1 per cent per year. Tenure in a job in 1991 accounts for some of the re-entry rise in 
post-break wages. For our total sample of women, current job tenure raises the wages of 
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the combined sample by 0.6 per cent at the mean. This is in line with the Mincer and 
Ofek interpretation of the appreciation in real wages following a return to work that 
highlights the rapid re-acquisition of lost skills. 
Table 5.20 includes both total work experience and out of work experience in the same 
specification, (columns I and III). The effect is to reduce the estimated return to work 
experience by around 1 percentage point to around 1.5 per cent a year, (compare column 
I with column III in Table 5.17). Note also that one year out of work, on average, 
reduces current earnings by more than one year's additional work experience. This 
suggests, however, that it may not be the case that time out of work can be modelled 
simply as a reduction in the amount of total work experience. There may be additional 
effects and it is important to allow for these in wage equations. We return to this issue 
and discuss the possible causes of this finding in Section 5.3.4 and Section 5.4. 
In order to continue to assess the hypothesis contained in Stratton (1995) that failure to 
distinguish between full-time and part-time work experience may overestimate the 
penalty to time out, we compare the results in column I with a specification that splits 
total work time accordingly (column II). The exercise is again repeated for the sub- 
sample of women with a career break (column IV). Column I includes a dummy 
variable for part-time working. The estimated coefficient for this variable indicates that 
hourly wages are 27 per cent lower for women in part-time work, consistent with the 
findings in the overview in Chapter 2. When actual experience is split into full and part- 
time work experience, the results show that all the positive returns to work experience 
accrue to full-time work experience. The F tests for equality of coefficients on the part- 
time and full-time experience variables are rejected at the 95% significance level. There 
appear to be significant negative wage returns to part-time working in both samples of 
women. This may explain why the gender wage gap for women in part-time work, 
observed in Chapter 2, has widened relative to men and women in full-time work over 
time. There appear to be no gains to part-time, only to full-time work experience. 
Distinguishing between different types of periods spent out of work 
Once an individual has had a break from continuous employment, the cost of this is 
long-term and far-reaching. If we view this loss as a result of the erosion of job-specific 
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skills, then we would expect a similar process whatever the nature of the non-work 
break. If, however, the worker decides to invest in education and this is later to be 
rewarded in the labour market, then the negative impact of a break may be outweighed 
on re-entry. Equally, unemployment may scar workers more than a spell in home 
production. 1° This section explores the impact on wages of breaks spent in education, 
unemployment or some other activity in addition to spending time in domestic duties. 
Table 5.21 shows that the negative impact of time out of work observed earlier is 
confined to breaks spent in domestic duties, unemployment and sickness (or disability) 
or the other, catch-all, category. One additional year spent in a period of unemployment 
reduces wages by some 7.9 per cent, whilst one extra year spent in a period of domestic 
duties reduces wages by some 4.6 per cent. These effects are statistically significantly 
different according to the standard F test for equality of the regression coefficients on 
the levels and squares of the unemployment and home time variables, although this is 
not the case for the sub-sample of women excluding continuous workers. In contrast, a 
year in education raises earnings by some 6 per cent, (column I). This indicates that 
breaks that could be expected to enhance human capital have precisely the expected 
effect on earnings. The addition of controls for actual work experience raise the penalty 
on unemployment, home time and other, unspecified breaks further (column III) .11 
5.3.4 Short run and Permanent Effects of Breaks 
The NCDS data set enables us to distinguish between career interruptions of different 
types and to analyse the transitory effects of such career breaks. Table 5.20 suggests that 
one year out of work does not have an equal and opposite effect to one extra year's work 
experience in a wage equation. Furthermore, as Table 5.21 shows, the type of 
interruption affects the size of the earnings penalty. We now examine whether the 
interruption type also matters for the rebound effect. We commence with a version of 
the Groot and van Ours (1994) model, where all interruptions are grouped into a single 
time out category. We later split this into the four non-work types used above. In this 
latter case as explained in Chapter 4, total experience for individual i takes the form: 
10 See Ruhm (1991) for a discussion of scarring. 
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totspelliTreoutspi+ß2Ui+ß30i +ß4 Hi +R5 Edi +ß6Ru, i+ß7Ro, i +ß8Rh, i 
+ß9Red, i +ß 1 O(Ti-Ru, i-R), i-Rh, i-Red, i) (5.4) 
where totspell is the total amount of work experience, preoutsp is the experience before 
job loss (or total work experience in the case of continuous female workers), Rj the 
rebound period following re-entry from state j, and T is tenure in the current job. Groot 
and van Ours (1994) assume the length of the rebound period is 24 months, because this 
is the maximum length of probation in new jobs in the Netherlands during which time 
workers may be dismissed with out notice. In Britain, at the time of our sample, a 
similar probationary period pertained to full-time jobs. The qualifying period for part- 
time jobs was five years. 12 We, therefore, work with the 24 months constraint and test 
for whether the coefficient on this rebound period is different from the coefficient on 
current tenure net of the rebound. 
Table 5.29, column I, presents the simple version of the model. The results confirm our 
earlier findings that destruction of human capital takes place, as a result of time spent 
out of work. The short run negative effect on wages of the last non-work period, hi, is 
2.0 per cent a year. The rebound effect is not significantly different from the effect of 
subsequent tenure in the current job, (witness the confidence interval implied by the 
standard error on rebound). Column III indicates that both the penalties to time out and 
the rebound effect differ when we control for the type of break. The rebound effect is 
positive and strong after periods spent in education and the other, unspecified category. 
Again, according to the conventional F test, there appear to be significantly higher 
penalties for the last unemployment spell than for the last home time spell. There is no 
evidence of a rebound effect for those whose last break was spent in unemployment or 
home production. The coefficients on these two variables are individually insignificant 
and jointly statistically undistinguishable. 
5.3.5 Diagnostic Checks 
Before proceeding further, we assess the sensitivity of the results so far across subsets of 
the data. We do this in three ways. First, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to 
the influence of particular observations in the sample, paying close attention to the size 
" Of course, all results hinge upon accurate respondent recall. As previously mentioned, Elias (1991), 
amongst others, has studied the reliability of retrospective data. We acknowledge here that life events 
such as childbirth are usually associated with a 
high level of recall accuracy. 
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of the residuals and the amount of leverage associated with these observations. Second, 
we re-estimate some key equations across subsets of the sample defined according to 
educational level attained and by manual non-manual status, in order to observe whether 
the results hold across these sub-groups. Third, we undertake quantile regressions at 
different points in the earnings distribution in order to see whether there are differences 
in the response of wages to the work experience and other key variables at different 
quantiles of the wage distribution. 
Leverage and Residual Outliers 
Table 5.22 reports the results of three specifications with and without adjustments for 
the effects of outlying residuals and leverage. Individual observations lying away from 
the mass of sample observations are said to have high leverage if the regression line 
passes close to them. Were this observation not present in the data, its removal may 
have a large effect on the estimated regression line. Conversely, individual observations 
lying far away from the fitted regression line, where the predicted value of the 
dependent variable is far away from the actual value (so-called outlying residuals) may 
also exert undue influence on the estimates. The regression estimates are forced to pass 
13 closer to these observations than may be necessary. 
We take three specifications from the previous results, (columns I and II in Table 5.20 
and column III in Table 5.21), and run them over the sub-sample without including the 
observations with high leverage or large studentised residuals. We use two methods of 
assessing the combined effect of leverage and the residuals: the Welsh and Kuh (1977) 
statistic and the Cook's Distance statistic (Cook (1977)). Essentially, these statistics are 
weighted indices representing the combined effect of the size of residuals and the size of 
leverage. 14 We remove those observations which exceed the values 2 i/(k/n) on the 
Welsh and Kuh (1977) measure, (where k is the number of right hand side variables, and 
n is the sample size) or exceed the value 4/n, when using the Cook's Distance statistic, 
12 European Union regulations later equalised the qualifying period to two years. 
" For example, individuals with very high or very low hourly wages might be thought to have potentially 
high leverage in our sample. An individual with measurement error generating low wages, but with a lot 
of full-time work experience may give rise to a residual outlier in our estimates. 
'a The Welsch and Kuh statistic is d= r; 
'(hj(1-h; ) ) where r; are the studentised residuals, dividing each 
residual by its appropriate standard error, r; = e; 
/(s; I1-h; ) and hi is the leverage measures obtained 
from the diagonal elements of the hat matrix H= X(X'X)-'X'. 
The Cook's Distance is then [ 1/k (s i/ s2) ] d; 
2 where k is the number of variables, s is the root mean 
square error, and s; is the root mean square error when the i`h observation is omitted. 
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as recommended by the respective authors, since these may be the observations that 
pose the greatest cause for concern. 
Table 5.22 gives the results. We present results for all women, (columns I, III and V) 
and for the sub-sample not subject to excessive leverage or outliers, (columns II, IV and 
VI). We note that our principle variables of interest, total length of non-work spell 
(outspell) and total work experience, are affected negligibly by the removal of 
observations with high leverage and studentised residuals. The negative impact of non- 
work time is marginally reduced whilst the positive return to experience is raised 
slightly. The effects of different types of full and part-time work and of the different 
types of non-work time are also little changed. As the effects are so slight, we continue 
to work with the full sample in what follows. 
Do the results hold across groups of women with different levels of education and 
occupational status? 
Table 5.23 reports our three specifications estimated over two different sub-samples: 
that of women with low (A' level and below) and high educational qualifications. 15 
There is some evidence that the returns to experience and time out do vary by education. 
While the estimated overall penalty to an out of work spell is similar across the two 
groups, the estimated returns to work experience are higher for the lower education 
group. This holds for the samples of all women in work in 1991 and the sub-sample of 
women with some career break. The penalty to part-time work is larger for those with 
higher qualifications, as are the penalties to unemployment. Of the other variables, it is 
interesting to note that the union wage premium is greater for the higher education 
group and that the large firm effect is greater for the low education group. 
We next perform a similar exercise, by splitting the sample of women into manual and 
non-manual occupations. The results are reported in Table 5.24. The general pattern of 
results is similar to that of Table 5.23, because of the high correlation between education 
and occupation. Hence, the return to work experience for manual workers is higher than 
for non-manuals and the penalties to part-time work, unemployment and child care are 
's Those with higher technical qualifications and degrees comprise around one third of the sample. 
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greater for non-manual workers. In all cases the sample split is accepted on the basis of 
a Chow test for equality of coefficients across the two groups. 16 
Quantile regressions 
We next see whether our results hold across different groups of women, as defined by 
their earnings ranking in the wage distribution. To do this, we undertake quantile 
regression estimation: estimating the median, 25th and 75`' percentile of the log hourly 
wage distribution conditional on the set of independent variables used in our preferred 
specifications highlighted above. Quantile regression finds a line through our data that 
minimises the sum of the absolute residuals, rather than the sum of the squared 
residuals. 
Let q be the quantile to be estimated, 0<q<1. Let the residual for each observation be 
rj = Yj -ßjx ij (5.5). 
Let h; = 2q if r; >0 (that is, positive residuals) 
= 2( 1- q) otherwise (negative residuals). 
The quantity being minimised with respect to ßj is Ir1 1h j. The quantiles other 
than the median are estimated by weighting the residuals. When estimating the 75th 
quantile regression, for example, the negative residuals are weighted by 0.5, and the 
positive residuals are weighted by 1.5. The useful features of quantile regressions are 
summarised in Buchinsky (1998). For our purposes, we wish to see whether changes in 
the set of explanatory variables, notably those connected with work experience, provoke 
a different response in the dependent variable at various quantiles of the wage 
distribution. 
Table 5.25 reports the coefficients, standard errors and the pseudo R2 for various 
quantiles'7 for the three models using the entire sample of women and the sample of 
women who have had a break. Here, where the standard errors are potentially 
16 Using the Chow test, F(k, N1+N2 -2k) =[ Rest. RSS - Unrest. RSS]/k / Unrest. RSS / (N1+N2 -2k), 
where Unrest. RSS is calculated as the sum of the RSS from the separate regressions for manual and non- 
manual with sample sizes Ni and 
N2, Rest. RSS is the RSS from the pooled regression and k is the 
number of right hand side variables 
including the constant. 
17 The pseudo R2 we use here is 1- 
[( sum of weighted deviations about the estimated quantile sum 
of weighted deviations about the raw quantile) 
]. 
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heteroscedastic, the standard errors were obtained by the bootstrapping method using 
100 replications (see Koenker and Bassett (1982) ). 18 
The Table shows clearly that the returns to work experience increase as we move up the 
wage distribution (the coefficient on actual work experience becomes larger as we move 
from the 25th to the 50th to the 75th percentile). Similarly, the negative impact of time 
spent not in work (outspell) is larger, the higher up the wage distribution. This suggests 
that the simple splits in the preceding section into education and occupation were too 
crude to pick up the subtleties of the underlying data generating process. While the 
coefficients on full-time work are not significantly different from each other across the 
quantiles, the penalty to part-time work is larger at the 75`" percentile. The penalty to a 
spell of unemployment is lower at the bottom quarter of the wage distribution, whilst at 
the middle and top end the effects are similar. However, the negative impact of a spell 
in childcare, rises as we move up the wage distribution. Note that the other control 
variables of interest do not change much over the quantiles. 
Summary 
Essentially, this Chapter focuses upon whether women with career breaks command 
lower wages on their return to the labour market. This Section has shown that there are 
significant wage penalties for time spent not in work. On average, a year spent out of 
work is associated with a loss of earnings of the order of 2 per cent. However, there are 
large variations around this average with, notably, the penalty to time out being roughly 
3.5 times larger at the 75th percentile of the wage distribution than at the 25th percentile. 
Time out spent in unemployment carries the largest wage penalty, whereas time spent in 
education and training increases subsequent earnings. It is also apparent that most of the 
returns to work experience are found in full-time and not part-time work. The penalties 
to time out persist in the presence a large number of controls. It is possible, however, 
that these results derive from any remaining unobserved heterogeneity that is associated 
with earnings determination. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
18 Given a sample of size N, the bootstrapping procedure draws a sample also of size N, but with 
replacement. In this case, the method runs 
100 quantile regressions, calculates the standard error of the 
estimates for each sample, and then 
finally takes the average of these estimates. 
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5.4 Issues of Selectivity 
5.4.1 Estimation Allowing for Selectivity 
The last section illustrated how the effect of spending time away from continuous 
employment had a negative and significant effect on wages. However, if unobserved 
characteristics play an important part in wage determination then the negative effect that 
we observed may be biased, if unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for. Given a 
general wage equation of the form: 
In W; = ß; x; +u; 
U1 =µ; +( i (5.6) 
then we may think of the error term, as consisting of two components: , u,, the 
unobserved characteristics that are assumed to remain fixed over time and which may be 
correlated with the observable characteristics, and (p;, a white noise error term. It is 
possible that some of the regressors (for example, experience, time out and job tenure) 
could be correlated with one or both of these error components. The literature generally 
deals with this by instrumentation, fixed effects or selectivity methods. Two issues 
arise. First, as Sections 5.2 and 5.3 suggest, non-working women may systematically 
differ from their working -counterparts, and so our results may not generalise to the 
sample of women as a whole. Second, as suggested in Chapter 4, (Section 4.2), women 
may choose to take time out of work in accordance with some unobservable 
characteristic (and thereby possess less work experience). This characteristic may be 
correlated with some bundle of attributes that are remunerated at a low wage. That is, 
would this group of workers receive a low wage even if they were continuously 
employed? If this is so, then the inclusion of a time out dummy variable amongst the 
list of regressors in (5.6) may incorporate something other than merely the effects of a 
career break. In other words, the time out dummy variable may be endogenous. This 
second type of selectivity we refer to as the treatment effect. We address each of these 
issues sequentially, rather than attempt to model them simultaneously. 19 
19 See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) for an attempt to Account for these two effects simultaneously 
(participation and the self-selection of experience) in a dynamic, structural model of labour supply. 
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5.4.2 Selection Models 
We begin by using the standard selectivity approach. It may be the case that the 
estimation process needs to be adjusted for incidental truncation of the error term. The 
sub-sample of working women may not be representative of the population of women as 
a whole. Since labour supply theory suggests individuals will participate in the labour 
market only if the wage offer exceeds their reservation wage, then wages are only 
observed for those women with a wage offer in excess of the reservation wage. So the 
(accepted) wage we observe is incidentally truncated. In other words, it is observed 
only for the sub-sample of women with an offered wage that exceeds their reservation 
wage. 
Our approach to this issue is to view, simultaneous to the wage equation in (5.6), an 
associated employment equation. Let P, be some unobservable index, reflecting the 
process whereby the decision to work is determined20 which depends on a set of 
characteristics w, so that 
Pi. =y'wi+E; (5.7) 
We observe participation in work as follows 
p1=1 if Pi*> 0 
Pi =0 otherwise (5.8) 
that is, only if the latent variable P, exceeds a given threshold which prompts women 
to enter work. 
Given a wage equation of the form, 
1nW; =P x1+ui (5.9) 
W, is observed only for the sub-sample of working women, so that the error term 
becomes conditional on positive participation. Let the correlation coefficient between 
the error terms, ui and s;, be p. That is, there are unobserved influences on the 
probability of a female not working, which are not controlled for in (5.8), that may have 
wage-depressing effects in the wage equation (5.9). To obtain a model that applies to 
the observations in our sample, Heckman (1979) shows that the correlation between 
20 Hardoy (1998) refines such analysis by drawing out the distinction between selection rules and the 
sampling rules. Person-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity may bias results due to the treatment selectivity 
issues (which we deal with here), and also due to the rules by which individuals are sampled. We leave 
the extension that the latter provokes to 
further work. 
95 
errors results in the expected value of earnings, for the sample of working women, 
becoming: 
E[1nW; IP, =1]=ß'xi +E[u1IPi=1]=ß'xi +E[uilE; >-y'w1] 
Using the rules on means of truncated bivariate normal distributions, this expression can 
be written as 
=ß'"x +pau 
ý(Y., w, ) (5.10)21 
The term ' =, % ; (5.11) 
is the inverse Mills ratio. By estimating the model, but omitting 2;, the coefficients in 
the least squares estimation are biased. The process needs to be moderated by the 
inclusion of Ai. 
The estimation procedure is as follows. Whether or not a female works is estimated 
using a standard probit model. It is desirable, though not technically necessary, to 
require that the probit equation contain variables that do not appear in the wage equation 
(the identification issue). 2 Chapter 2 shows that female participation is influenced by 
household composition. Female non-participation may be thought to be a function of 
such variables as the number and age of youngest children at home and partner's labour 
market status. We use these variables and the previous part-time work status variable 
represented in the vector wi to identify our selection equation. The inverse Mills ratio 
are subsequently calculated using the predicted values from the probit over the whole 
sample of NCDS women. When included in the wage equation, the coefficient on this 
term, j 
8A p a,, , captures the correlation 
between participation and the wage equation. 
21 Note that [4(y'w)] / [d(Y'w)] = [4(-Y'w) ]/ [l-((-Y'w)] _X since the standard normal distribution is 
symmetric. 
22 If all the variables that appear 
in the probit equation also appear in the wage equation then identification 
proceeds on the basis that the 
inverse Mills ratio is a non-linear function of the variables concerned, but 
this is a rather tenuous foundation on which to proceed. It should also be borne in mind that selectivity 
estimates may be very sensitive 
to the choice of variables included in the probit equation. 
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The Treatment Effect 
The second selection issue deals with the potential endogeneity of the time out (or 
experience) variable when included on the right hand side of the wage equation. 
Individuals who choose a period of home time may be essentially different to those who 
do not. If a woman would have commanded a low market wage whether or not she had 
had hometime, but is observed in our sample as having had a period outside the 
workforce, then the estimated coefficient on time out may overestimate the impact of a 
career break. This issue may be illustrated by using a simple dummy variable for home 
time, TO; , as the experience-type variable 
in our wage equation. This cannot be treated 
as exogenous, if the individual herself has chosen to take such a break. Rather than deal 
with the issue of participation as above, the treatment model deals with the problem of a 
potentially endogenous dummy variable. Let T, be some unobservable index, reflecting 
the process whereby home time is selected, which depends on a set of explanatory 
variables, Z,. So, 
T; `=Y'Z; +-r; 
and we observe a dummy variable 
TO; = 1 if Ti* >0 that is, time out is taken, 
TO; =0 otherwise 
Given a wage equation of the form: 
lnW; =ß; x; +STO; +u; 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
if the probability of having taken hometime is correlated with z, there are influences on 
the probability of a female taking home time that also have wage-depressing effects in 
the wage equation (5.13). It follows that the expected value of earnings for the subset of 
women with time out is given by 
E[1nW; ITO; =1]=ß'x; +S+E[u; ITO; =1 ] 
which, if r and ui have a bivariate standard normal distribution, is given by 
E[In W1IT0; =1]=ß'"xi +S+pcry 
Oý; 
'z') 
where, as before, 
±' 
= X, , but now defined over the set of variables, z. 
Similarly, for the subset of continuous workers, 
(5.14) 
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Notice that the difference in expected earnings for those who receive the time out 
treatment and those who do not is 
E[1nW; ITOi=l]-E[1nW; IT0; =0] =8+po-u 
1' 
(5.16) 
(D, (1-(D, ) 
The net result will be a different estimate of 8 that will account for the self-selecting 
nature of time out. By estimating the model, but omitting A, , the difference 
in earnings 
between the two groups is exaggerated if the correlation between the error terms (-rand 
u), p, is greater than zero. In this case, the least squares procedure overestimates the 
negative impact of time out, TO,. 2i captures other wage-depressing characteristics of 
women not associated with the home time experience. For women with time out, labour 
market wages may have been lower compared to their continuous counterparts had their 
participation remained uninterrupted. A priori, we would expect the coefficient on A; 
(pes) to be positive and significant, given that some women select periods of home time 
through voluntary choice. 
The estimation procedure of the model is as follows. Whether or not a female has had 
time out is estimated using the standard Probit Model. The inverse Mills ratio are 
subsequently calculated using the predicted values from the probit on the sample of 
NCDS women in work, (not on all women in the sample, as with the standard selection 
model). Again the results may depend on which variables are included in the selection 
equation but not the wage equation. We use the same set of identifiers, age of youngest 
child, previous part-time work status and partner's labour market status, as in the 
standard selection probits to identify the probability of having taken time out. These 
variables do not enter the associated wage equation. 
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Instrumenting Dummy Endogenous Variables 
Bowden and Turkington (1990). 23 show that the problem of an endogenous explanatory 
dummy variable can also be addressed using an instrumental variable approach. Rather 
than include a selection correction term in the wage equation, they suggest that the 
endogenous dummy variable can be instrumented directly. Given a set of exogenous 
variables, w,, that explain time out (but not wages), then define an instrument, 
TO, =1 if individual i is predicted to have had time out 
=0 otherwise (s. i7) 
The predictions are based on a probit equation of time out on the set of exogenous 
variables, w; . Note that this 
is the same probit equation as appears in the first stage of 
the treatment selection model. If the predicted probability of having had time out in the 
past is greater than or equal to 0.5, we assign the individual to the TO, =1, category. If 
the predicted probability is less than 0.5, the individual is assigned to the TO, = 0, 
category. This variable is then included as an instrument for TO; in the wage equation. 24 
Results 
Table 5.26 reports the Heckman selectivity corrected wage equations, where the 
selection controls for the participation of women in work. The initial probit 
specification (column I) shows that the probability of being observed in employment is 
positively related to post-compulsory education and marital status, and inversely related 
to the number of children. A history of part-time work is positively associated with 
being in work in 1991. In Table 5.26, we report three specifications of the wage 
equation, reflecting the key findings of the previous section. Our selectivity adjusted 
wage equations in this table (columns II, III and IV) should be compared with those of 
Table 5.17 (column III), Table 5.19 (column III) and Table 5.21 (column III). These 3 
equations contain, respectively, actual experience and its square, actual experience split 
23 Bowden and Turkington (1990) pages 42-44. 
24 While instrumental variable estimates may be consistent, they may still be biased in finite samples. 
Further, such estimates may be inefficient if the instruments are only slightly correlated with the 
endogenous variable. (See Bowden and 
Turkington (1990) and also Johnson and DiNardo (1997). ) 
Greene (1993) points out that the choice of 0.5 as a threshold is arbitrary. We experimented with different 
thresholds and the estimated coefficient on instrumented Time Out varied from around -. 04 to -. 06. 
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into its pre- and post-gap components and actual experience and time out split into its 
constituent components. In none of the specifications is the selectivity term (A) 
significant and, as a result, the coefficient on the variables of interest (education and 
experience) are largely unchanged. 
5 
Table 5.27 reports the results of the treatment model, where the selection now takes 
place on the time out dummy right hand side variable. Column I reports the probit on 
the probability of having had time out, column II gives the results of a wage equation 
containing a time out dummy, and no other experience controls, column III repeats the 
specification including an inverse Mill's ratio (A). Column IV gives wage equation 
estimates where Time Out is instrumented following the procedure outlined earlier. As 
with the previous selection on participation equation, the probability of having had time 
out is positively correlated with higher levels of education, with the number of children 
and with a history of part-time work. The unadjusted coefficient on the time out dummy 
suggests that having had time out is associated with earnings 6.6 log points lower than 
those without time out. The introduction of a selectivity term reduces this a little, such 
that the time out penalty is now associated with earnings that are 5.8 log points lower. 
The instrumented estimate of Time Out in column IV is also lower, at around 4.2 log 
points, and no longer significant. 
26 Together, these results suggest that there may. be a 
small endogeneity effect, whereby women who have time out would have earned lower 
wages even had they had continuous work histories. We refrain from drawing too 
strong a conclusion, however, until a satisfactory set of instruments can be found. 
Extension to Multiple Selection Outcomes 
Following Lee (1983), the selectivity approach can be extended to the case where there 
are more than two outcomes. As recognised by Groot and van Ours (1994), the 
selectivity problem may not be confined to the simple observation of whether or not 
women are in work; or confined to one potentially endogenous dummy variable. 
Women may be employed having never had an interruption, may be back in work 
following a break (with or without passing a probationary period) or they may not be in 
25 These results are sensitive to the choice of 
identifier. We tried various specifications of the probit 
model, but the results were little changed. 
26 An increase in the estimated standard error is a common feature of instrumentation. 
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work at all. Allocation across these labour market states is not likely to be random. 
Any attempts to estimate rebound effects or the returns to work experience may suffer 
from selectivity bias, as the resulting groups may be a self-selected sample. 
The extension from the two variable case to the case where there are more than two 
options is relatively simple. This new approach is similar to the two step Heckman 
(1978) method for endogenous dummy variables. The probit selection equation is 
replaced by a multinomial logit estimation routine. The equation essentially estimates 
the probabilities of being in the different labour force categories. 
Let I=1 if the i`h woman is observed in labour force categoryj. Otherwise I'=0 
(j =1,... , n) where n reflects the total number of 
labour force status categories 
included. The worker will only be observed in labour force categoryj if the index 
V; aj+ci>max(EkV; «k+s; k, 0) fori#k, i, k=1,..., n (5.18) 
where V is a vector of characteristics determining the labour force status of the 
individual, with associated coefficients a, and s; is a random term capturing unmeasured 
determinants on labour force categories. Assuming e, has a logistic distribution 
generates the multinomial logit model. 
Following Lee (1983) the multinomial logit distributions are transformed to standard 
normal random variables and the selectivity bias correction term for category j (that is, 
Ay) becomes 
Aid =Iii %ii -(1-I, i)X [(1-F(V; aj))/F(Vicc j)] (5.19) 
where A_0 (1(V ra j)) / F(V ia j) . F(V ,a j) is Prob(I ,= 1) in the multinomial 
logit distribution and J( Vta j) =« 
'(F(V 
iaj )) which converts the estimated 
multinomial logit probability into a value on the cumulative standard normal 
distribution function abscissa. These correction terms are then added to the wage 
equation, so that we estimate 
Ln wagei = ßo + PI Si + ß2 Xi + 
ß3 Xi2 +7Z+w1 Ai i+ c02Ai2 + ... + UJnAin + Ui 
(5.20) 
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The coefficients on the cv; are the covariances between J( V ;a j) and u;. Negativity of 
the ch coefficients indicates that the lower the reservation wage becomes, the higher the 
probability that a worker will find a job. Positivity of cif; suggests that an individual who 
is out of work may have a positive probability of receiving offers of employment. 
The results of the multinomial logit selection equations are given in Table 5.28 (a) and 
(b). We report two selection equations. The first uses four labour force states: 
continuous employment, work returners with current tenure less than the assumed 
rebound period of 24 months, work returners with current tenure 24 months (or above), 
and those not in work. To allow for the possibility, as revealed by earlier results, that 
the various out of work states may have different effects on the rebound, we use a 
second selection equation (Table 5.28(b)). This splits work returners into those who 
have had a break in home production and all other out spell categories: creating 6 labour 
force states in total. 21 The default category in both cases is the set of those women not 
in work. We follow Groot and van Ours in our multinomial logit selection equations by 
including regional, marital status, young child and education dummies and a continuous 
variable for the years of education. Obviously, identification of the wage equation relies 
heavily on non-linearity in the selection terms. Since, we believe that there are few 
variables which truly influence participation and not wages, then the introduction of 
selectivity correction terms, which are effectively non-linear combinations of existing 
variables, (A y= q$ (J( V1 a1)) / F(V ,a j)) in the wage equation, are sufficient to 
identify the model. 
Table 5.28 (a) shows that women with the technical educational attainment are more 
likely to have been in work continuously and that women with young children 'are 
significantly less likely to have been in continuous employment. Table 5.28 (b) reveals 
that women with young children are relatively more likely to have spent time at home 
(rather than any of the other non-work groups) before returning to work (compare 
column II with columns III, IV and V for the young child dummy). 
27 Small sample sizes prevented us from splitting the returners into previously unemployed, in training 
and so on for the multinomial 
logit. 
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Columns II and IV of Table 5.29 give the selectivity adjusted estimates of rebound 
effects in the wage equation, using the estimates from Tables 5.28(a) and (b) 
respectively to calculate the selection terms. The unadjusted estimates are given in 
columns I and III. Column II is the estimate of Equation (5.20), where work experience 
is divided into that attained before the last break, the rebound period after the last break, 
(set to 2 years) and residual tenure (if back in work for greater than 2 years). These 
variables appear alongside a measure of the length of the last break. 
The results suggest that work experience before the last break adds little to current 
earnings and that the 2 year rebound period is insufficient to offset the negative impact 
of a break in employment of more than nine months (compare the coefficient of -. 020 
points a year for time out with the coefficient of . 007 a year for rebound). Thereafter, 
further experience in the job will work to offset these time out effects. The selectivity 
controls in column II, however, reduce, but do not remove, the penalty to time out, (as 
with the earlier treatment model), and strengthen the impact of the rebound effect 
relative to current tenure. The rebound coefficient is now positive, significant and larger 
than the coefficient on job tenure suggesting that all the loss from a break is offset 
within the rebound period, once self-selection is controlled for. 
Column III splits both the duration of the last break and the rebound effect according to 
whether the break was spent in childcare, unemployment, education or some other 
category. As before, the wage penalty to unemployment is significantly larger than the 
penalty to childcare, which in turn is larger than the effect of having had a break in 
education. Childcare (home time) continues to have a negative effect on pay even after 
allowing for selectivity effects The rebound effects on education and the other, 
unspecified, category are much larger than the rebound effects on childcare and 
unemployment (if anything, the latter are negative). In the absence of controls for 
selectivity, earnings restoration after having had a break spent in childcare or 
unemployment occurs after the end of the two-year rebound period. However, 
following the inclusion of the selectivity controls in column IV, the magnitude of all the 
rebound coefficients are 
increased again. The rebound coefficients on unemployment 
and home time are no longer negative, 
but are insignificantly different from zero. For a 
spell in childcare, the coefficients suggest that the wage effect of a one-year break will 
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be offset following one year spent back in work. For a one-year spell in unemployment, 
this effect will be achieved after two years. The rebound effect is larger for women with 
unemployment, but the penalty to time out of work for women with unemployment is 
also larger compared to women with child care. Thus the overall penalty is larger for 
women with a spell of unemployment. The selectivity terms confirm that there is 
positive association between continuous work and wages and that wages for those 
women back in work for more than two years are larger than for more recent returners. 
However, in the absence of an appropriate identifier, we merely note that including 
selection terms has the expected effect on experience and we leave the search for better 
instruments to future work. 
5.5 First Difference Estimation 
The preceding section attempts to control for the effects associated with women 
selecting themselves into periods of non-paid work. The unobserved differences 
between workers which lead them to take career breaks may play a key role in 
explaining the wage penalty between continuous and intermittent workers. 
Unequivocally, there exist differences between groups of women that cannot be 
accounted for by differences in human capital endowments. An alternative way of 
dealing with these unobserved effects (such as motivation) is to assume that they do not 
vary over time. By working with a first difference specification in the earnings 
equation, any fixed effects are removed. Waldfogel (1993) attempts to control for 
various unobservable characteristics that may be linked to the higher earning power of 
some women (characteristics such as ability and drive) in this way. Waldfogel's 
evidence suggests that there is not much support for the view that being a working 
woman and having children and gaining a lower wage is correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity and lower earnings ability. We test to see whether this procedure affects 
the estimates of different types of non-work spell. It may be that when we control for 
fixed effects, the intermittent workers who have children constitute that sub-sample of 
women who have lower earnings. 
That is, if the source of the endogeneity is with the 
individual-specific component of the error term, then fixed effects estimation will 
provide consistent estimates of the model. 
So in this Section, to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we use a first difference specification. This seeks to estimate the effect of 
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changes in the individual regressors on the difference between two log wage 
observations : 
28 
O1nW; =Aeo; +Aeo; 2+Aha; +AV; +Dµ; +A(pi (5.21) 
where all variables are defined as above. The change, dln Wi = (In wage 11991- In wage 
11981) , represents the 
difference between the Sweep 5 wage and the last observed Sweep 
4 wage for each individual. The disturbance term gyp; is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed, with zero mean and variance 2. The fixed effect is captured in 
the u, term. By working with the first difference specification, the term Au, is zero and 
the fixed effect disappears. Now V contains only those characteristics that change 
between wage observations (namely, the number and age of children, marital status, the 
amount of work experience and its constituent parts, and the amounts of non-work 
experience). All variables in difference form, therefore, represent the change between 
the sample observations between 1981 and 1991. For example, the work experience 
term in differences represents the change in the amounts of work experience from 1981 
to 1991, and similarly the difference in the outspell variable the change between these 
two dates for the total amount of non-work time. Workers reporting wages in both 
sweeps (with no missing or inaccurate job histories) are included in this sample. 
29 This 
reduces our sample size from that of the previous section. We therefore repeat the key 
regressions in levels form for wages at Sweep 5 on the new sample alongside the 
difference estimates. Waldfogel (1993) follows a similar procedure, but she enlarges 
her sample of women by including the range of all possible wage observations. That is, 
where information on the wage in 1991 was missing, she uses the last known wage (the 
wage from the preceding job). This is not what we do here, as it is impossible to 
pinpoint the exact date of the wage observations other than those collected at the 
interview date for Sweeps 4 and 5.30 The absence of dates makes it impossible to 
calculate precisely the relevant amount of work experience for the wage from the 
28Our sample restricted to observations that 
include at least two wage observations may also be biased by 
selection effects. Following 
Waldfogel (1993), we do not seek to address this potential source of bias in 
this section. 
29 Fixed effects estimation will exacerbate any problems caused by measurement error in the experience 
variable generated by retrospective recall 
bias. Any error in the levels is made worse by the difference 
process. This may therefore 
downward bias the estimated coefficients. 
3° The NCDS includes wage information on the cohort member's current job, the last job (where the 
current job does not exist), and the second 
from last job. In this section, we use information specifically 
on the current job, in case those women not 
in work at the interview date in 1981 and 1991 are 
systematically different from those 
in work on these dates. 
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preceding job. The first difference procedure eliminates from the regression any 
characteristic that is invariant for a worker over our ten year window. Thus, regressors, 
such as educational attainment and region, which are fixed over time for each 
individual, drop out of the difference analysis, but appear in the wage equation 31 
Table 5.30 outlines the change in average wages, work experience and length of outspell 
between 1981 and 1991. The average growth in real hourly wages over the period is 
around 30 log points, which disguises much larger wage growth differences between 
manuals and non-manuals. Manual workers have the largest amount of work experience 
in 1981 consistent with this group having left full-time education earlier. Not 
surprisingly, the total amounts of in and out of work experience rise between the two 
dates. The rise in work experience for non-manuals was higher than for manuals, whilst 
the rise in non-work experience was higher for manuals. Childcare accounts for around 
half the increase in time out of work, and around three quarters of the increase for 
manual workers. 
Table 5.31 reports Ordinary Least Squares results of first differences for three 
alternative specifications, alongside level estimates for wages in Sweep 5.32 The Table 
shows that the coefficient on actual work experience is increased when moving from the 
levels to the first difference results by around 1.8 percentage points (compare columns I 
and II). The any kids variable demonstrates the effect of changing family size from 
having no children to having one or more children in the difference specification. 
Similarly, married captures the effect of going from the single to the married category 
within our ten-year window. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity has a small 
effect on the estimated effects of these variables. When experience is split into its full- 
and part-time components, the negative effect of part-time work is much reduced in the 
first difference specification (see columns III and IV). This suggests that unobservable 
characteristics may be negatively 
linked to wages and part-time work. The differenced 
estimates for the type of 
break specification (column VI) are smaller than the levels 
31 The variable on VDU use does not appear in Sweep 4. 
32 Waldfogel (1993), uses a similar technique but does not distinguish between the nature of the time out 
spell. Her variable "hometime" 
includes all time unemployed or out of the labour force (Waldfogel 
(1993), page 18). We are explicitly 
interested in the comparison of effects of periods spent in home 
production against other forms of withdrawal. 
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(column V). The negative effect of home time is reduced by more than half in the 
differenced model, but remains significant. Now, the overall home time effect can no 
longer distinguished from the unemployment effect. So, on this basis, there remains a 
wage penalty to childcare even allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, of around 5 per 
cent a year. Notice that this may be a lower bound on the time out effect if the 
reservations regarding the consequence of the differencing process raised in footnote 21 
hold, since measurement error biases down estimated coefficients. The (positive) effect 
of education on subsequent earnings rises under the first difference specification 
although it is no longer significant. The negative effect of unemployment is relatively 
unchanged by differencing. 
The results obtained on the childcare variable complement those found above in Table 
5.29, where the controls for self-selection reduced the penalty to time spent in childcare. 
This suggests that there may be some unobserved heterogeneity correlated with 
childcare that upwardly biases the estimates of the penalty to time out spent in childcare. 
These effects do not appear to be present for a spell of unemployment and are obscured 
when a general measure of time out (rather than the specific type of time out) is used. 
However, the negative penalty, whilst reduced, is still persistent. 
5.6 Conclusion 
We set out to investigate the effect of breaks in continuous employment on earnings. 
This Chapter has presented new evidence on the effect of work interruptions on earnings 
for Britain. The nature of the data set we employ allows us to undertake a study where 
actual experience, both in and out of work, are used as explanatory variables in a wage 
equation, rather than the usual proxy of potential experience. This has facilitated a 
detailed study of the effects of experience on earnings. Our results indicate that use of 
potential experience may seriously overestimate the returns to work experience in 
earnings equations. 
We explore whether women who have a spell out of work receive lower earnings as a 
result. We find that time out of work 
does have a negative effect on re-entry wages. 
Women who take time out experience lower earnings than those who work 
continuously. The average earnings 
loss is around 1 to 2 percentage points a year. The 
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size of this penalty is similar to Mincer and Ofek's (1982) results for the United States. 
Having established that there are lower earnings for those with time out, we then tried to 
establish whether this could be attributed to differences in the characteristics, both 
observed and unobserved, of women who work continuously and women who do not. 
The wage difference is indeed robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls for 
observed heterogeneity afforded by the NCDS data set. The overall wage difference is 
reduced, but persists, when we attempt to control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity using selectivity and first differencing methods. 
The size of the earnings penalty varies with the type of out of work spell. Those who 
are unemployed suffer the highest earnings penalty (at around 7 per cent for each year 
out), but there is still a significant negative impact on earnings for a spell of childcare 
(at around 4 to 5 per cent for each year out). Again, this childcare penalty is reduced, 
but does not disappear, when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Whilst the 
characteristics of women who take childcare may lend themselves to lower earnings 
there still appears to be more underlying processes at work which may be caused by the 
depreciation of human capital during time out or due to the signalling effect of time out. 
There is evidence that women who return to work may make up some of their lost 
earnings, but this is quicker for those who are out for reasons other than unemployment 
or home production. This is consistent with the Mincer and Ofek (1982) view of the 
existence of a human capital restoration period: but only for specific types of time out. 
The stylised single-peaked lifetime earnings profile is inappropriate in the context of 
female intermittent workers and the work above provides conclusive evidence for this. 
Moreover, it is the case that a history of part-time work is associated with much lower 
hourly earnings than those of women who pursue a career in full-time work. Wages 
mostly accrue, in our data set, to women with experience of full-time work. This may 
explain why we observe larger experience effects on earnings as we move up higher 
quantiles of the wage distribution. These findings also have important implications for 
helping to explain the different wage experiences of men and women. Chapter 6 goes 
on to investigate the link between time spent out of work and the gender wage gap in 
more detail. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of Work History Patterns by Age 33 
Number of Jobs since Total Married Lone Single Married 






















Mean number of jobs 
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1.0 0.7 1.2 2.0 1.3 
12.3 13.7 8.0 12.4 13.3 
14.6 15.2 13.6 13.3 15.6 
17.8 18.6 16.8 15.8 18.5 
16.3 16.8 17.1 13.6 17.4 
12.6 12.2 13.7 12.6 12.4 
8.4 8.1 9.5 8.1 7.8 
5.7 5.3 5.5 7.3 5.1 
11.3 9.4 14.6 14.9 9.2 
4.2 4.0 4.6 4.5 4.0 
10.4 11.3 4.5 13.4 9.8 
13.3 13.5 12.0 13.8 13.7 
17.9 18.6 16.7 16.3 18.3 
16.8 17.9 16.8 13.8 19.0 
13.1 12.5 14.3 13.4 13.3 
9.8 9.6 11.6 8.7 9.4 
6.2 5.8 6.5 7.1 5.5 
12.5 10.9 17.6 13.6 11.1 
4.5 4.3 5.1 4.5 4.3 
Note: Sample 1. All Women in 1991 N=6857 Sample 2. Women in work in 1991 N= 4712 
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Table 5.2 Summary of Work History Patterns for Working Women in 1991 
Mean Duration (years) 
Number Frequency Total Pre-last Non- Post-last Total Total 
of non- (%) work break work break Full- Part- 
work work spell work time time 
spells 
I II III IV V. VI VII 
0 37.9 14.4 NA NA NA 12.3 2.1 
(3.6) (5.4) (4.0) 
1 32.6 12.1 5.2 3.4 6.9 9.4 2.7 
(3.5) (4.4) (3.4) (4.6) (4.8) (3.6) 
2 17.7 11.4 6.2 4.3 5.2 8.5 2.8 
(3.4) (4.4) (3.2) (4.2) (4.3) (3.1) 
3+ 11.7 10.7 6.4 5.3 4.3 7.7 3.0 
(3.2) (3.8) (3.0) (3.5) (4.0) (3.4) 
Note 1. Standard deviations in parentheses 2. Sample: All Women in work in 1991, N=4712 
3. NA = Not Applicable 
Table 5.3 Summary of Work History Patterns for Non-Working Women in 1991 
Mean Duration (y ears) 
Number Frequency Total Pre-last Non- Post- Total Total 
of non- (%) work break work work last Full- Part- 
work spell break time time 
spells work 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Never 2.0 NA NA 15.7 NA NA NA 
worked (2.5) 
1 44.4 8.3 6.7 6.4 1.5 7.0 1.3 
(4.7) (4.8) (4.7) (2.8) (4.7) (2.7) 
2 28.0 8.7 7.6 6.9 1.0 7.0 1.6 
(4.0) (4.3) (4.2) (2.3) (4.0) (2.5) 
3+ 25.6 8.0 7.5 7.3 0.4 6.2 1.9 
(3.7) (3.7) (3.7) (1.4) (3.7) (2.5) 
Note 1. Standard deviation in parentheses 2. Sample: Women not in work in 1991, N=2145 
3. NA = Not Applicable 
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Table 5.4 Summary of Non-Work History Patterns for Working Women in 1991 




Total Home time Unemployed Education Other 
Non-work 
I II III IV 
Total 2.5 1.6 0.3 0.5 
(3.3) (3.0) (0.9) (1.4) 
1 3.4 2.3 0.3 0.6 
(3.4) (3.5) (1.1) (1.5) 
2 4.3 2.9 0.4 0.8 
(3.2) (3.4) (1.1) (1.5) 
3+ 5.3 2.7 0.8 1.3 
(3.0) (3.5) (1.4) (2.2) 
















Total Home time Unemployed Education Other 
Non-work 
I II III IV 
Total 8.7 6.8 0.7 0.4 
(4.7) (5.2) (2.3) (1.2) 
1 6.4 5.4 0.3 0.2 
(4.7) (4.9) (1.5) (0.8) 
2 6.9 5.5 0.5 0.5 
(4.2) (4.4) (1.6) (1.3) 
3+ 7.3 4.5 1.2 0.9 
(3.7) (3.9) (2.1) (1.5) 











Table 5.6 Summary of Work History Patterns for Single Working Women 
Mean Duration (years) 
Number Frequency Total Pre-last Non- Post Total Total 
of non- (%) work break work work last Full- Part- 
work spell spell break time time 
spells spell 
I II III IV V VI VII 
0 47.9 14.0 NA NA NA 12.4 1.6 
(3.9) (5.1) (3.5) 
1 28.0 12.6 1.2 2.5 1.1 10.6 2.0 
(3.9) (2.9) (3.3) (2.5) (5.1) (3.7) 
2 13.4 11.6 1.9 4.1 1.6 9.0 2.6 
(3.4) (3.2) (3.3) (2.6) (4.6) (3.3) 
3+ 10.6 10.6 2.2 5.5 1.1 8.1 2.4 
(3.3) (3.6) (3.0) (2.4) (3.6) (3.8) 
Note 1. Standard deviation in parentheses 2. Sample: Women in work in 1991 who are single, N=968 
Table 5.7 Summ ary of Work History Patterns for Married Working Women 
Mean Duration (years) 
Number Frequency Total Pre last Non- Post last Total Total 
of non- (%) work break work break Full- Part- 
work work spell work time time 
spells spell spell 
I II III IV V VI VII 
0 36.3 14.6 NA NA NA 12.3 2.4 
(3.3) (5.6) (4.3) 
1 33.9 11.9 5.0 3.7 6.8 8.8 3.0 
(3.4) (4.2) (3.4) (4.6) (4.7) (3.7) 
2 18.9 11.3 6.5 4.5 4.8 8.3 3.0 
(3.3) (4.3) (3.2) (4.0) (4.1) (3.0) 
3+ 10.8 10.8 6.6 5.1 4.3 7.2 3.6 
(3.2) (3.8) (3.0) (3.5) (4.0) (3.5) 
Note 1. Standard deviations in parentheses 2. Sample: Women in work in 1991 who are married, 
N=2958 
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Table 5.8 Summary of Work History Patterns for Working Lone Mothers 
Mean Duration (years) 
Number Frequency Total work Pre last Non- Post Total Total 
of non- (%) break work last Full- Part- 
work work spell break time time 
spells spell work 
spell 
I II III IV V VI VII 
0 34.0 12.8 NA NA NA 9.9 2.8 
(4.7) (5.8) (4.0) 
1 3 2.4 11.6 6.3 4.0 5.4 8.3 3.3 
(4.1) (4.5) (3.7) (4.1) (4.8) (3.8) 
2 17.4 10.6 6.4 5.4 4.4 7.2 3.4 
(3.8) (3.9) (3.5) (3.5) (4.1) (3.5) 
3+ 16.3 10.1 6.8 6.3 3.4 7.1 3.1 
(3.5) (3.7) (3.1) (3.4) (3.9) ( 
Note 1. Standard deviation in parentheses 2. Sample: Women in work in 1991 who are lone mothers, 
N=847 
Table 5.9 Summary of Work History Patterns for Working Married Mothers 
with Children 
Mean Duration (years) 
Number Frequency Total work Pre last Non- Post Total Total 
of non- (%) break work last Full- Part- 
work work spell break time time 
spells spell work 
spell 
I II III IV V VI VII 
p 32.4 14.2 NA NA NA 11.3 2.9 
(3.7) (5.9) (4.6) 
1 36.2 11.6 5.3 4.0 6.4 8.1 3.5 
(3.5) (4.0) (3.5) (4.5) (4.7) (3.7) 
2 20.7 11.2 6.9 4.8 4.2 7.7 3.3 
(3.4) (4.1) (3.3) (3.6) (3.9) (3.0) 
3+ 10.7 10.6 6.8 5.5 3.8 6.6 4.0 
(3.3) (3.6) (3.1) (3.3) (3.8) (3.6) 
Note 1. Standard deviations in parentheses 2. Sample: Women in work in 1991 who are both married 
and who have children, N= 2307 
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Table 5.10. a. Summary of Work History Patterns for Working Women by Part- 
time Status 
Mean Duration (years) 
Number Frequency Total Pre last Non- Post last Full- Part- 
of non- (%) work break work break time time 
work (years) work spell Work (years) (years) 
spells (years) (years) (years) 




0 24.0 12.1 NA NA NA 6.7 5.4 
(4.6) (5.4) (5.1) 
1 38.1 11.1 6.4 4.6 4.8 6.7 4.4 
(3.7) (4.6) (3.6) (3.9) (4.1) (3.7) 
2 23.2 10.7 6.3 5.3 3.3 6.7 4.1 
(3.5) (3.9) (3.4) (2.9) (3.7) (3.0) 
3+ 14.7 10.0 7.5 6.4 2.7 5.5 4.5 





0 47.3 15.0 NA NA NA 13.8 1.2 
(2.9) (4.3) (3.1) 
1 28.7 12.8 4.3 2.5 8.5 11.4 1.4 
(3.3) (4.6) (2.9) (4.5) (4.3) (2.9) 
2 13.9 12.0 5.0 3.4 7.0 10.3 1.7 
(3.2) (4.4) (2.8) (4.3) (4.0) (2.7) 
3+ 9.9 11.2 5.6 4.4 5.6 9.5 1.8 
(2.8) (3.8) (2.7) (3.8) (3.4) (2.9) 
N 4506 
Note: 1. Standard deviations in parentheses 2. Sample: Women in part-time work in 1991; b Women in 
full-time work in 1991 
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Table 5.10. b. Full-Time and Part-Time Work Experience Patterns 
Mean Duration ears 
Number of Total Total Pre-last Pre-last Post- Post- Non- N 
non-work Full- Part- break break last last work 
spells time time Full- Part- break break spell 
time time Full- Part- 
time time 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
In Work 
in 1991 
0 12.3 2.1 12.3 2.1 0 0 0 1832 (5.4) (4.0) (5.4) (4.0) 
1 9.4 2.8 4.7 0.7 4.7 2.2 2.4 1564 
(4.8) (3.6) (4.4) (1.9) (5.3) (3.2) (3.4) 
2 8.5 2.8 5.3 1.0 3.3 1.9 4.3 834 
(4.2) (3.1) (4.2) (1.8) (4.5) (2.4) (3.2) 
3+ 7.7 3.0 5.0 1.5 2.7 1.5 5.3 547 




1 7.3 1.3 
(4.6) (2.8) 
2 7.1 1.6 
(4.0) (2.5) 
3+ 6.2 1.9 
(3.7) (2.5) 
6.8 1.0 0.5 
(4.6) (2.5) (2.1) 
6.8 1.3 0.3 
(4.1) (2.3) (1.6) 
6.1 1.7 0.1 
3.7 (2.4) (0.7) 
Note 1. Standard deviations in parentheses 
0.4 6.3 900 
(1.6) (4.7) 
0.3 6.9 582 
(1.2) (4.2) 
0.2 7.3 536 
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Table 5.11 Weekly and Hourly Wages by Length of Time Out 
No Break 0-2 years 2-4 years 4+ years 
All women in 
work, 1991 
Mean weekly wage 296.9 256.4 234.5 155.7 
(416.7) (394.9) (322.9) (291.3) 
Mean hourly wage 7.8 7.2 7.0 5.3 
(9.8) (9.7) (8.2) (7.1) 
N 1809 993 665 1246 
Part-Time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 89.7 88.2 79.9 69.9 
(137.5) (48.1) (49.6) (60.5) 
Mean hourly wage 4.9 5.0 4.7 4.1 
(4.6) (2.3) (2.4) (2.8) 
N 394 290 254 745 
Full time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 354.6 325.7 330.1 282.2 
(448.8) (450.5) (378.7) (422.6) 
Mean hourly wage 8.6 8.2 8.5 7.2 
(10.7) (11.4) (9.9) (10.4) 
N 1415 703 411 501 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 5.12 Weekly and Hourly Wage by Number of Spells Not in Work 
No Break 1 spell 2 spells 3+ spells 
All women in 
work, 1991 
Mean weekly wage 296.9 209.2 198.1 221.4 
(416.7) (299.6) (344.3) (436.1) 
Mean hourly wage 7.8 6.3 6.3 6.6 
(9.8) (7.1) (9.3) (10.4) 
N 1809 1542 810 534 
Part time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 89.7 76.2 76.7 73.1 
(137.5) (60.0) (52.5) (52.4) 
Mean hourly wage 4.9 4.4 - 4.4 4.3 
(4.6) (2.9) (2.3) (2.7) 
N 394 659 388 235 
Full time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 354.6 308.4 309.7 337.9 
(448.8) (361.9) (446.3) (554.1) 
Mean hourly wage 8.6 7.8 8.1 8.5 
(10.7) (8.8) (12.4) (13.3) 
N 1415 883 422 299 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 5.13 Weekly and Hourly Wage by Length of Time Since Last Break 
No Break 0-2 years 2-4 years 4-6 years 6 years + 
All women in 
work, 1991 
Mean weekly wage 
Mean hourly wage 
N 
Part-Time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 
Mean hourly wage 
N 
Full-Time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 








III IV V 
148.7 161.1 285.7 
(256.3) (292.6) (394.9) 
5.3 5.6 7.8 
(6.0) (8.2) (9.5) 
495 434 1288 
89.7 64.8 76.7 78.0 91.8 
(137.5) (42.6) (76.2) (46.6) (54.5) 
4.9 4.0 4.5 4.4 5.0 
(4.6) (2.0) (3.6) (2.4) (2.5) 
394 398 307 283 284 
354.6 276.1 259.5 261.1 345.4 
(448.8) (436.7) (371.5) (410.1) (433.5) 
8.6 7.1 6.6 6.9 8.7 
(10.7) (12.1) (8.3) (11.8) (10.6) 
1415 231 195 197 985 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 5.14 Weekly and Hourly Wage by Length of Time Since Last Childcare 
Break 
I No Break 0-2 years 2-4 years 4-6 years 6 years + 
All women in 
work, 1991 
Mean weekly wage 
Mean hourly wage 
Part-Time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 
Mean hourly wage 
Full-Time in 1991 
Mean weekly wage 
Mean hourly wage I 
296.9 80.7 97.2 124.1 135.6 
(416.7) (69.8) (91.5) (257.9) (86.7) 
7.8 4.1 4.6 5.1 4.6 
(9.8) (2.3) (3.5) (8.5) (1.8) 
89.7 61.5 73.7 76.8 75.8 
(137.5) (41.6) (77.7) (44.9) (39.6) 
4.9 3.9 4.4 4.5 4.1 
(4.6) (2.1) (3.8) (2.6) (1.6) 
354.6 177.1 188.4 228.7 197.2 
(448.8) (98.2) (83.9) (441.7) (78.6) 
8.6 5.2 4.6 6.6 5.2 
(10.7) (2.9) (1.9) (14.8) (1.8) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Table 5.15 Sample Means of Key Variables 
All women Women with Home time 
Mean S. dev. Mean S. dev. 
Weekly wage 242.0 370.4 106.0 143.0 
Hourly wage 6.95 8.99 4.56 4.66 
Hours 32.0 13.5 22.2 11.3 
Log Hourly wage 1.7 . 57 1.3 . 43 Job Tenure 5.3 5.1 2.5 2.5 
Degree . 23 . 42 . 14 . 35 Technical . 37 . 48 . 33 . 47 A level . 01 '. 09 . 01 . 08 0 level . 19 . 39 . 24 . 43 Lower Quals. . 09 . 28 . 11 . 31 Actual Experience 12.9 3.5 10.7 3.3 
Potential Experience 15.8 1.8 12.9 70.4 
Pre gap Experience 11.7 4.7 6.8 3.5 
Post gap Experience 3.7 4.5 3.9 2.9 
Last non-work spell 1.6 2.6 4.1 3.3 
North . 04 . 19 . 03 . 19 North West . 07 . 25 . 08 . 27 Yorkshire . 06 . 23 . 06 . 24 West Midlands . 06 . 24 . 06 . 25 East Midlands . 04 . 19 . 05 . 22 East Anglia . 03 . 15 . 02 . 14 South West . 06 . 23 . 07 . 25 Wales . 02 . 15 . 02 . 14 Scotland . 07 . 25 . 06 . 24 Region missing . 35 . 47 . 32 . 46 Married . 62 . 48 . 73 . 44 Children present . 65 . 47 . 97 . 15 Child under 4 years . 28 . 45 . 29 . 45 English score 19.64 11.68 20.82 10.67 
English missing . 19 . 39 . 14 . 35 Part-Time . 35 . 47 . 72 . 44 Private . 56 . 49 . 60 . 48 Union . 39 . 48 . 27 . 44 >50 emps at work . 10 . 31 . 05 . 22 Works with VDU . 53 . 49 . 36 . 48 Primary production . 03 . 18 . 04 . 21 Manufacturing . 02 . 14 . 02 . 15 Construction . 09 . 29 . 16 . 37 Retailing . 05 . 23 . 05 . 22 Transport . 09 . 28 . 10 . 30 Property . 12 . 32 . 15 . 36 Industry Missing . 55 . 49 . 42 . 49 Managerial . 03 . 18 . 01 . 08 Technical . 36 . 48 . 25 . 43 Skilled non-manual . 28 . 45 . 34 . 47 Skilled manual . 10 . 30 . 06 24 Partly skilled . 15 . 36 . 23 
. 
. 42 Unskilled . 04 . 21 08 
. 28 
Nate Sample 1 N=4574 Sample 2 N=1265 
120 
Table 5.16 Comparison of Returns to Experience using Potential and Actual 
Experience Measures 
Variable I1 11 
Degree . 492* . 632* (. 029) (. 027) 
Tech . 381* . 379* (. 025) (. 024) 
Alevel . 228* . 260* (. 056) (. 046) 
Olevel . 219* . 206* (. 028) (. 027) 
Low . 115* . 085* (. 032) (. 030) 
Potential experience . 234* (. 059) 
Potential exp2 -. 010* 
(. 002) 
Actual experience . 054* (. 011) 
Actual exp2 -. 0008 
(. 0005) 
Constant . 321 . 820* (. 409) (. 066) 
Controls None None 
Adj R2 . 159 . 173 
F 143.6 173.3 
N 4574 4574 
Note 1. Dependent variable: Log hourly wage. 2. Sample: All females in work in 1991. 
3. White adjusted standard errors in parentheses for heteroscedasticity. 4. Asterisk notes 
significance at 5% level. 
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Table 5.17 Returns to Experience and Functional Form 
Variable II II III 
Degree . 632* . 294* . 
303* 
(. 027) (. 026) (. 026) 
Tech . 379* . 188* . 
196* 
(. 024) (. 023) (. 023) 
Alevel . 260* . 058 . 055 (. 046) (. 043) (. 044) 
Olevel . 206* . 070* . 
069* 
(. 027) (. 024) (. 024) 
Low . 085* . 042 . 
042 
(. 030) (. 025) (. 025) 
Actual experience . 054* . 027* . 027* (. 011) (. 010) (. 010) 
Actual exp2 -. 0008 -. 0008 -. 0009* 
(. 0005) (. 0004) (. 0004) 
Job Tenure . 007* (. 002) 
North -. 219* -. 228* 
(. 038) (. 038) 
North West -. 172* -. 175* 
(. 029) (. 029) 
Yorkshire -. 156* -. 165* 
(. 032) (. 032) 
West Midlands -. 160* -. 168* 
(. 029) (. 029 
East Midlands -. 164* -. 166* 
(. 036) (. 036) 
East Anglia -. 161 * -. 164* 
(. 044) (. 044) 
South West -. 140* -. 144* 
(. 033) (. 033) 
Wales -. 268* -. 274* 
(. 032) (. 032) 
Scotland -. 226* -. 229* 
(. 031) (. 031) 
Region missing -. 124* -. 126* 
(. 020) (. 020) 
Married . 092* . 087* (. 015) (. 015) 
Kids -. 165* -. 160* (. 019) (. 019) 
Young kid . 124* . 120* (. 018) (. 018) 
English: Test 
Bottom 20% -. 070* -. 068* (. 020) (. 020) 

















Constant . 820* (. 066) 
Controls No 
Adj RR . 173 
F 173.3* 
N 4574 
(. 021) (. 021) 
-. 064* -. 061 * 
(. 030) (. 030) 
-. 043* -. 040 
(. 022) (. 022) 
. 008 . 010 (. 021) (. 021) 
-. 287* -. 277* 
(. 017) (. 017) 
-. 056* -. 053* 
(. 016) (. 016) 
. 089* . 074* (. 015) (. 015) 
. 137* . 121* (. 025) (. 025) 
. 206* . 200* (. 016) (. 016) 
. 108* . 111* (. 044) (. 044) 
. 014 . 020 (. 052) (. 052) 
. 012 . 013 (. 040) (. 040) 
. 177* . 170* (. 045) (. 045) 
. 169* . 172* (. 044) (. 0440 
. 143* . 148* (. 038) (. 038) 
. 193* . 193* (. 037) (. 037) 
1.349* 1.336* 
(. 069) (. 069) 
Yes Yes 
. 381 . 396 111.0* 113.6* 
4574 4574 
Note 1. Dependent variable: Log hourly wage. 2. Sample: All females in work in 1991. 
3. White adjusted standard errors in parentheses for heteroscedasticity. 4. Asterisk notes 
significance at 5% level. 
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Table 5.18 Alternative Functional Forms of Actual Experience 
Variable II II III IV 
Degree . 297* . 294* . 283* . 298* (. 027) (. 025) (. 026) (. 026) 
Tech . 193* . 193* . 194* . 189* (. 024) (. 023) (. 023) (. 023) 
Alevel . 049 . 049 . 038 . 049 (. 076) (. 044) (. 045) (. 043) 
Olevel . 067* . 067* . 069* . 065* (. 026) (. 024) (. 024) (. 024) 
Low . 044 . 045 . 048 . 040 (. 031) (. 025) (. 025) (. 025) 
Actual experience . 020* (. 007) 
Actual exp2 / 100 . 072 (. 081) 
Actual exp3 / 1000 -. 076* 
(. 034) 
Exp. Spline <12 . 018* (. 004) 
Exp. Spline 12-16 -. 029* 
(. 009) 
Exp. Spline 16 + . 0008 (. 025) 
Actual Exp. <6 -. 055* 
(. 037) 
Actual Exp. 6-7 -. 092* 
(. 047) 
Actual Exp. 7-8 -. 073* 
(. 042) 
Actual Exp. 8-9 -. 036* 
(. 032) 
Actual Exp. 9 -10 . 067 (. 032) 
Actual Exp. 10-11 . 072 (. 027) 
Actual Exp. 11-12 . 112* (. 030) 
Actual Exp. 12-13 -. 022 
(. 029) 
Actual Exp. 13-14 -. 009 
(. 026) 
Actual Exp. 14-15 . 041 (. 024) 
Actual Exp. 15-16 . 072* (. 029) 
Full-Time 
. 020* (. 006) 
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Full-Time 2 -. 0007* 
(. 0003) 
Part-Time -. 003 
(. 006) 
Part-Timet . 0004 (. 0004) 
Current job tenure . 008* . 008* . 008* . 007* (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) 
Part Time now -. 279* -. 279* -. 278* -. 258* (. 017) (. 017) (. 018) (. 019) 
Private -. 052* -. 052* -. 053* -. 054* (. 016) (. 016) (. 016) (. 016) 
Union . 072* . 072* . 072* . 073* (. 016) (. 015) (. 015) (. 015) 
Large Firm . 120* . 121* . 120* . 121* (. 022) (. 024) (. 025) (. 025) 
Uses VDU . 198* . 198* . 197* . 198* (. 015) (. 016) (. 016) (. 016) 
Constant 1.317* 1.334* 1.474* 1.394* 
(. 070) (. 059) (. 050) (. 056) 
Adj R2 . 379 . 379 . 390 . 379 F 72.6* 72.6* 90.29* 104.5* 
N 4574 4574 4574 4574 
Note 1. Dependent Variable: Log real hourly wage. 2. Sample: All females in work in 1991. 
3. White adjusted standard errors in parentheses for heteroscedasticity. 4. Asterisk notes significance at 
5% level. 5. Regional, industry, marital status, reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, are also 
included but these results are not reported. 
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Table 5.19 Alternative Specifications of Experience and Time Out 
Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Degree . 286* . 312* 308* . 304* . 276* . 323* . 313* . 308* (. 027) (. 026) (. 026) (. 027) (. 032) (. 031) (. 031) (. 031) 
Tech . 195* . 
195* . 195* . 195* . 169* . 166* . 166* . 166* (. 024) (. 024) (. 024) (. 024) (. 029) (. 029) (. 029) (. 029) 
Alevel . 062 . 061 . 049 . 050 . 063 . 070 . 050 . 051 (. 076) (. 076) (. 076) (. 077) (. 081) (. 081) (. 081) (. 080) 
Olevel . 075* . 
071* . 071* . 072* . 044 . 040 . 039 . 041 (. 026) (. 026) (. 026) (. 026) (. 031) (. 031) (. 031) (. 031) 
Low . 046 . 042 . 043 . 044 . 040 . 037 . 035 . 036 (. 031) (. 030) (. 030) (. 030) (. 038) (. 038) (. 037) (. 038) 
Pre out . 012* -. 
0001 -. 0007 . 015* -. 0002 -. 0012 (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 004) (. 003) (. 003) 
Pre out2 -. 0008* -. 0004* 
(. 0002) (. 0002) 
Post out . 038* . 
003* 
. 003* . 059* . 015* . 015* (. 007) (. 001) (. 001) (. 008) (. 003) (. 003) 
Post out2 -. 002* -. 003* (. 0006) (. 0006) 
Pre * post -. 003* -. 003* 
(. 0005) (. 0006) 
Last -. 021 * -. 016* 
Outspell (hi) (. 003) (. 004) 
Previous -. 010* -. 003 
Outspell(ho)) (. 004) (. 004) 
Outspell -. 016* -. 017* -. 015* -. 011* (. 005) (. 003) (. 007) (. 003) 
Out2 / 100 . 0001 -. 0001 (. 0005) (. 0006) 
Current job . 005* . 
005* . 005* . 006* -. 001 . 006* -. 002 -. 001 
tenure (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 003) (. 002) (. 003) (. 003) 
Constant 1.346* 1.547* 1.540* 1.544* 1.223* 1.540* 1.469* 1.464* 
(. 062) (. 054) (. 061) (. 061) (. 075) (. 066) (. 081) (. 076) 
Adj. RZ .3 83 .3 
82 .3 83 . 384 . 429 . 417 . 423 . 425 F 70.2* 75.4* 73.6* 72.1* 52.8* 54.1* 54.1* 53.1* 
N 4570 4570 4570 4570 2823 2823 2823 2823 
Notes: 1: Dependent Variable: Log real hourly wage. 2. Sample: Specifications I, II, III and IV, All 
female workers Specifications V, VI, VII and VIII, All female workers with some out spell. 
3. White adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 4. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
5. Regional, industry, marital status, reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, are also included but 
results not reported. 
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Table 5.20 Effect of Full-Time/Part-Time Work on Returns to Experience and 
Time Out 
Variable II II III IV 
Degree . 303* . 296* . 302* . 300* (. 027) (. 027) (. 029) (. 032) 
Tech . 199* . 191* . 165* . 165* (. 024) (. 025) (. 025) (. 029) 
Alevel . 065 . 056 . 083 . 080 (. 044) (. 076) (. 053) (. 081) 
Olevel . 074* . 068* . 045 . 044 (. 024) (. 026) (. 027) (. 031) 
Low . 040 . 038 . 037 . 041 (. 025) (. 031) (. 030) (. 038) 
Actual experience . 015 . 028 (. 010) (. 015) 
Actual exp2 -. 0009* -. 002 (. 0003) (. 0007) 
Full-Time . 011 . 005* (. 007) (. 0009) 
Full-Timet -. 001 -. 001 (. 001) (. 0004) 
Part-Time -. 013* -. 032* (. 006) (. 008) 
Part-Time2 -. 0004* . 002* (. 0005) (. 0006) 
Outspell -. 024* -. 023* -. 038* -. 032* (. 006) (. 006) (. 010) (. 008) 
Out2 / 100 -. 0005 -. 0004 -. 001 -. 0005 (. 0005) (. 001) (. 001) (. 001) 
Part-time Work -. 267* -. 248* -. 236* -. 226* (. 017) (. 019) (. 020) (. 022) 
Current job tenure . 006* . 007* . 007* . 007* (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) 
Constant 1.522* 1.569* 1.555* 1.716* 
(. 074) (. 070) (. 101) (. 091) 
Adj. RZ . 384 . 34 . 433 . 429 F 72.2* 68.8* 73.6* 49.8* 
N 4570 4570 2823 2823 
Note 1. Dependent Variable: Log real hourly wage. 2. Sample: Specifications 1, II, All female workers. 
Specifications III, IV, female workers with some out spell. 3. White adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses for heteroskedasticity. 4. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
5. Regional, industry, marital status, reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, are also included but 
not reported. 6. F test of equality between full-time and part-time experience variables = 6.44 (F(2,4527)) 
in II and 6.35 (F(2,2780)) not accepted. 
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Table 5.21 Estimates of Time Out Effect by Type of Non-work Spell 
Variable II II III IV 
Degree . 241* . 198* . 234* . 180* (. 026) (. 031) (. 026) (. 030) 
Tech . 189* . 142* . 190* . 144* (. 022) (. 025) (. 023) (. 025) 
Alevel . 079 . 079 . 083 . 096 (. 043) (. 049) (. 044) (. 053) 
Olevel . 076* . 040* . 076* . 045* (. 023) (. 026) (. 024) (. 026) 
Low . 043 . 045 . 040 . 044 (. 025) (. 031) (. 025) (. 029) 
Actual exp . 019 . 030 (. 010) (. 015) 
Actual exp2 -. 0009 -. 0019 
(. 0004) (. 0007) 
Unemp -. 079* -. 082* -. 084* -. 097* (. 011) (. 013) (. 012) (. 014) 
Unemp2 . 0043* . 004* . 0046* . 004* (. 0011) (. 001) (. 0011) (. 001) 
Educ . 060* . 072* . 055* . 055* (. 009) (. 011) (. 010) (. 012) 
Educe -. 0037* -. 004* -. 0034* -. 004* (. 0008) (. 001) (. 0008) (. 001) 
Home -. 046* -. 062* -. 052* -. 078* (. 0061) (. 007) (. 0065) (. 009) 
Home2 . 0021 
* . 003 * . 0026* . 003* (. 0005) (. 0005) (. 0006) (. 0006) 
Other -. 042* -. 034* -. 045* -. 048* 
(. 018) (. 018) (. 018) (. 019) 
Other2 . 0006 -. 
0004 
. 0009 -. 0003 (. 0019) (. 002) (. 0020) (. 002) 
Current job . 004*- . 
002 
. 005*- . 003 
tenure (. 001) (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) 
Constant 1.554* 1.570* 1.482* 1.570* 
(. 047) (. 058) (. 075) (. 058) 
Adj. R2 . 406 . 
462 
. 408 . 469 F 102.3* 76.45* 97.3* 72.47* 
N 4570 2823 4570 2823 
Notes. I Dependent Variable: Log real hourly wage. 2. Sample: Specifications I and III, All female 
workers. Specifications II and IV, All female workers with some out spell. 3. White adjusted standard 
errors in parentheses. 4. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 5. Regional, industry, marital status, 
reading and child dummies, as 
in Table 5.17, were also included but results are not reported. 6. F test of 
equality between unemployed and 
home-time spell variables = 5.27 (F(2,4525)) in I and 5.56 (F(2,4523)) 
in III not accepted. F test of equality between unemployed and home-time spell variables = 2.09 
(F(2,2778)) in II and 1.92 (F(2,2776)) in IV not rejected. 
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Table 5.22 Test of Robustness of Estimates to Leverage and Outliers in Residuals 
Variable II II III IV V VI 
Degree . 303* . 311* . 296* . 
298* . 234* . 251 * (. 027) (. 020) (. 027) (. 020) (. 027) (. 020) 
Tech . 199* . 193* . 191* . 179* . 
190* . 189* 
(. 024) (. 018) (. 024) (. 018) (. 024) (. 017) 
Alevel . 065 . 041 . 056 . 029 . 083 . 061 (. 076) (. 057) (. 076) (. 057) (. 075) (. 034) 
Olevel . 074* . 
062* . 068* . 049* . 077* . 071* (. 026) (. 019) (. 026) (. 019) (. 026) (. 018) 
Low . 040 . 
046* . 038 . 029 . 040 . 044 (. 031) (. 023) (. 031) (. 023) (. 030) (. 020) 
Actual exp . 015* . 
016* 
. 019* . 
023* 
(. 007) (. 006) (. 007) (. 005) 
Actual exp2 -. 0009* -. 0009* -. 0009* -. 0011 
(. 0003) (. 0003) (. 0003) (. 0002) 
Out spell -. 024* -. 022* -. 023* -. 020* 
(. 006) (. 005) (. 006) (. 005) 
Out spe112 . 0005 . 
0004 . 0004 . 0001 (. 0005) (. 0004) (. 0005) (. 0004) 
Unemp -. 084* -. 092* 
(. 015) (. 010) 
Unemp2 . 0046* . 
0061* 
(. 0017) (. 0010) 
Educ . 055* . 056* (. 009) (. 008) 
Educ2 -. 0034* -. 0034* 
(. 0010) (. 0010) 
Home -. 052* -. 051 * 
(. 007) (. 005) 
Home2 . 0026* . 
0028* 
(. 0007) (. 0005) 
Other -. 045* -. 042* 
(. 020) (. 020) 
Other2 . 0009 . 0007 (. 0024) (. 0034) 
Job Tenure . 006* . 
007* . 007* . 007* . 004* . 005* (. 001) (. 001) (. 002) (. 001) (. 002) (. 001) 
Part time sp -. 013* -. 023 * 
(. 006) (. 005) 
Part time sp 2 . 0004 . 001* (. 0005) (. 0003) 
Full-time sp . 011 . 008 (. 007) (. 005) 
Full-time sp 2 -. 0008* -. 0006* (. 0003) (. 0003) 












. 073 * (. 015) 
. 119* (. 022) 
. 197* (. 015) 
1.522* 
(. 074) 
. 384 72.17* 
4570 
-. 055* -. 053* 
(. 012) (. 016) 
. 088* . 071 * (. 012) (. 016) 
. 101* . 120* (. 017) (. 022) 
. 193* . 194* (. 011) (. 015) 
1.493* 1.569* 
(. 058) (. 070) 
. 527 . 384 123.78* 68.80* 
4410 4570 
-. 054* -. 044* 
(. 012) (. 016) 
. 081* . 071* (. 011) (. 015) 
. 099* . 124* (. 017) (. 022) 
. 191* . 177* (. 011) (. 015) 
1.580* 1.482* 
(. 052) (. 074) 




. 085* (. 011) 
. 106* (. 016) 
. 169* (. 012) 
1.458* 
(. 050) 
. 551 151.4* 
4409 
Note 1. Sample: I, III, V: All women in work in 1991; Sample: II, IV, VI: All women in work in 1991 
with observations with excessive leverage and outliers omitted. 2. White adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses. 3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 4. Regional, industry, marital status, reading and 
child dummies, as in Table 5.17, are also included but not reported. 
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Table 5.23 Experience and Time Out Effects by Educational Attainment 
Variable Low Quals High Quals. Low Quals. High Quals. 
All women. All women Some break Some break 
Actual exp . 022 . 006 . 046* -. 002 (. 012) (. 016) (. 020) (. 021) 
Actual exp2 -. 0007* -. 0011 -. 0020* -. 0014 
(. 0005) (. 0006) (. 0010) (. 0009) 
Out spell -. 024* -. 024* -. 032* -. 040* (. 008) (. 011) (. 014) (. 015) 
Out spell2 . 0012 . 0002 . 0016 . 0006 (. 0006) (. 0010) (. 0009) (. 0012) 
Job Tenure . 006* . 007* . 008* . 007 (. 002) (. 002) (. 003) (. 004) 
Part-time -. 286* -. 212* -. 238* -. 206* 
now (. 020) (. 031) (. 023) (. 035) 
Private -. 035* -. 034 -. 088* -. 035 (. 019) (. 028) (. 024) (. 034) 
Union . 036* . 096* . 072* . 081 * (. 019) (. 025) (. 022) (. 031) 
Large firm . 181* . 
057 
. 151* . 089* (. 041) (. 030) (. 046) (. 040) 
Uses VDU . 206* . 189* . 228* . 166* (. 021) (. 024) (. 026) (. 031) 
Constant 1.400* 1.945* 1.316* 2.105* 
(. 085) (. 137) (. 121) (. 169) 
Adj R2 . 375 . 249 0.386 0.269 
F1 57.7* 22.4* 35.1* 17.6* 
F2 9.7* 8.2* 
N 2810 1760 1665 1158 
Note 1. Sample: Specifications I, II: All women in work in 1991. Specifications III, IV: Women in work 
in 1991 having had some break in continuous employment. 2. White adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses for heteroscedasticity. 3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 4. Regional, industry, 
marital status, reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, are also included but results not reported. 
5. Fl is F test for joint significance of regressors. 6. F2 is Chow test for sample split high and low 
education. 
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Table 5.23 Experience and Time Out Effects by Educational Attainment (cont. ) 
Variable Low Quals. High Quals. Low Quals. High Quals. 
All All Some out Some out 
Out spell -. 022* -. 023* -. 018 -. 041 * 
(. 008) (. 011) (. 012) (. 015) 
Out spell2 . 0010 . 0002 . 0005 . 0006 (. 0006) (. 0010) (. 0007) (. 0013) 
Job Tenure . 006* . 007* . 006* . 006 (. 002) (. 003) (. 003) (. 004) 
Part time exp . 007 -. 040* -. 014 -. 053* (. 009) (. 011) (. 009) (. 014) 
Part time exp2 -. 0004 . 002* . 0013* . 002* (. 0005) (. 0008) (. 0094) (. 0010) 
Full-time exp . 015* -. 001 . 013 -. 009 (. 007) (. 014) (. 008) (. 017) 
Full-time exp2 -. 0003 -. 0011 -. 0006 -. 0013 
(. 0004) (. 0006) (. 0005) (. 0009) 
Part-time now -. 261* -. 198* -. 224* -. 196* 
(. 022) (. 035) (. 024) (. 040) 
Private -. 037 -. 033 .. 094* -. 036* 
(. 019) (. 028) (. 024) (. 035) 
Union . 036 . 091 * . 067* . 077* (. 019) (. 025) (. 022) (. 031) 
Large firm . 183* . 058 . 155* . 091* (. 041) (. 030) (. 045) (. 040) 
VDU . 202* . 185* . 229* . 163 (. 021) (. 024) (. 027) (. 031) 
Constant 1.432* 2.019* 1.484* 2.206* 
(. 074) (. 123) (. 107) (. 144) 
Adj R2 0.376 0.249 0.378 0.269 
F1 55.5* 21.2* 33.5* 17.2* 
F2 9.2* 7.5* 
N 2810 1760 1665 1158 
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Table 5.23 Effects of High and Low Educational Qualifications (cont. ) 
Variable Low Quals. High Quals. Low Quals. High Quals. 
All All Some out Some out 
Actual exp . 024 . 001 . 049* -. 018 (. 012) (. 016) (. 020) (. 019) 
Actual exp2 -. 0007 -. 0010 -. 0020* -. 0007 
(. 0005) (. 0006) (. 0009) (. 0008) 
Job Tenure . 005* . 004 . 004 . 001 (. 002) (. 002) (. 003) (. 004) 
Unemp. Spell -. 049* -. 133* -. 044* -. 154* 
(. 013) (. 043) (. 017) (. 047) 
Unemp. Spe112 . 002* . 0028 . 0015 . 0058 (. 001) (. 0114) (. 0013) (. 0119) 
Educ. Spell . 081* . 029* . 105* . 015 (. 032) (. 011) (. 033) (. 015) 
Educ. Spell2 -. 0030 -. 0020* -. 0057 -. 0013 (. 0061) (. 0008) (. 0062) (. 0010) 
Home Spell -. 030* -. 086* -. 046* -. 108* 
(. 007) (. 018) (. 012) (. 022) 
Home2 . 0018* . 0034 . 0028* . 0040 (. 0007) (. 0022) (. 0008) (. 0023) 
Otherout Spell . 024 -. 007 -. 020 -. 019 (. 019) (. 060) (. 019) (. 063) 
Otherout2 -. 0000 . 0127 -. 0005 -. 013 (. 0019) (. 0112) (. 0018) (. 0112) 
Part-time now -. 275* -. 163* -. 215* -. 146* 
(. 019) (. 031) (. 022) (. 035) 
Private -. 027 -. 020 -. 076* -. 018* (. 018) (. 027) (. 024) (. 034) 
Union . 035 . 
101* 
. 071 * . 085* (. 019) (. 025) (. 021) (. 030) 
Large firm . 180* . 
061 * 
. 154* . 091 * (. 041) (. 029) (. 044) (. 038) 
Uses VDU . 194* . 
154* 
. 207* . 109* (. 021) (. 024) (. 026) (. 030) 
Constant 1.378* 1.987* 1.264* 2.234* 
(. 086) (. 139) (. 124) (. 166) 
Adj R2 0.381 0.280 0.403 0.314 
Fl 52.3* 25.2* 33.5* 21.2* 
F2 6.7* 4.6* 
N 2810 1760 1665 1158 
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Table 5.24 Experience and Time Out Effects by Manual/Non-Manual Status 




Actual exp . 021* . 008 . 027* . 032 (. 006) (. 017) (. 009) (. 025) 
Actual exp2 -. 0004 -. 0009 -. 0012* -. 0022* 
(. 0003) (. 0007) (. 0004) (. 0011) 
Out spell -. 021 * -. 023* -. 021 -. 037* (. 007) (. 009) (. 014) (. 013) 
112 Out spe . 0011* . 0001 . 0009 . 0007 (. 0005) (. 0008) (. 0008) (. 0010) 
Job Tenure . 003 . 009* . 004 . 009* (. 003) (. 002) (. 004) (. 003) 
Part-time -. 280* -. 250* -. 213* -. 246* 
now (. 028) (. 021) (. 033) (. 025) 
Private -. 055* -. 045* -. 102* -. 062* (. 022) (. 021) (. 028) (. 027) 
Union . 142* . 
033 
. 149* . 054* (. 026) (. 019) (. 032) (. 023) 
Large firm . 078 . 
119* 
. 057 . 131* (. 051) (. 027) (. 053) (. 034) 
Uses VDU . 278* . 
110* 
. 301* . 102* (. 029) (. 020) (. 036) (. 024) 
Constant 1.339* 1.660* 1.287* 1.656* 
(. 081) (. 119) (. 121) (. 158) 
Adj R2 . 431 . 
315 0.416 0.365 
pl 44.1* 54.8* 23.8* 40.4* 
F2 6.9* 5.7 
N 1457 3113 917 1906 
Note 1. Sample: Specifications I, II: All women in work in 1991. Specifications III, IV: Women in work in 
1991 having had some break in continuous employment. 2. White adjusted standard errors in parentheses 
for heteroscedasticity. 3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 4. Regional, industry, marital status, 
reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, are also included but results not reported. 
5. F, is F test for joint significance of regressors. 6. F2 is Chow test for sample split manual and non- 
manual. 
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Table 5.24 Experience and Time Out Effects by Manual/Non-Manual Status 
(cont. ) 
Variable Manual Non-Man. Manual Non-Man. 
Some out Some out 
Out spell -. 016 -. 023 * -. 006 -. 031 * 
(. 009) (. 009) (. 014) (. 011) 
Out spe112 . 0007 -. 0002 -. 0002 . 0001 (. 0007) (. 0008) (. 0008) (. 0008) 
Job Tenure . 002 . 010* . 002 . 008* (. 003) (. 002) (. 004) (. 003) 
Part time exp . 003 -. 021 * -. 017 -. 039* (. 011) (. 008) (. 013) (. 010) 
Part time exp2 . 0003 . 0004 . 0017* . 002* (. 0007) (. 0006) (. 0008) (. 0007) 
Full-time exp . 006 . 007 -. 004 . 010 (. 009) (. 009) (. 010) (. 012) 
Full-time exp2 . 0004 -. 0010* . 0005 -. 0015* (. 0005) (. 0005) (. 0006) (. 0006) 
Unemp -. 254* -. 230* -. 203* -. 226* 
(. 034) (. 024) (. 037) (. 027) 
Unemp2 -. 059* -. 045* -. 111* -. 062* 
(. 022) (. 021) (. 028) (. 027) 
Educ . 144 . 
032 
. 143* . 050* (. 026) (. 020) (. 033) (. 023) 
Educ2 . 082 . 
118* 
. 067* . 132* (. 050) (. 026) (. 053) (. 033) 
Home . 280* . 
106* 
. 306* . 097* (. 029) (. 020) (. 035) (. 024) 
Home2 1.396* 1.700* 1.413* 1.814* 
(. 079) (. 096) (. 121) (. 117) 
Other 
Adj R2 0.431 0.316 0.415 0.362 
F1 40.8* 52.7* 22.3* 39.5* 
F2 6.4* 5.4* 
N 1457 3113 917 1906 
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Table 5.24 Experience and Time Out Effects by Manual/Non-Manual Status 
(cont. ) 
Variable I Manual Non-Man. Manual Non-Man. 
Some out Some out 
Actual exp . 023 
* . 012 . 031* . 035 (. 006) (. 017) (. 009) (. 025) 
Actual exp2 -. 0004 -. 0010 -. 0012* -. 0022* 
(. 0003) (. 0007) (. 0004) (. 0011) 
Job Tenure . 002 . 007* . 002 . 003 (. 003) (. 002) (. 004) (. 003) 
Unemp -. 048* -. 101* -. 029 -. 113* 
(. 016) (. 017) (. 020) (. 019) 
Unemp2 . 0031 
* . 0053 * . 0011 . 0057* (. 0014) (. 0017) (. 0016) (. 002) 
Educ . 094* . 043 * . 108* . 045 * (. 028) (. 012) (. 029) (. 015) 
Educ2 -. 0046* -. 0037* -. 0054* -. 0039* 
(. 0015) (. 0014) (. 0016) (. 0015) 
Home -. 028* -. 062* -. 038* -. 091* (. 008) (. 0093) (. 014) (. 012) 
Home2 . 0017* . 
0030* 
. 0022* . 0047* (. 0007) (. 0009) (. 0009) (. 0010) 
Other -. 0095 -. 077* -. 004 -. 082* 
(. 021) (. 030) (. 022) (. 031) 
Other2 -. 0012 . 0038 -. 0020 -. 0034 
(. 0020) (. 0036) (. 0020) (. 0036) 
Part-time -. 272* -. 216* -. 191* -. 198* 
now (. 027) (. 021) (. 033) (. 024) 
Private -. 048* -. 038 -. 091 * -. 051 * 
(. 021) (. 021) (. 028) (. 027) 
Union . 133 . 
032 
. 135* . 052* (. 026) (. 018) (. 031) (. 022) 
Large firm . 093 . 
124* 
. 075* . 139* (. 050) (. 027) (. 049) (. 032) 
Uses VDU . 251* . 
099* 
. 253* . 077* (. 029) (. 020) (. 037) (. 024) 
Constant 1.295* 1.637* 1.212* 1.664* 
(. 081) (. 123) (. 126) (. 162) 
Adj RZ 0.439 0.339 0.439 0.329 
F1 42.6* 52.6* 27.6* 42.1 * 
F2 5.0* 4.1 * 
N 1457 3113 917 1906 
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Degree . 215* . 
328* . 363* . 193* . 331* . 330* (. 023) (. 028) (. 028) (. 030) (. 037) (. 035) 
Tech . 126* . 
193* . 244* . 088* . 154* . 196* (. 021) (. 020) (. 028) (. 029) (. 028) (. 030) 
A level . 122* . 
046 . 014 . 125* . 076 . 022 (. 033) (. 064) (. 077) (. 054) (. 061) (. 091) 
0 level . 037* . 
064* . 079* -. 022 . 021 . 037 (. 023) (. 019) (. 026) (. 032) (. 029) (. 031) 
Low . 035 . 
014 
. 023 . 028 . 017 . 020 (. 022) (. 024) (. 025) (. 031) (. 027) (. 031) 
Actual exp . 002 . 
005 . 022* . 016 . 010 . 022 (. 008) (. 008) (. 011) (. 011) (. 014) (. 018) 
Actual exp2 -. 0002 -. 0005 -. 0011* -. 0012* -. 0011 -. 0016* 
(. 0004) (. 0004) (. 0004) (. 0005) (. 0006) (. 0008) 
Out spell -. 008 -. 025 -. 027* -. 029* -. 037* -. 037* 
(. 007) (. 007) (. 005) (. 009) (. 009) (. 010) 
Out spe112 -. 0006 . 0008 . 0011* . 0005 . 0011 . 0015* (. 0006) (. 0007) (. 0004) (. 0007) (. 0008) (. 0006) 
Job Tenure . 006* . 
007* . 006* . 005* . 007* . 
008* 
(. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 003) (. 003) (. 003) 
Part-time now -. 222* -. 252* -. 263* -. 172* -. 226* -. 266* 
(. 019) (. 018) (. 020) (. 019) (. 023) (. 024) 
Private -. 084* -. 061 * -. 030 -. 011 * -. 100* -. 072* 
(. 013) (. 016) (. 017) (. 017) (. 027) (. 025) 
Union . 117* . 
095* . 073* . 134* . 096* . 
079* 
(. 013) (. 016) (. 018) (. 016) (. 020) (. 023) 
Large firm . 113* . 
110* . 112* . 139* . 146* . 138* (. 025) (. 023) (. 028) (. 037) (. 031) (. 034) 
Uses VDU . 213* . 
189* . 183* . 227* . 188* . 
189* 
(. 014) (. 017) (. 019) (. 019) (. 020) (. 024) 
Constant 1.332* 1.579* 1.625* 1.412* 1.660* 1.752* 
(. 077) (. 070) (. 084) (. 088) (. 092) (. 129) 
Pseudo RZ . 305 . 
306 . 277 . 303 . 332 . 
325 
N 4570 4570 4570 2823 2823 2823 
Note 1. Sample: Specification s I, 1I, I11: A ll women in work in 1991. Specifications IV, V , VI: Women 
in 
work in 1991 having had some 
break in continuous employment. 2. Asterisk notes significance at 5% 
level. 3. Regional, industry, marital status, reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, are also included 
but results not reported. 
137 
Table 5.25 Quantile Regressions (cont. ) 
Variable 25' Median 75'" 25 th Median 75' 
Percentile Percentile Percentile Some out Percentile 
Some out Some out 
Degree . 233* . 
313* . 350* . 199* . 318* . 334* (. 022) (. 023) (. 032) (. 026) (. 033) (. 037) 
Tech . 137* . 
182* . 232* . 088* . 152* . 185* (. 023) (. 023) (. 024) (. 029) (. 028) (. 029) 
A level . 139* . 020 . 010 . 153* . 081 . 001 (. 036) (. 059) (. 080) (. 041) (. 068) (. 083) 
0 level . 048* . 
060* . 068* -. 008 . 029 . 024 (. 021) (. 022) (. 028) (. 031) (. 028) (. 029) 
Low . 041 . 
005 . 017 . 035 . 030 -. 029 (. 023) (. 022) (. 029) (. 031) (. 026) (. 029) 
Out spell -. 006 -. 025* -. 028* -. 025* -. 036* -. 033* 
(. 005) (. 007) (. 006) (. 008) (. 008) (. 011) 
Out spell2 . 0008 . 
0008 . 0011* . 0002 . 0009 . 0012* (. 0005) (. 0007) (. 0005) (. 0007) (. 0007) (. 0006) 
Job Tenure . 006* . 
008* 
. 007* . 005 . 007* . 009* (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 003) (. 002) (. 003) 
Part time exp -. 017* -. 019* -. 009 -. 031 * -. 036* -. 018 
(. 005) (. 008) (. 008) (. 008) (. 009) (. 010) 
Part time exp2 . 0010* . 
0009 
. 0002 . 0020* . 0020* . 0005 (. 0004) (. 0005) (. 0005) (. 0005) (. 0006) (. 0007) 
Full-time exp. . 006 . 
012 . 010 . 014 . 011 . 
001 
(. 006) (. 007) (. 006) (. 009) (. 008) (. 010) 
Full-time exp2 -. 0003* -. 0009* -. 0008* -. 0013* -. 0014* -. 0007 
(. 0004) (. 0004) (. 0003) (. 0005) (. 0004) (. 0005) 
Part-time now -. 205* -. 228* -. 248* -. 159* -. 217* -. 254* 
(. 017) (. 022) (. 021) (. 018) (. 023) (. 024) 
Private -. 084* -. 057* -. 031 -. 108* -. 084* -. 060* 
(. 012) (. 018) (. 018) (. 016) (. 021) (. 021) 
Union . 116* . 
093* . 066* . 127* . 094* . 076* (. 014) (. 018) (. 019) (. 019) (. 018) (. 022) 
Large firm . 114* . 
113* . 110* . 136* . 157* . 152* (. 024) (. 023) (. 026) (. 033) (. 027) (. 030) 
VDU . 208* . 
187* . 175* . 231* . 191* . 179* (. 013) (. 016) (. 019) (. 017) (. 021) (. 022) 
Constant 1.322* 1.579* 1.746* 1.471* 1.732* 1.873* 
(. 058) (. 070) (. 079) (. 075) (. 068) (. 122) 
Pseudo RZ . 307 . 
307 . 277 . 306 . 333 . 
324 
N 4570 4570 4570 2823 2823 2823 
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Degree . 197* . 
232* . 287* . 151* . 181* . 226* (. 049) (. 026) (. 031) (. 032) (. 035) (. 040) 
Tech . 140* . 170* . 220* . 102* . 127* . 188* (. 049) (. 021) (. 030) (. 028) (. 028) (. 036) 
A level . 175* . 
025 . 021 . 193* . 067 . 010 (. 058) (. 050) (. 064) (. 042) (. 046) (. 088) 
0 level . 049* . 
058* . 057 . 002 . 031 . 031 (. 072) (. 023) (. 031) (. 029) (. 027) (. 034) 
Low . 038 . 
007 -. 004 . 057 . 018 -. 022 (. 066) (. 028) (. 034) (. 028) (. 029) (. 036) 
Actual exp . 006 . 
015* . 018 . 022* . 014 . 022 (. 008) (. 007) (. 013) (. 008) (. 012) (. 020) 
Actual exp2 -. 0002 -. 0007* -. 0009 -. 0012* -. 0011* -. 0017 
(. 0003) (. 0003) (. 0005) (. 0004) (. 0005) (. 0009) 
Job Tenure . 005* . 
005* 
. 003* . 004 . 003 . 003 (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 003) (. 002) (. 002) 
Unemployment -. 058* -. 086* -. 085* -. 081* -. 091* -. 088* 
spell (. 029) (. 011) (. 023) . 
(. 016) (. 014) (. 025) 
Unemp2 . 0033 . 
0046* 
. 0047* . 0045* . 0041* . 0041* (. 0018) (. 0015) (. 0030) (. 0014) (. 0016) (. 0027) 
Education spell . 072* . 
061* . 039* . 065* . 061* . 042* (. 021) (. 011) (. 011) (. 017) (. 016) (. 013) 
Educ2 -. 0058* -. 0028 -. 0022* -. 0053* -. 0027* -. 0023 
(. 0029) (. 0018) (. 0009) (. 0021) (. 0014) (. 0013) 
Home spell -. 022* -. 048* -. 061* -. 048* -. 069* -. 083* 
(. 007) (. 007) (. 009) (. 009) (. 009) (. 011) 
Home2 . 0006 . 
0028* . 0033* . 0019* . 0035* . 0040* (. 0007) (. 0006) (. 0008 (. 0008) (. 0007) (. 0008) 
Other spell -. 013 -. 050* -. 021 -. 028 -. 056* -. 052 
(. 044) (. 018) (. 032) (. 021) (. 021) (. 024) 
Other -. 0019 . 0018 . 0014 . 0011 . 0021 . 0010 (. 0053) (. 002) (. 0046) (. 0041) (. 0030) (. 0026) 
Part-time now -. 223* -. 229* -. 240* -. 154* . -. 19l* -. 207* (. 053) (. 019) (. 021) (. 021) (. 021) (. 025) 
Private -. 076* -. 055* -. 042* -. 097* -. 072* -. 070* 
(. 015) (. 016) (. 024) (. 017) (. 019) (. 023) 
Union . 109* . 
081* . 071* . 129* . 092* . 072* (. 030) (. 013) (. 021) (. 020) (019) (. 022) 
Large firm . 110* . 
133* . 089* . 146* . 154* . 144* (. 026) (. 021) (. 023) (. 040) (. 030) (. 032) 
Uses VDU . 190* . 
174* . 156* . 188* . 179* . 128* (. 019) (. 016) (. 025) (. 022) (. 020) (. 021) 
Constant 1.294* 1.505* 1.689* 1.314* 1.593* 1.812* 
(. 080) (. 061) (. 112) (. 085) (. 099) (. 151) 
Pseudo RZ . 316 . 
323 . 292 . 326 . 363 . 354 
N 4570 4570 4570 2823 2823 2823 
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Table 5.26 Heckman Selectivity Adjusted for Participation Wage Equations 
Variable Probit in work Wage En Wage En Wage En 
I II III IV 
Degree . 548* . 302* . 315* . 252* (. 058) (. 030) (. 029) (. 030) 
Tech . 056* . 196* . 207* . 208* (. 049) (. 027) (. 027) (. 028) 
A level 1.049* . 056 . 065 -. 113 (. 237) (. 079) (. 079) (. 078) 
Olevel -. 472* . 068* . 081* -. 093 (. 054) (. 028) (. 028) (. 028) 
Low . 319* . 041 . 050 -. 056 (. 064) (. 031) (. 031) (. 031) 
Kids -. 158* -. 153* -. 105* (. 020) (. 020) (. 020) 
Young kid . 121* . 106* . 061* (. 019) (. 019) (. 019) 
Number of kids -. 403 * 
(. 016) 
Age of youngest . 029* (. 005) 
Partner out of wk . 031 (. 032) 
Part time 2nd last job . 467* (. 043) 
Married . 125* . 088* . 086* . 085* (. 036) (. 015) (. 015) (. 015) 
Actual Experience . 025* . 021* (. 007) (. 007) 
Actual Exp2 -. 0009* -. 0010* (. 0002) (. 0003) 
Unemployment spell -. 085* 
(. 015) 
Unemp2 
. 005* (0 
Education spell 
. 055* 5* (. 009) 
Educe -. 003* 
(. 001) 
Home spell -. 052* 
(. 007) 
Home2 
. 003* (. 001) 
Other spell -. 045* 
( . 020) Other2 -. 001 
(. 002) 
Current job tenure 007* . 003 . 004* (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) 
Pre out experience -. 004* 
(. 002) 
Post out experience . 005 (. 002) 
Outspell -. 019* 
(. 003) 
-. 003 . 032 057 
* 
(. 042) (. 041) . (. 041) 
Constant . 220 1.348* 1.563* * 426 1 (. 060) (. 077) (. 065) . (. 081) 
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R . 108 . 378 . 383 . 402 
F 72.2 71.9 66.2 
N 7162 4574 4570 4570 
Note 1. Dependent variables: (I) Work Dummy, (II, III and IV) Log real hourly Wage. 2. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 4 Regional, industry, marital status, 
reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, were also included but these results are not reported. 
5. Sample: All female workers 
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Table 5.27 Selectivity Adjusted Treatment Model Wage Equations 
Variable Probit: Time out 
-Wage 
Estimates 
II III IV 
(Unadjusted) (Treatment) (Instrumented) 
Degree . 340* . 313* 369* . 306* (. 059) (. 027) (. 028) (. 027) 
Tech -. 051 . 202* . 185* . 202* (. 052) (. 024) (. 024) (. 024) 
A level . 5129* . 081 . 176* . 063 (. 243) (. 076) (. 078) (. 077) 
0 level -. 047 . 076* . 064* . 073 * (. 057) (. 026) (. 026) (. 026) 
Low -. 142* . 041 . 015 . 040 (. 068) (. 030) (. 031) (. 031) 
Kids -. 129* -. 039 -. 160* (. 023) (. 026) (. 019) 
Young Kid . 126* . 116* . 127* (. 017) (. 017) (. 017) 
Number of kids . 290* (. 018) 
Age of youngest . 014* (. 005) 
Partner out of work -. 044 
(. 033) 
Part time 2nd last . 289* 
job (. 048) 
Married -. 064* . 089* . 089* . 085* (. 036) (. 015) (. 015) (. 015) 
Time out -. 066* -. 058* -. 042 (. 015) (. 015) (. 039) 
Current job tenure . 006* . 005* . 008* (. 002) (. 002) (. 001) 
Part time now -. 274* -. 246* -. 282* (. 017) (. 017) (. 017) 
Private -. 052* -. 054* -. 052* (. 016) (. 016) (. 016) 
Union . 075* . 075* . 074* (. 022) (. 016) (. 016) 
Large firm . 123* . 124* . 119* (. 022) (. 022) (. 056) 
VDU . 203* . 196* . 201 * (. 01 S) (. 015) (. 015) 
. 422* (. 067) 
Constant . 153* 1.537* 1.246* 1.536* (. 063) (. 055) (. 071) (. 065) 
log L -3858.12 
X2 618.9* 
Adj R2 . 074 . 379 . 384 . 376 F 76.3* 76.0* 75.5* 
N 4567 4567 4567 4567 
Note 1. Dependent variables: (I) Break Dummy, (II, III and IV) Log real hourly Wage. 2. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 4 Regional, industry, marital status, 
reading and child dummies, as 
in Table 5.17, were also included but these results are not reported. 
5. Sample: All female workers in work in 1991. 
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Current job tenure >=2 
years 
III 
Years of -. 0012 -. 002 . 006* 
educ (. 0013) (. 002) (. 002) 
North -. 155 -. 142* -. 118 (. 095) (. 105) (. 097) 
South east -. 147 -. 138 -. 149 (. 089) (. 099) (. 092) 
Midlands -. 008 . 124 . 085 (. 095) (. 102) (. 096) 
Celts -. 007 -. 068 -. 069 (. 122) (. 136) (. 122) 
Degree . 950* 1.175* 1.321 * (. 123) (. 132) (. 120) 
Tech 1.289* 1.003* 1.063* 
(. 103) (. 117) (. 108) 
A/O level . 962* 1.879* . 881 * (. 112) (. 125) (. 116) 
Low . 726* . 442* . 406* (. 131) (. 152) (. 143) 
Married -. 052 . 228* . 072* (. 069) (. 078) (. 071) 
Young kid -1.214* -1.061* -1.351 (. 070) (. 077) (. 073) 
Constant -. 377 -1.450* -2.029* (. 362) (. 380) (. 341) 
log L 





. 046 7126 
Note 1. Base reference category: not in work. 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 4. Regional, industry, marital status, reading and child 
dummies, as in Table 5.17, were also included but these results not reported. 
5. Dependent variable: Labour force status. 6. Sample: All women. 
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Table 5.28. b. Multinomial Logit Estimates of Labour Force Status 





T< 2 yrs 
II 
Other out 
T< 2 yrs 
III 
Home out 





Years of ed -. 001 -. 006 -. 008* -. 006 -. Oil* 
(. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 003) (. 002) 
North -. 157* -. 068* -. 248* -. 037* -. 236* 
(. 095) (. 128) (. 145) (. 102) (. 116) 
South-East -. 047 -. 082 -. 213 -. 040 -. 210 
(. 089) (. 125) (. 134) (. 132) (. 107) 
Midlands . 004 . 
338 -. 193 -. 141 -. 041 
(. 095) (. 121) (. 146) (. 134) (. 111) 
Celts . 007 -. 
019 -. 138 -. 016 -. 098 
(. 112) (. 168) (. 185) (. 174) (. 140) 




(. 123) (. 167) (. 184) (. 171) (. 151) 
Tech 1.290* . 851 * 1.234* . 712* 1.422* (. 103) (. 141) (. 173) (. 140) (. 142) 
A/O level . 959* . 
956* 
. 692* . 692* 1.101 (. 112) (. 146) (. 198) (. 148) (. 154) 
Low . 726* . 
477* 
. 309 . 303 . 500 (. 131) (. 177) (. 246) (. 180) (. 195) 
Married -. 058 . 603* . 203 . 504* -. 217* (. 069) (. 101) (. 104) (. 102) (. 082) 
Young kid -1.212* -. 831 * -1.368 -1.677* -1.156 
(. 070) (. 091) (. 113) (. 111) (. 085) 
Constant -. 395 -. 727 -3.385* -. 317 -3.676* 
(. 362) (. 525) (. 472) (. 567) (. 377) 
Log L -10927.6 
X2 (55) 1294.6 
Pseudo R2 . 056 
N 7126 
Note 1. Base category: not in work 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% 
level. 4. Regional, industry, marital status, reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, were also 
included but these results are not reported. 
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Table 5.29 Groot and van Ours Specification 
II II III IV 
Pre out Work 
Experience 
Duration of last out 
spell 
Home*Last out spell 
Ed*Last out spell 
Unemp* Last out spell 
Other *Last out spell 
Rebound 
Reb * home 
Reb * education 
Reb * unemployed 
Reb * other 
Current job tenure -2 
yr 
A, Continuous Work 
A2 All out back less 
than 2 years 
A3 All out back >=2 
years 
A4 Home out back less 
than 2 years 
A5 Home out back 
>=2 years 
A4 All other out back 
less than 2 yrs 






-. UUI -. UU1 -. 003 -. 003 (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) 
-. 020* -. 016* 
(. 003) (. 003) 
-. 021* -. 015* 
(. 004) (. 004) 
. 005 . 006 (. 011) (. 010) 
-. 046* -. 043* 
(. 011) (. 011) 
-. 063* -. 058* 
(. 014) (. 014) 
. 007 . 043 * (. 008) (. 017) 
-. 020 . 019 (. 012) (. 021) 
. 063* . 093* (. 018) (. 027) 
-. 010 . 025 (. 012) (. 023) 
. 066* . 098* (. 018) (. 027) 
. 006* . 003 . 005 * . 002 (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) (. 002) 
. 891* . 333* (. 249) (. 140) 
-. 579 
(. 303) 





. 070 (. 260) 
-. 073 
(. 174) 
1.537* 1.311* 1.556* 1.471* 
(. 058) (. 090) (. 057) (. 072) 
. 382 . 386 . 389 . 397 72.1* 69.3* 65.7* 61.1* 
4574 4574 4574 4574 
Note 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 2. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
3. Regional, industry, marital status, education, reading and child dummies, as in Table 5.17, also included 
but results not reported. 4. Dependent Variable: Log real hourly wage. 5. Sample: All women in work 
in 1991.6. F test for equality of coefficients for last spell unemployed or in home care = 4.84 (F(1,4528) 
in III and 5.86 F(1,4523) in IV not accepted. 7. F test for equality of rebound effects following 
unemployment or home time = 
0.40 (F(1,4528) in III and 0.04 (F(1,4523) in IV not rejected. 
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Table 5.30 Mean Changes in Wages and Experience 1981 to 1991 
1981 1991 Difference 
Total 
Hourly Wage 1.5 1.8 +0.3 
(0.7) (0.6) (0.8) 
Work experience 3.9 13.7 +9.8 
(2.4) (3.1) (3.0) 
Non-work experience 0.1 1.7 +1.7 
(0.8) (2.5) (2.5) 
Unemployment 0.1 0.2 +0.1 
(0.4) (0.8) (0.5) 
Childcare 0.1 0.9 +0.8 
(0.6) (2.1) (1.6) 
Manual 
Wage 1.4 1.5 +0.1 
(0.7) (0.5) (0.8) 
Work experience 4.4 13.7 +9.3 
(2.3) (3.4) (3.4) 
Non-work experience 0.2 2.0 +1.8 
(0.7) (2.9) (2.8) 
Unemployment 0.1 0.3 +0.2 
(0.3) (1.1) (0.8) 
Childcare 0.2 1.4 +1.2 
(0.8) (2.7) (2.0) 
Non-Manual 
Wage 1.6 1.9 +0.3 
(0.8) (0.5) (0.8) 
Work experience 3.7 13.7 +10.0 
(2.4) (2.9) (2.8) 
Non-work experience 0.1 1.6 +1.6 
(0.8) (2.4) (2.4) 
Unemployment 0.1 0.2 +0.1 
(0.4) (0.6) (0.4) 
Childcare 0.1 0.7 +0.6 
(0.5) (1.8) (1.4) 
Note. 1. Sample sizes 2960 of which 834 manual and 2126 non-manual. 2. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5.31 Fixed Effect Estimation: Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Variable Levels Difference Levels Difference Levels Difference 






Full time 2 
Part time 
Part time 2 
Home out 








Kid more than 2 kids 
Married 
Constant 
I II III IV V VI 
. 063* . 081* . 035 . 036* (. 018) (. 010) (. 019) (. 009) 
-. 002* -. 0012* -. 0015* -. 0007 
(. 0007) (. 0004) (. 0008) (. 0004) 
-. 029* -. 022 
(. 011) (. 014) 
-. 001 . 005* (. 001) (. 001) 
. 010 . 014 (. 012) (. 014) 
-. 001 -. 001 
(. 001) (. 001) 
-. 072* -. 033* 
(. 009) (. 011) 
. 004* . 001 (. 001) (. 001) 
-. 116* -. 051 
(. 013) (. 020) 
. 0062* -. 001 (. 0013) (. 003) 
-. 136* -. 120* 
(. 018) (. 050) 
. 0087* -. 004 (. 0023) (. 006) 
. 084* . 
121 
(. 014) (. 088) 
-. 0057* . 004 (. 0014) (. 007) 
-. 043 . 024 (. 027) (. 090) 
-. 0005 -. 015 
(. 0025) (. 010) 
-. 193* -. 084* -. 094* -. 094* -. 064* -. 088* 
(. 024) (. 035) (. 026) (. 035) (. 026) (. 035) 
-. 155* -. 162* -. 106* -. 192* -. 086* -. 153* 
(. 024) (. 038) (. 023) (. 039) (. 023) (. 038) 
. 101* . 083* . 088* . 085* . 072* . 082* (. 020) (. 033) (. 020) (. 033) (. 020) (. 033) 
1.218* . 237 1.784* . 383* 1.563* . 114 (. 112) (. 066) (. 086) (. 034) (. 126) (. 071) 
Adjusted R2 . 091 . 
048 . 143 . 029 . 274 . 050 
F 46.7* 29.1* 51.5* 10.5* 50.8* 13.9* 
N 2955 2955 2955 2955 2955 2955 
Note. 1. In the ordinary least squares model, the dependent variable is the log of the real hourly wage. 
In the first difference model, the dependent variable is the change in the log of the hourly wage: 
Aln wage = (In wage i t., - In wage 1c) 
The first difference values represent the change in variables between Sweep 4 and Sweep 5 (1981 to 
1991). 2. White adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 3. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
4. All wages. are in 1991 pounds. 5. 
F tests on equality of full and part-time coefficients =18.54 (F(2, 
2933) in III and 4.49 (F(2,2950) in IV not accepted. 6. F tests on equality of unemployed and home 
time coefficients = 0.56 (F(2,2929) 
in V and 1.35 (F(2,2946) in VI not rejected. 
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Chapter 6 
British Evidence on the Effects of Re-Entry on the Gender Wage Gap 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 confirmed the well-known observation that women earn less than men, but 
that this gender pay gap has been falling in recent years. It is also apparent from 
Chapters 2 and 5 that women who work part-time have lower hourly earnings than 
women who work full-time and that this full-time - part-time gap has been rising at the 
same time as the gender wage gap has narrowed (see also Paci and Joshi (1996) and 
Harkness (1996)). There is an enormous literature (see amongst others Blau and Kahn 
(1992)) aimed at estimating the size of the gender pay gap and the proportions of the gap 
that can be ascribed to various explanations (which generally means differences in 
characteristics and coefficients between men and women in earnings functions). 
However, what passes as an explanation for economists often seems less than 
satisfactory to non-economists. For example, consider the following possible 
explanations for the gender pay gap: 
"Women are less likely to be promoted than men so their wage growth is lower and so 
they tend to get stuck in the lower-paying jobs. " 
"From the time they enter the labour market, women are in the low-paying jobs. " 
"The interruption to labour market careers of women caused predominantly by care 
responsibilities leads to lower earnings for women. " 
Of course, economists are fully aware of these competing possible explanations for the 
gender pay gap, but it is simply very hard, if not impossible, to assess the relative 
importance of them with many of the data sets and the approaches that are commonly 
used. For example, with simple cross-sections of earnings and characteristics (which 
are the most commonly used), 
little more can be done than to regress earnings on 
characteristics and then to 
decompose the pay gap into a part which is the result of 
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differences in characteristics and a part which is the result of differences in coefficients. 
Speculation can then be carried out on the causes of the results found (see, for 
example, Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980) who look at differences in occupation, 
Gronau (1988) who looks at differences in skill intensity, and Swaffield (1997) who 
looks at differences in motivation). Of course, the results from these studies can be 
interpreted as shedding light on the explanations proposed above. For example, finding 
significantly different effects of children on the earnings of men and women is plausibly 
interpreted as the consequences of interrupted labour market careers. Mincer and 
Polachek (1974), Corcoran and Duncan (1979), Mincer and Ofek (1982), Cox (1984), 
and Chapter 5 have established the connection between interruptions and reduced 
earnings for women. 
Given the cross section data available, it is unclear what more can be done. However, 
once there is the opportunity to use panel data, other possibilities are extended. There 
is a large literature on whether better measures of labour market experience can help in 
explaining the gender pay gap (for example, Groot and van Ours (1994), Albrecht, 
Edin, Sundstrom and Vroman (1996) ). Panel data containing information on labour 
market histories makes such estimation possible. Chapter 5 suggests that estimates of 
the returns to experience can be biased if potential, rather than actual, experience 
measures are used. Chapter 5 also shows that women who have a career break receive 
lower earnings than women who do not and that it takes time to make up these lost 
earnings. 
Some researchers have attempted to model the evolution of earnings over the whole 
life cycle (for studies of the evolution of male earnings see Abowd and Card (1989), 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995), for the US and Dickens (1996) for the UK). The aims 
of this Chapter are more modest (in part because we have access to a very short 
panel). We show how, with a minimum of just two observations on earnings and 
employment, a different decomposition of the gender pay gap can be derived which 
can shed further light on the sources of the disadvantage of women in the labour 
market. 
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The decomposition can be described straightforwardly. We divide the workers 
observed in a single cross-section into two groups: those with continuous employment 
and those who have had some period of non-employment in the past year (whom we 
shall call entrants following the terminology of Gregg and Wadsworth (1996)'). The 
latter are the same types of women who we observed as having had time out in 
Chapter 5 (although the data set used here is different). Continuous workers may 
have had several employers over their working lives but have never left employment. 
The current average wage can be thought of as being a weighted average of the 
average wages of these two groups with the weight being determined by the 
proportion of labour market entrants. For those who have been continuously 
employed the current wage can be written as the previous wage plus their wage 
growth. Having written the average wage this way, we can decompose the pay gap 
between men and women into differences in these components. This is what this 
Chapter does. It should be emphasised that this decomposition is not the only one that 
might be done, but we think that its usefulness should be judged by the insights into 
the explanation of the gender pay gap it produces. For example, if it was found that 
the gender pay gap could be ascribed largely to the fact that there were differences in 
wage growth, this might suggest that discrimination in promotion or job change 
decisions was important. 2 On the other hand, if it were found that differences in 
entrant shares were the most important factor in explaining the wage gap it would 
suggest the need to examine differences in labour market transitions. 
This Chapter uses a British longitudinal data set, the British Household Panel Survey, 
(BHPS) to investigate the impact of re-entry on explaining the gender wage gap. 
Section 6.2 outlines the decomposition in more detail. Section 6.3 gives an outline of 
the data and sample construction, whilst section 6.4 presents the empirical evidence. 
Section 6.5 concludes. 
This terminology might be found a bit confusing as the term entrants is sometimes reserved for those 
workers entering the labour market 
for the first time from full-time education. Our entrants include these 
workers but also those who are re-entering paid employment after a period of non-work. 
2 For more evidence on pay and promotion see Booth, Francesconi and Frank (1998). For a summary of 
the evidence on job change and wage growth see 
Topel (1991) and Topel and Ward (1990). In what 
follows, we do not distinguish between these two 
hypotheses, concentrating instead on the continuous 
worker-entrant divide. 
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6.2 Gender Pay Decomposition 
Introduction 
In this Section, we introduce the decomposition of the wage gap. In the following 
subsection, we demonstrate the use of this decomposition when we analyse the 
differences in wages between the genders. In the subsequent subsection, we follow a 
similar procedure but we account for the differences between full and part-time work of 
women. The next Section provides information about the data set that we use for the 
study. 
6.2.1 Oaxaca Decomposition 
The conventional approach to the measure of pay differences between men and women 
stems from the Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) original method of decomposing 
differences in the mean pay gap into differences in characteristics and differences in the 
returns to these characteristics. The differences in the returns to characteristics are then 
traditionally ascribed to discrimination. Defining the percentage wage gap between 





-1 (6.1) Wf Wf 
So that, Gap + 1= 
Wm (6.2) 
Wf 
Thus ln(Gap + 1) = ln(wm) - ln(wf) (6.3) 
Let the mean male and female log wage depend on a set of characteristics, Z, which 
include a set of personal, human capital and job-specific characteristics, according to the 
preferences of the researcher, so that we have, 
1n(Wm) = Zm Pm and If(WC) = Zf ßf (6.4) 
Thus, the gap may be decomposed as, 
rw - rw 
ln(Gap + 1) = Zm ßm- 
Zf. ßf (6.5 (a)) 
= Zm f Pf (6.6 (a)) 
rw_rw 
tZ ßf Zm Aß (6.7 (a)) 
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The first term can be interpreted as predicting differences in earnings from a wage 
equation estimated for women and allowing characteristics to vary across gender. The 
second term captures the extent of residual `discrimination'. 
Equally, 
ln(Gap+1)=Zmýßm-Zf/(Ap+(3m) (6.5 (b)) 
=0Z ßm-Zf A (6.7 (b)). 
This can be interpreted as evaluating pay gaps according to a male base wage equation. 
Differences in the two approaches can, and do, lead to differences in the extent of pay 
discrimination. The literature often reports two sets of results or takes a weighted 
average following the work of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). 
6.2.2 A New Decomposition 
Given the availability of panel data, a richer decomposition may be derived, which can 
account for the possible explanations for the gender pay gap outlined in the introduction. 
Suppose that there were No workers in employment last year with a log wage wo;. For 
each of these workers, define an indicator variable O which takes the value 1 if the 
worker has been in continuous employment since last year, and 0 if the worker is no 
longer in employment. For those workers who have been in continuous employment, let 
us define gl to be the change in their log wage (so that this is approximately the rate of 
growth of their wage). Suppose, in the course of a year, there are El labour market 
entrants who each have a wage wj 
`. Then the average wage observed at time 1 must be 
given by the weighted average of the wages of the two types of workers, (continuous 
and entrants)3: 
3 For those with 0--0 (non-workers) we obviously cannot define g but in what follows how we specify g 








where the denominator gives the total employed in the population at time 1 and the first 
term is the average wage of job stayers at time 1. 






where a bar over a variable denotes a mean and the mean of g is only taken over those 
who remain in continuous employment. In turn (6.9) can be rearranged as: 
No0. g+wo + 
Coy(wo1,03) 
+Elw 
W' NOO + EI 
(6.10) 
where Cov (wo , 0) = 
E0 wo - No wo 0a 
This can be written as, 
Cov(w01, eý) 
wl =(1-a) g+wo+ 0 +aw` (6.11) 
where a =- -EI ONO + E, 
where a represents the share of entrants in current employment. Equation (6.11) says 
that the current average wage is a weighted average of the average wage of new entrants 
and the average wage of continuing workers, whose current average wage is the average 
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previous wage, wo, plus average wage growth, g, plus a covariance term (which is 
essentially the correlation of job retention with the previous wage. ) If this covariance 
term is positive (which it generally is), then high wage workers are less likely to leave 
employment so that the average wage among continuing workers is higher than the 
previous period's average wage. 
If we are in a steady state, then we can further simplify the above formula. Suppose we 
are in a static steady state with constant wage growth and employment. Then, as 
employment is constant, it must be the case that inflows into employment must equal 
outflows and that: 
«= i-e (6.12) 
so that the share of new entrants, the inflow rate, a, in the steady state equals the risk of 
leaving employment for existing workers. Then, dividing through by a in (6.11) the 





In this formulation, the average wage is the average entrant wage plus the average 
annual growth of real wages for continuing workers multiplied by (1-a)/a together with 
the covariance of employment loss with wages. Since a is the outflow rate and 1/a is 
the average duration of job stayers in the employed population, then (1-a)/a represents 
the expected number of periods of wage growth. It should be stressed that everything 
we have done so far is simply manipulation of identities and the terms may themselves 
be influenced by other factors. It is clear that if we want to understand the difference in 
wages across groups (say men and women) we can think about this difference as being 
made up of different components of (6.13). These different components can all be given 
natural interpretations in terms of the three explanations of the gender pay gap discussed 
in the introduction. Wage growth for workers in continuous employment is connected 
with promotion (same firm) or 
job change (different firm); entrant wages are concerned 
with gender pay gaps 
from the moment of entry; and the entrant share is concerned with 
interruptions to labour market careers. 
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It should be emphasised that the split of current employees into the two groups of 
entrants and continuous employees are not the only ones that might be done and are 
themselves heterogeneous groups. We might, for example, think of breaking them 
down further. For example, our entrants can be thought of as consisting of two types of 
workers: those first entering the labour market after full-time education and those re- 
entering employment after a period of unemployment, sickness or domestic 
responsibilities. In fact, only 3 per cent of entrants in the BHPS are new entrants who 
have just completed full-time education, so that sample sizes prevent us from splitting 
our entrants in this way. Similarly, those in continuous employment could be divided 
into those in the same job, those who have changed job but remained with the same 
employer and those who have changed employer. We do include controls for whether 
an individual has changed jobs below, but it is sample sizes again that prevent us from 
doing a more thorough disaggregation along these lines. 
6.2.3 The Full Time - Part Time Gap 
We can apply a similar decomposition to the earnings of full-time (FT) and part-time 
(PT) women to try to discover the origin of the differences in their wages. However, 
there is an additional complication here, as individuals can move between FT and PT 
states. Given this, it is simple to think of those who have been in continuous 
employment as being divided into two groups: those who were previously employed FT 
and those who were previously employed PT. The average current wage will then be a 
suitably weighted average of the earnings of these two groups of workers and the 
entrants. 
Let us introduce some notation. Suppose there are Nrk workers at date t (t=0,1) in state k 
(k=FT, PT) and Elk entrants. Let the variable at take the value one if an individual was 
in state k in period 0, has remained in continuous employment and is in state 1 this 
period (k, 1=FT, PT)" Also, 
denote by gki the change in the log wage for those in 
continuous employment and 
in state k at date 0 and state I at date 1. On this basis, the 
From the algebra, (1-a )/a = (No 
0 )/Ei 
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population of FT workers, 6f Nof + Ef can be written as Off Nof +O pfN 0p +Ef, and the 
entrant share in the population of FT workers, a1, is given by - 
Ef 
OfN0f +O fN0 +Ef 
Then, from (6.13), we have the following expression for the average full-time wage: 
6ffNof Coy(wof, Aff) - wlf 




ApfNOp Cov(wop, Apf ) 
+_ WOp + -h 








This has the following interpretation. The first term is the share of current full-time 
workers who have been in continuous employment and were previously full-time 
multiplied by their average wage today. The latter can be written as their current wage 
yesterday plus a covariance term plus their average wage growth. The term on the 
second line is then the share of workers who are currently FT, but who were part-time 
multiplied by their average current wage. The term on the final line is the share of 
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(6.15) 
Now let us turn to the data to see how these decompositions work in practice. 
6.3 Data 
Our data is drawn from the first 5 waves of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), 
covering the period 
from 1991-95, (for more details see Chapter 3), a period of 
recession in which unemployment peaked 
in 1993, followed by the beginning of 
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economic recovery. We restrict our attention to employees and use net hourly wages 
including overtime as our wage measure. In the "Living in Britain" Individual 
Questionnaire of BHPS, individuals were asked to give information on their take-home 
pay (after tax, National Insurance, pensions and union dues) for the last time they were 
paid. They were subsequently asked to say for which time period this wage was paid 
and whether this was their usual take-home pay. From this, we have constructed hourly 
wages. We remove from the sample all wages below 50 pence and all above £100 an 
hour, as these may be mismeasured and create outliers in our sample. The remaining 
hourly wages were deflated using New Earnings Survey average weekly earnings and 
weekly hours indices for full-time workers for the whole economy, to a base of January 
1991. The average wage in our sample on this measure should then be constant over 
time (if we regress the adjusted wage on a time trend, the trend is not significant). 5 This 
facilitates pooling across waves and highlights the fact that our interest lies in wages 
measured relative to the average wage change for men and women. To be part of the 
computation of wages, an individual must have been in employment either now or 
previously, but the decomposition of average wages which we use also requires the 
availability of other information, such as details of schooling and job tenure, which 
further restricts our sample. The following groups of people in our sample are 
identified: 
(a) Those employees in employment at the previous interview, but no longer in 
employment. 
(b) Those not in employment at the previous interview, but in employment now. 
(c) Those in employment at both interviews, and with no intervening period of non- 
employment. 
(d) Those in employment at both interviews, but with some intervening period of non- 
employment. 
In addition, those in employment in both periods require information on the intervening 
period (from the job history records) to 
be available in order to check whether they have 
had any intervening period of non-employment. To try to ensure that this restriction did 
An alternative means of indexing wages would 
be to deflate by the Retail Price Index. This would then 
mean that the average wage 
level would grow across the sample period. 
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not lead to under-representation of those in continuous employment, we limited our 
sample (entrants and continuous workers) to those for whom the job history information 
was available, even if this information was not strictly necessary for our entrants. 6 
Table 6.1 provides information on the loss in sample size from these restrictions. For 
example, there are 9249 observations for men who were employees at the time of last 
interview, of which 7696 were in employment when next interviewed. The need for job 
history information through the intervening period reduces the sample to 7317 
observations. Of these, 7078 have been in continuous employment but not necessarily 
with the same employer (group (c) in our decomposition), but only 6387 have both wage 
and personal and job characteristics information. Amongst those currently in 
employment, there are 239 who were in employment when last interviewed but who had 
a subsequent break in employment, 182 of whom have information on wages and 
characteristics. These are our group (d) and we will only use information on their 
current average wages in the decomposition. This means throwing away wage change 
information for group (d), since the wage change for this group does not enter the 
decomposition. The total stock of entrants is (d) together with those in work now who 
were not in work at the previous interview date, of which there are some 452 men with 
wage and characteristic information, (row 18). From Table 6.1 (a), we can see that there 
are relatively small numbers of people in group (d) (the tenth row is the relevant one), so 
we cannot have a separate group for these people. In terms of their average wages (not 
shown) these individuals are, as we might expect, between groups (b) and (c), but they 
are much closer to group (b) than (c). For this reason, we choose to put them in with the 
labour market entrants. 
6.4 Results of the Decomposition 
6.4.1 Introduction 
In this section, we present the results of the decomposition. The first subsection 
includes the results of the gender pay gap and the following subsection provides the 
results when we analyse the gap accounting for differences in full- and part-time work. 
We then go on to provide an insight into a longer run view of the gender wage gap. 
6 Entrants could have been defined simply by using a job tenure criterion. 
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Finally, we conclude this section with a detailed analysis of the components of the 
decomposition that we have used. 
6.4.2 Results of the Gender Pay Gap 
Table 6.2 summarises the mean annual log hourly wage change across the sample. The 
mean annual wage growth is around 2.6 per cent exhibiting marginally higher wage 
growth for women over the period. There is large variation around the mean, median 
wage growth is 1.1 log points and around 46 per cent of the sample are measured with 
zero or negative wage growth between interview dates. There is little difference in 
wage growth distribution between men and women. Mean wage growth in full-time 
jobs is around 1.5 per cent higher than wage growth in part-time jobs. The distribution 
of full-time wage growth lies generally to the right of the part-time wage growth 
distribution, with the exception of the top decile. This is consistent with the lower 
returns to part-time experience observed in Chapter 5. Figure 6.1 confirms that wage 
growth declines with the age of worker, as to be expected, since wage levels tend to 
grow with age whilst promotions tend to fall with age. 
Table 6.3 presents our basic decomposition of the average wage in each year. The 
average hourly wage for men is around £6.17 and the average hourly wage for women is 
around £4.44, (see the total column for the mean log wage: log values of 1.82 and 1.49 
respectively). The raw wage gap is 36 log points in 1992 falling to 32 log points by 
1995, (row 1). This is basically consistent with the trends observed in the gender wage 
gap in other data sets and confirmed by the GHS data in Chapter 2. Table 6.3 also 
breaks down the log wage into the different components of Equation (6.13). 
It is apparent that the bulk of the gender pay gap this year is `explained' by the gender 
pay gap in the previous year (row 2). However, as Equation (6.13) shows, it is the other 
components which are more 
fundamental in the sense of explaining the gender pay gap 
in the long-run, so it is on these components that we will focus. It should be apparent 
that there is quite considerable variation in these components from year to year, so that 
our discussion will 
focus on the average, paying particular attention to the variables 
where the differences 
do seem to be systematic. This year-to-year variation could be the 
product of the relatively small sample sizes in the BHPS or because there is 
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considerable cyclical variation in the factors we will study. It is a pity that we only have 
five waves of data with which to work as certain conclusions must inevitably be 
somewhat speculative although below we do look at information from other data sets to 
try to get some idea of longer-run trends. 
Taking the five years together, wage growth for those in continuous employment seems 
very similar for both men and women (2.1 points for men and 2.4 for women), with 
growth actually being higher for women than men in 1993 and 1995 though the pattern 
is reversed in 1994. This might be thought somewhat surprising given that we might 
expect that promotions are important sources of wage growth and that women's access 
to higher-paid positions within firms is restricted by the so-called "glass ceiling" (see 
Gregg and Machin (1994)). However, we should remember that wage growth and 
promotions are likely to be somewhat easier to obtain at lower rungs on the job ladder. 
So the fact that women only have the same wage growth as men when they are 
concentrated on the lower rungs of the ladder could be taken as indication that, given 
their position, they do worse in terms of wage growth. (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 
(1998) complement this finding. They show that promotions are as likely for women, 
but wage growth in promotions is lower for women). The covariance term is always 
positive albeit with a large unreported standard error, (row 5), indicating (as is well 
known from other studies, see, for example, Burgess and Rees (1996)) that high-wage, 
high skill workers, are much less likely to leave employment. The covariance terms also 
do not seem to show any large systematic differences between men and women. The 
implication of these results is that the wage gap does not widen through the years 
between men and women who remain in continuous employment and that any pay gap 
between these men and women must have occurred on entry into employment. 
Table 6.3, (row 7), does show that there is a large systematic difference in the entry 
wages of men and women. 
The average hourly entry wage for men is around £4.14. The 
average hourly entry wage 
for women is around £3.46. Note that the gender pay gap on 
entry is less than the gender gap 
in average wages, with an average gap across the years 
of about 18 log points or something 
like half the overall gender pay gap. It would seem 
that the stock of women in employment contains a larger share of entrants who receive 
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lower wages and this could explain the gender wage gap. The fact that the gender gap in 
entry wages is less than the average gap is consistent with evidence from other studies. 
For example, Manning (1996) finds that there is no gender pay gap for those workers 
entering the labour market immediately after leaving full-time education and Graddy 
and Pistaferri (1997) find that the gender pay gap for newly-graduated MBAs is about 8 
log points. It is also important to note that labour market entrants earn significantly less 
than the average. The traditional interpretation of this is that entrants have less human 
capital. Chapter 5 suggests that those with time out do, indeed, earn less than 
continuous workers, but that the difference is not entirely due to different endowments 
of human capital and that the time out process may depreciate human capital or generate 
uncertainty among employers which leads to lower wages. 
Finally, Equation 6.13 suggests that we do need to be concerned with the difference 
between men and women in the proportion of entrants to employment (row 8). As we 
would expect, the entrant share is higher for women (about 14 per cent) than men (about 
11 per cent). As labour market entrants earn less than the average this will also tend to 
produce a gender pay gap. However, while these differences are systematic, it might 
also be argued that they seem to be quite small, so that it might be asked how much of 
the gender pay gap can be ascribed to differences in the entrant shares. 
In order to assess the relative importance of the contribution of each of these 
components in explaining the gender gap, we take the long-run steady-state equation 
(6.13) and vary each of the components one by one. That is to say, we predict the long 
run log hourly wage for women with the female entrant shares, wage growth, covariance 
and entry wages and then 
look to see what the predicted wage will be if we use the male 
values for one of these components 
instead. 
Table 6.4 gives the details. Row 2 calculates steady state wages using the male entrant 
shares for both men and women. Row 3 uses the female entrant shares for both sexes. 
The value of (1- a)/ a for women is 6.1, while for men it is 8.1, a difference that seems 
quite large. The result of these substitutions 
leads, for example, to a predicted male log 
hourly wage for 1992 of 1.87 compared to the actual wage of 1.99, (rows land 3) and a 
7 Note that Burgess and Rees deal explicitly with employment at a given firm rather than at any firm. 
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predicted female log hourly wage of 1.79 compared to an actual wage 1.67, (rows 1 and 
2). As a result, the predicted gender wage gap in 1992 falls to around 20 log points: 
two-thirds of the total wage gap (compare column 3 in rows 1 and 2). Rows 4 and 5 
vary log entry wages and hold everything else constant. The predicted wage gap now 
falls to around 10 log points. Rows 6 and 7 vary the continuing job wage change and 
hold other factors constant. Continuous worker wage growth explains nothing of the 
wage gap in 1992. This pattern is generally repeated across all years. So, on this basis, 
it would seem that something like two-thirds of the overall gender pay gap may be 
ascribed to differences in pay among labour market entrants, one-third to differences in 
the proportion of entrants with little contribution from differences in wage growth. The 
gender difference in the entrant share helps explain why women are disproportionately 
concentrated among the low-paid. Entrants receive lower wages. More entrants means 
a lower average wage. The differential entrant share also explains why their earnings- 
experience profile is flatter (see also Manning (1996)) even though wage growth for 
those in continuous employment is approximately the same. 
6.4.3 Results of the Full Time - Part Time Pay Gap 
Table 6.5 presents the results of applying the decompositions in Equation (6.14) and 
(6.15) to the pay gap for full- and part-time women, where we have used 30 hours as the 
cut-off between part- and full-time work. The average pay gap seems quite stable over 
this period at around 22 log points (row 1). There are several points worth noting about 
the results reported in Table 6.5. First, there are very few transitions between full- and 
part-time status (rows 11 and 12). 
8 Only something like 6 per cent of current part-time 
workers have been in continuous employment and were previously employed full-time 
with a similar proportion of full-time workers being previously part-time. 
9 We note 
then that for many women the superior wage returns to full-time work observed in 
Chapter 5 are not realised through this form of transition. It is quite likely that a 
substantial fraction of these transitions are in fact some form of measurement error. 
This means that in understanding the pay gap between FT and PT women, one can treat 
them as approximately separate groups with little in the way of transitions between 
them. 
$ Such transitions are the subject of more discussion in Chapter 7. 
9 The shortfall being made up 
by entrants (row 10). 
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Looking first at the average entrant wage (row 9), one can see that the pay gap here is 
very small averaging about 4 log points or only about 20 per cent of the overall gap. So, 
the pay gap between full- and part-time women does not emerge at the point of entry 
into paid work. Looking at wage growth for those in continuous employment, the 
picture is rather confusing. In 1992 and 1993, the average wage growth for those in 
continuous FT employment is not very different from those workers in continuous PT 
employment (compare row 4, column 1 with row 7, column 2). However, in 1994 and 
1995, there is a substantial gap, with average wage growth being over 4 per cent higher 
for those in continuous full-time employment. This difference is then magnified by the 
covariance terms (rows 5 and 8) which is quite large and positive for full-time workers 
and close to zero for part-time workers. The implication is that, while high-wage FT 
workers are less likely to leave employment, the same is not true of high-wage PT 
workers. 
The other big difference between FT and PT workers is in the entrant share (row 10). 
While 10 per cent of FT women are labour market entrants (a figure that is slightly 
lower than the overall figure for men in Table 6.3), the entrant share for PT women is 
closer to 20 per cent, so that one in five PT women have had a period of non- 
employment in the past year. From Equation (6.13), we can see that the steady-state 
gap depends on one minus the entrant share divided by the entrant share. This averages 
9 for FT women, compared with 4 for PT women. This implies, given an average sum 
of the wage growth and covariance terms of 4 per cent a year, a contribution of the 
difference in entrant shares to the overall pay gap of 16 log points (about 75 per cent of 
the actual gap). So it is clear that the main source of the gap between FT and PT women 
is because of differences in the entrant share in the stock of these job types. 
This discussion has ignored those workers who move between FT and PT status while 
remaining in continuous employment. While those who do move are a small group, 
some attention should be paid to them. What one notices when one looks at Table 6.5 is 
that those workers moving from FT to PT status have apparently very positive wage 
growth (row 7, odd columns), while those going in the opposite direction have very 
negative wage growth 
(row 4, even columns). One possible explanation for these 
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results is measurement error. Our hourly wage measure is computed by dividing weekly 
earnings by weekly hours, so it is very vulnerable to problems caused by division bias. 
Given that very few people seem to move between FT and PT status, a high percentage 
of those who are classed as having moved may be the result of mistakes in coding hours 
in one of the years. This can then account for the patterns of wage growth seen among 
those making the transitions. The alternative is that these are manifestations of the PT - 
FT wage gap. This would then suggest that the decomposition such as Equations 6.14 
and 6.15 should be used to explain this particular pay gap. However, small cell sizes 
prohibited further investigation of this. 
So far, we have concentrated on the pay gaps in the early 1990's. We know that there 
have been substantial changes in the pay gaps over time with the gender pay gap falling 
and the FT - PT gap rising. So we might be interested in which of the components 
identified above have changed. 
6.5 A Longer Run View 
It should be apparent from Equation (6.13) that if there were permanent changes in the 
main components, the observed gender pay gap would change only slowly in response 
to these changes. So, one way of getting some idea of likely future changes in the 
gender pay gap is to use Equation (6.13) to compute what the steady-state gap would be 
if the fundamentals remained at their current levels. If the current wage gap is above the 
implied long-run level then we would expect the gender pay gap to decline further while 
if it is above it we would expect it to rise. The implied levels of long-run wages are 
presented in the top row of Table 6.4 using the average values for each year, alongside 
the steady state gender pay gap. The numbers jump around quite a lot (largely because 
of the variation in wage growth, which is probably due to sampling variation of this 
variable), but the steady state gaps are always below the current pay gaps. Taking the 
average across the four years, the steady-state gender pay gap is about 4 log points less 
than what we currently observe. This implies that if the current gender differences in 
wage growth, entry wages and entrants' shares stayed the same we would expect to see a 
gradual narrowing of the gender pay gap with it eventually ending up at about 29 log 
points. 
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The gap between the actual and steady-state pay gap may be interpreted in another way. 
If the current gender pay gap is above the implied steady-state level then it must be the 
case that the components of the gap have been changing in such a way as to narrow the 
gender pay gap. So let us consider whether there is any evidence for this. This analysis 
must be somewhat speculative, as we cannot rely on the BHPS for data prior to 1991. 
There is no single data source which we can use for all the information that we require 
and the data that is available is not generally in an exactly equivalent form. Our 
information on the longer-run evolution of the entrant shares comes from the annual 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) conducted in the spring of every year. The LFS asks a 
question about current labour market status and also a question about status one year 
ago. This can be used to compute the fraction of workers currently in employment who 
were not in employment a year ago. This will obviously lead to an under-estimate of the 
entrant share, as we have measured it in the BHPS, as there is no information in the LFS 
on labour market status between the two points which we have used to classify those 
with interruptions to work as entrants. 
Table 6.6 shows the share of entrants from 1975 to 1995 using LFS data for men and 
women and for FT and PT women separately. 
10 The numbers from the LFS suggest that 
the gender gap in the entrant shares has narrowed over time, although more because the 
entrant shares for men are higher than 20 years ago than because female entrant shares 
have fallen. The entrant share for men has risen from 4 to around 7 per cent between 
1975 and 1995. The entrant share for women has fallen from 12 to 11 per cent over the 
same period. There does seem to be good evidence that the gender gap in entrant shares 
is less now than it used to be. On its own, this will tend to have caused some reduction 
in the gender pay gap and, even if the entrants' shares stabilised at their current levels, 
we would expect to see some further narrowing of the gap as implied by the steady-state 
computations reported above. 
10 For the years 1991-95, we can compare the LFS estimate of the entrant share with that from the BHPS 
on an equivalent definition to 
the LFS. Even on a consistent definition the entrant share in the BHPS 
seems to be higher than 
in the LFS. There may be important seasonal variation (the BHPS is conducted in 
the autumn, the LFS in the spring), so 
it is difficult to know what the exact cause of the difference is. 
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There are important differences between FT and PT women in the entrant shares. The 
entrant share for PT women, at around 15 per cent, has always been above that for FT 
women but the gap has widened over time largely as a result of a marked fall in the 
entrant share of FT women since 1985 to levels slightly below those for men. This 
suggests that FT jobs for women are becoming more stable. The entrant share for PT 
women does not show such a notable decline. This growing divergence in the entrant 
shares for FT and PT women is likely to be part of the cause of the widening pay gap 
between these two groups. 
Due to the lack of wage data in the LFS before 1992, our information on the evolution 
of the entry pay gap comes from the General Household Survey (GHS) for 1979-91. 
The GHS asks a question about labour market status a year ago that is similar to the 
question asked in the LFS and our definition of a labour market entrant is the same as in 
the LFS. However, retrospective data ended in 1991. The wage information in the GHS 
is not ideal as it measures gross weekly earnings including overtime, but the hours 
measure excludes overtime, so our hourly wage has some measurement error induced by 
the absence of this information. 
" 1 Table 6.7 gives the average gender pay gap for 
entrants and, as a comparison, the average gender pay gap in the whole sample (see also 
Chapter 2). The measure of the entry pay gap jumps around a bit more because the 
sample sizes are quite small, but it can be seen that the gender gap for entrants has 
always been less than the average gap and that the entrant pay gap has declined over 
time as has the average pay gap. In fact the trend declines in the two pay gaps are very 
similar. The finding from the LFS that the gap in the entrant shares has fallen means 
that one would expect the average gap to fall faster than the entry pay gap, so these 
findings, on their own, are not entirely consistent. Table 6.7 also presents the average 
pay gap for FT and PT women and the respective entry pay gap. We can see a marked 
rise in the average FT - PT pay gap from around . 16 in 1979 to . 
25 in 1991, but no 
marked trend in the entrant pay gap over the period. 
" It should be noted that for the period 
1974-79 overtime hours is available and omitting overtime hours 
does not seem to make that much 
difference, the correlation between the two measures being over 95 per 
cent after taking out time effects. 
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Now consider differences in wage growth between men and women. Our longer-run 
information on this comes from the New Earnings Survey (NES) conducted in April 
each year. As this is a panel study, we can compute wage growth for those individuals 
in employment in two adjacent years (so excluding entrants as defined in the GHS and 
LFS). Figure 6.2 plots the difference in annual wage growth for women and men for 
full-time adult workers. 12 We notice the very large excess in female wage growth in the 
early 1970's which is almost certainly the result of implementation of the Equal Pay 
Act. With the exception of a few isolated years, female wage growth is always above 
that of men and the early 1990s actually seem to be a period in which the difference is 
rather small. One interpretation of this result is that as women have worked their way 
up the job ladder, they have exploited the easy opportunities for advancement, and so it 
is this that accounts for the declining gaps in wage growth. It is unfortunate that these 
figures only relate to full-time workers, but what this suggests is that women have never 
been at a disadvantage in terms of wage growth if they remain in employment. 
So, in terms of longer-run trends it would seem that the gender pay gap has been falling 
because of a declining entry pay gap and convergence in the share of entrants, but that 
recent changes in wage growth relative to earlier years would have tended to widen the 
pay gap. Comparing FT and PT women we lack the data on wage growth but it would 
seem that it is the growing divergence in the entrant shares which can account for the 
widening pay gap. 
6.6 Decomposing the Decomposition 
In this Section, we attempt to model the different components of the gender pay gap in 
trying to evaluate the extent to which the differences between men and women can be 
ascribed to differences in their observable characteristics or to differences in the effect 
of those characteristics using the familiar Oaxaca decomposition outlined above. In 
modelling the main components of Equation 6.13, we use a common set of regressors, 
12 Unfortunately, we do not have adequate data on PT women workers who are heavily under-sampled in 
the NES. See Chapter 3 
for more details. 
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namely, experience, 
13 race, marital status, number of children, education, employer size 
and region. We pool across all five waves to model wage growth for those in 
continuous employment, entry wages among labour market entrants and the probability 
of being an entrant among those in current employment. Descriptive statistics for these 
variables are summarised in Table 6.8 for men and women and in Table 6.9 for FT and 
PT women. Looking at Table 6.8, the overall characteristics of men and women are 
very similar with the only substantial differences being in average job tenure (note that a 
change of job in the BHPS also includes those without changes of employer), the 
household characteristics and the proportion working in small firms (this is consistent 
with the findings of Paci and Joshi (1996) and Harkness (1996) using other data sets). 
Once we look at the distinction between continuing workers and entrants there are more 
marked differences. Female entrants are much more likely to have children, and young 
children in particular, to work in a small enterprise, are somewhat younger than average. 
There is little difference in job tenure for continuing workers (we do not report job 
tenure for entrants, as they must have job tenure less than a year by definition). 
Turning to Table 6.9, the most important differences in the characteristics of FT and PT 
women are in experience, education (FT women are more educated), the number of 
children (PT women have more, younger children) and job tenure. Perhaps surprisingly 
given that PT women are more likely to be entrants, they have longer job tenures than 
FT women. The explanation lies in the proportions of women in continuous 
employment that are changing jobs where FT women are much more likely to do so than 
PT women. This is consistent with the view that PT women may be stuck in jobs with 
little prospect of advancement. We start our analysis by doing the familiar 
decomposition of the overall wage gap. 
6.6.2 The Overall Wage Gap 
Table 6.10 presents the results of the estimation of standard earnings functions. The 
first column presents the results for all workers, the next two columns present the results 
of estimating separate equations 
for men and women, and the fourth and fifth the results 
11 We work with potential rather than actual experience for computational simplicity. In order to compute 
actual experience, it would 
be necessary to reconcile several job history files over several waves. This 
enormous task is left to 
future work. 
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for FT and PT women. If we look at the coefficients for men and women, the most 
striking differences are to be found in the effect of children, job tenure, job changing, 
and in the experience profile (in the higher orders of the quartic). The number of 
children has no effect on male wages, but a very powerful downward effect on the 
wages of women (the so-called family penalty, see Waldfogel (1995) and Chapter 5). 
Perhaps surprisingly, the detrimental effect on female wages of very young children is 
smaller than the effect of older children: this is almost certainly a sample selection effect 
as only high-wage women can afford the high childcare costs of very young children. 14 
The experience profiles for men and women are similar for something like 10 years but 
then decline for women earlier and faster for men leading to a gap of about 20 log points 
after 40 years. Women who change jobs experience a 4.7 log point wage rise, but male 
job changes do not appear to receive any wage gain. 
Comparing FT and PT women, the most marked differences are in the experience 
profiles and in the effect of children. As Chapter 5 has shown, the returns to experience 
for part-time women are much flatter though this is partially off-set by higher returns to 
job tenure. The negative impact of children is seen to be exclusive to women in full- 
time jobs. 
In what follows, we will attempt to understand how the source of these differences can 
be found in the individual elements of our decomposition. Table 6.14 (column 1) 
presents the results of a Chow test of the hypothesis of equality of coefficients between 
men and women and the results of the standard Oaxaca decomposition estimated from 
both the male and female characteristics version of the equation (6.7 (a) and (b)). As 
can be seen, the hypothesis of equality of coefficients is overwhelmingly rejected as we 
would expect, thus we are justified in running separate equations for men and women. 
The Oaxaca decomposition suggests that around 75 per cent of the gender pay gap can 
be ascribed to differences in coefficients. In contrast, differences in characteristics 
explain around 63 per cent of the 
FT - PT pay gap for women (Table 6.14, panel B, row 
14 This raises the issue of whether we should be doing sample selection corrections to these equations. In 
the absence of any good instruments to 
identify sample selection effects we think little is added by doing 
this but we should retain an awareness of the possibility that some results may be driven by sample 
selection effects. See the previous 
discussion in Chapter 5. 
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1). However, the Chow test still does not accept the equality of the coefficients between 
full- and part-time women. 
So far we have mirrored standard practice. Let us now extend this approach to the 
decomposition of the main explanatory features underlying the wage gap outlined in 
Equation (6.11). We do this by running OLS equations on the three principal 
components: namely, wage growth for those in continuous employment, entry wages 
and the entrant shares. We then look at what the main determinants of each these are 
and whether they vary across the three components in order to analyse whether an 
aggregate wage decomposition obscures the detailed picture. 
6.6.3 Wage Growth for Those in Continuous Employment 
Table 6.11 presents the results of a similar exercise to that in Table 6.10 but now the 
sample is restricted to workers in continuous employment and the dependent variable is 
the annual change in the log hourly wage. We present regressions pooled across the 
whole sample and regressions separately for men, women, full-time women and part- 
time women. What is remarkable about these regressions is that the fit is extremely 
poor. One of the few significant variables is the job change dummy, which suggests that 
changing jobs lead on average to an extra 2 per cent in wage growth. As this is the 
average level of wage growth in the sample this suggests that the only way in which 
individuals can achieve wage gains beyond the rise in average earnings is by changing 
jobs. Note that the premium to job changing is around 2 log points higher than the 
premium for job changing for women in part-time jobs. This is consistent with the 
implications for part-time workers found in Chapter 5. 
What is notable about the wage growth equations is that the differences between the 
male and female equations are very small. In fact, one can accept the hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients 
(see Table 6.14). This is consistent with our earlier conclusions 
that gender differences in wage growth are very small. However, if anything, having 
children seems to raise wage growth 
for women more than for men, so that the child 
penalty for women, observed 
in Table 6.10, is not the consequence of lower wage 
growth for those in continuous employment. The Oaxaca decomposition suggests that 
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small differences in wage growth between men and women stems mainly from the 
differences in coefficients. 
Turning to FT and PT women in the last two columns of Table 6.11, the coefficient 
differences are also not very noteworthy. There is some evidence that wage growth in 
part-time work at lower levels of experience is smaller but in general one can reject the 
hypothesis of equality of coefficients at the 5 per cent significance level. The strength 
of the rejection is less marked than in the case of the overall pay gap. The Oaxaca 
decomposition suggests that, on the basis of characteristics alone, full-time women 
should do better in terms of wage growth. This is largely because FT women are 
younger, and the estimated returns on experience suggest that wage growth becomes 
more negative as women age. However, overall, the coefficients are more favourable to 
part-time women, with the net result that part-time women have marginally higher wage 
changes than full-time women in the decomposition. This is perhaps another indication 
that groups of workers who are concentrated on the lower rungs of the job ladder have 
greater opportunities for wage growth. 
6.6.4 Entry Wage Equations 
Table 6.12 presents the results of the OLS estimates for the sample restricted to entrants 
and the dependent variable is the log of their hourly entry wage. Entry wages rise with 
experience, but less so than for the wages of all workers (see Table 6.10). Entry wages 
also rise with education and workplace size. Comparing the regressions for men and 
women, the effects of children on entry wages seem very similar so, again, this cannot 
be the source of the family penalty. The experience profiles are different. The female 
experience entry wage profiles largely mirror the experience profile for all women. The 
male experience entry wage profiles are much flatter than the experience profile for all 
men. This is reflected in Table 6.14 in the Oaxaca decompositions, where the 
coefficients account for more than 80 per cent of the entry wage gender gap. 
Turning to the differences between entrant PT and FT women, we also find that the 
experience profiles are much 
flatter for PT women. Entry wages do not increase with 
age in part-time jobs to the same extent that entry wages for full-time jobs do. Women 
feature more heavily in part-time jobs, so this means that the entry wage gap between 
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men and women rises with age. However, differences in characteristics, chiefly the age- 
related ones, rather than coefficients explain the majority of the entry wage FT - PT gap. 
Once again, we can reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients at the conventional 5 
per cent significance level. 
6.6.5 Entrant Equations 
Table 6.13 presents the result of an `entrant' equation. The dependent variable is now 
binary, taking the value one if the individual is an entrant and zero otherwise. These 
entrants comprise those recently hired from non-employment rather than the stock of all 
new hired workers. In order to facilitate the Oaxaca decomposition, we estimate a linear 
probability model (OLS) on a binary variable that indicates whether an individual is an 
entrant or not-15 It should be remembered that the linear probability model does give 
consistent estimates of the average marginal effects16 even if the standard errors are 
heteroscedastic (see Greene (1993)). The experience profiles confirm that entrants are 
dominated by younger, less qualified workers. It is here that we find big differences in 
the effect of children for men and women. Having young children in the household has 
a dramatic positive effect on the entry probability for women, but very modest and 
insignificant effects for men. It is in the fact that women with children are much more 
likely to be labour market entrants, rather than in wage growth or entry wages, that the 
main explanation of the pay penalty witnessed in Table 6.10 associated with having 
children can be found. Again, the Oaxaca decomposition suggests that it is differences 
in coefficients rather than characteristics that can account for the gender differences in 
entrant shares. It is this coefficient difference that drives much of the, albeit small, 
difference in entrant proportions outlined in the Oaxaca decomposition in Table 6.14. 
Turning to FT and PT women, the differences in the coefficients on the regressors, with 
the exception of the experience profiles, are not very marked, but the Oaxaca 
decomposition suggests that most of the difference in entrant shares is the result of 
differences in coefficients, so that it is the difference in the intercept and experience that 
's Probit estimates were also obtained and were very similar. 
16 One of the problems with the 
linear probability model, namely that it may predict values outside the unit 
interval afflicts only 2 per cent of our sample in spite of the fact that the average value of the dependent 
variable is 0.1. 
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accounts for almost all the differences. It would seem that part-time jobs are simply 
more likely to be entrant jobs, whatever the other characteristics of the worker or the 
job. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have presented a new decomposition of the gender pay gap, which 
uses limited panel information on employment transitions and wage changes. While we 
must always be aware that the decomposition is essentially arbitrary, we believe that it 
does shed some interesting light on the causes of the gender pay gap and the pay gap 
between FT and PT women. What this Chapter and the evidence in Chapter 5 suggests 
is that on entry into the labour market, after leaving full-time education, the earnings of 
men and women are very similar. As earnings growth while in continuous employment 
shows no significant gender differences, male and female earnings will follow each 
other closely as long as there are no breaks in paid employment. Differences in wages 
start to emerge once there are breaks in employment. When entering the labour market 
after a break, both men and women do so at lower wages, but men return at higher 
wages than women. This, combined with the fact that women are more likely to have 
breaks in paid employment, is the explanation of why women's pay increasingly falls 
behind the pay of men over the life-cycle. Women who work part-time are paid less 
than their full-time counterparts because they are much more likely to be entrants and 
because they have slightly lower wage growth when in paid employment. 
As the bulk of the pay gap can be put down to the result of higher numbers of women 
having breaks in employment and the pay penalty associated with these breaks, this 
suggests that it is labour market interruptions that are the main cause of women's labour 
market disadvantage. Chapter 7 models this duration process more explicitly. As the 
majority of the interruptions to the labour market careers of women are caused by 
having children (which is largely a voluntary choice), some might be inclined to 
interpret our results as saying that a substantial part of the wage gap (though not 
necessarily a wage cut) can 
be ascribed to the choices of women. We would prefer to 
interpret this another way. Women are still often forced to choose between career and 
children, and given this choice, often choose children. However, such a stark choice is 
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not inevitable: maternity leave entitlements can give women some opportunity to have a 
family and retain their pre-childbirth job. Our sample sizes here are small. Some 10 per 
cent of female entrants indicate that they have had a period of maternity leave, but the 
entry wages seem to be much higher for those who have had leave. So, maternity leave 
can seem to reduce both the entry pay gap and the share of entrants, which is consistent 
with evidence from other sources (for example, Paci and Joshi (1996)) and is also 
consistent with the view that it can reduce, or even eliminate, the fall in wages generally 
experienced when returning to the labour market after childbirth. Improving the rights 
and opportunities of women returning to the labour market after childbirth may be the 
most practical and effective way to further reduce the gender pay gap. 
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Note. 1. Source: BHPS, various years. 2. The ordinate axis represents the percentage growth rate. 
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Figure 6.2 Annual Proportional Change in the Female-Male Wage Gap 
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Table 6.1. a. Sample Sizes 
1991-1995 Sample Sizes 
Total men Total women 
1. Previously in Employment 9249 2376 
2. (1) + Currently in Employment 7696 1940 
3. (2) with job history information 7317 1921 
Continuous Group c 
4. (3) and continuous employment 7078 1838 
5. (4) with current wage 6926 1804 
6. (5) with previous wage 6744 1783 
7. (6) with information 6387 1713 
on characteristics 
Entrants Group d 
8. (3) with break in employment 239 83 
9. (8) with current wage 226 83 
10. (9) with information 182 79 
on characteristics 
Employment Exits 
11. (1) + not currently in employment 793 303 
12. (11) with job history information 735 301 
13. (12) with previous wage 664 280 
14. (1) but no record of current status 949 264 
Entrants Group b 
15. not previously in employment but currently in 765 220 
employment 
16. (15) with job history information 718 216 
17. (16) with current wage 650 204 
18. (17) with information on characteristics 452 165 
Others 
19. currently in employment but no previous record 788 216 
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Table 6.1. b. Sample Sizes by Year 
1 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1. Previously in 2380 2376 2291 2383 2293 2346 2285 2326 
Employment 
2. (1) + Currently in 1928 1940 1914 1939 1924 1941 1930 1915 
Employment 
3. (2) with job history 1877 1921 1781 1855 1820 1886 1839 1855 
information 
4. (3) and continuous 1817 1838 1721 1807 1758 1826 1782 1790 
employment 
5. (4) with current wage 1777 1804 1685 1773 1722 1799 1742 1764 
6. (5) with previous wage 1753 1783 1645 1744 1660 1738 1686 1730 
7. (6) with information 1697 1713 1567 1662 1557 1629 1566 1616 
on characteristics 
8. (3) with break in 60 83 60 48 62 60 57 65 
employment 
9. (8) with current wage 58 83 57 45 57 59 54 62 
10. (9) with information 50 79 48 37 43 49 41 49 
on characteristics 
11. (1) + not currently in 247 303 215 245 174 258 157 246 
employment 
12. (11) with job history 240 301 197 227 160 253 138 237 
information 
13. (12) with previous 225 280 181 220 138 224 120 218 
wage 
14. (1) but no record of 293 264 255 194 194 185 207 185 
current status 
15. not previously in 175 220 192 269 190 264 208 268 
employment but currently 
in employment 
16. (15) with job history 166 216 176 260 179 251 197 259 
information 
17. (16) with current wage 155 204 156 239 162 235 177 230 
18. (17) with information 123 165 99 186 114 180 116 175 
on characteristics 
19. currently in 277 216 185 175 179 141 147 143 
employment but no 
previous record 
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Table 6.2 Distribution of Annual Log Hourly Wage Change 
Total Men Women PT-PT FT - FT 
Mean . 026 . 
023 . 029 . 012 . 027 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.34) (0.24) 
Median . 011 . 011 . 012 . 000 . 013 
10'x' Percentile -. 218 -. 227 -. 208 -. 258 -. 188 
90`h Percentile . 286 . 
288 
. 283 . 290 . 261 
% <= Zero 46.0 46.6 45.4 49.8 45.1 
change 
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Table 6.5 Decomposition of the Full-Time - Part-Time Pay Gap 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part 
1. Mean log wage 1.52 1.34 1.54 1.31 1.55 1.33 1.56 1.32 
(0.50) (0.53) (0.49) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.52) 
2. Mean log initial wage 1.50 1.28 1.54 1.33 1.54 1.32 1.54 1.33 
(0.51) (0.48) (0.48) (0.53) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
3. Proportion now full-time 0.81 0.07 0.85 0.07 0.84 0.09 0.83 0.08 
(0.39) (0.25) (0.36) (0.25) (0.37) (0.29) (0.37) (0.27) 
4. Mean log wage change for 0.024 -0.089 0.012 -0.113 0.043 -0.129 0.044 -0.110 
those now full-time (0.19) (0.34) (0.20) (0.36) (0.22) (0.46) (0.20) (0.44) 
5. Covariance between initial 0.022 0.022 0.031 0.016 0.022 0.001 0.024 0.016 
wage and current FT (0.74) (0.44) (0.71) (0.42) (0.72) (0.36) (0.74) (0.45) 
employment 
6. Proportion now PT 0.05 0.73 0.04 0.78 0.05 0.73 0.04 0.76 
(0.21) (0.44) (0.20) (0.42) (0.21) (0.44) (0.20) (0.43) 
7. Mean log wage change for 0.238 0.030 0.288 0.011 0.194 -0.000 0.234 0.008 
those now PT (0.50) (0.32) (0.51) (0.33) (0.41) (0.33) (0.46) (0.30) 
8. Covariance between initial 0.003 0.020 -0.011 -0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.007 0.002 
wage and current PT (0.35) (0.69) (0.28) (0.71) (0.36) (0.71) (0.31) (0.71) 
employment 
9. Mean log entrant wage 1.22 1.16 1.22 1.17 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.18 
(0.54) (0.56) (0.60) (0.48) (0.55) (0.56) (0.45) (0.58) 
10. Proportion of entrants 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.21 
(0.30) (0.39) (0.27) (0.40) (0.31) (0.39) (0.28) (0.41) 
11. Proportion previously FT 0.84 0.06 0.86 0.05 0.82 0.07 0.85 0.06 
(0.36) (0.24) (0.34) (0.22) (0.38) (0.25) (0.36) (0.24) 
12. Proportion previously PT 0.06 0.76 0.05 0.74 0.07 0.74 0.06 0.73 
(0.23) (0.43) (0.23) (0.44) (0.26) (0.43) (0.23) (0.44) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6.6 Changes in the Entrant Share 1975-1995 
Year Entrant Share 
Male Female Gap Female PT . Female FT 
1975 . 040 . 
120 +. 08 . 160 . 096 1981 . 048 . 
105 +. 07 . 139 . 081 1985 . 067 . 
124 +. 06 . 163 . 098 1990 . 061 . 
110 +. 05 . 156 . 079 1995 . 073 . 108 +. 04 . 151 . 076 
Source: LFS 
Table 6.7 The Entry and Average Gender Pay Gap 1979-91 
Year Pa y Gap 
Gender FT-PT Gender Entry FT - PT Entry 
1979 . 45 . 
16 
. 12 . 02 1983 . 43 . 
18 
. 20 -. 16 
1985 . 42 . 
21 
. 03 -. 21 
1987 . 41 . 
20 
. 04 -. 14 
1991 . 39 . 
25 
. 13 . 05 
Source. GHS 
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Table 6.8 Characteristics of the Wage Equation Sample: Men and Women 
Whole Continuing Entrants 
sample workers 
men women men women men women 
Experience 20.6 21.0 20.9 21.4 17.6 18.0 
(years) (12.4) (12.4) (12.2) (12.4) (13.4) (12.2) 
Job tenure (years) 5.52 4.65 5.98 5.08 
(6.56) (5.29) (6.65) (5.38) 
Proportion changed jobs in 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 
past year 
Proportion with degree 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.09 
Proportion with 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.18 
teaching/nursing 
`A' level or equivalent 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.11 
`0' level or equivalent 0.26 0.38 0.26 0.38 0.28 0.40 
White 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 
Married 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.52 0.63 
Number of kids aged below 5 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.34 
in household (0.46) (0.36) (0.46) (0.31) (0.46) (0.57) 
Number of kids aged 5-11 in 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.45 
household (0.63) (0.62) (0.64) (0.60) (0.62) (0.73) 
Number of kids aged 12-18 in 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.22 
household (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51) 
Workplace <25 employees 0.27 0.41 0.26 0.39 0.44 0.54 
Workplace 25-99 employees 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.22 
Workplace 99-499 employees 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.15 
Log wage 1.81 1.45 1.84 1.49 1.46 1.210 
(0.52) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.578) (0.54) 
Log wage change - - 0.019 0.023 - - (0.26) (0.28) 
Proportion of entrants 0.09 0.12 0 0 1 1 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6.9 Characteristics of the Sample: Full-Time and Part-Time Women 
Whole Continuing Entrants 
sample workers 
FT PT FT PT FT PT 
Experience 18.0 24.8 18.3 25.8 13.6 20.1 
(years) (11.8) (11.9) (11.8) (11.7) (11.2) (12.0) 
Job tenure (years) 4.37 5.00 4.62 5.73 
(5.07) (5.53) (5.13) (5.53) 
Proportion changed jobs in past 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.12 
year 
Proportion with degree 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.07 
Proportion with 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.24 0.17 
teaching/nursing 
`A' level or equivalent 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.10 
`0' level or equivalent 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.41 
White 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 
Married 0.53 0.80 0.54 0.81 0.43 0.74 
Number of kids aged below 5 in 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.24 0.39 
household (0.28) (0.44) (0.25) (0.38) (0.49) (0.60) 
Number of kids aged 5-11 in 0.14 0.48 0.13 0.46 0.23 0.56 
household (0.43) (0.76) (0.42) (0.75) (0.50) (0.80) 
Number of kids aged 12-18 in 0.15 0.29 0.15 0.31 0.20 0.23 
household (0.43) (0.57) (0.43) (0.58) (0.52) (0.50) 
Workplace <25 employees 0.30 0.53 0.30 0.51 0.37 0.61 
Workplace 25-99 employees 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.21 
Workplace 99-499 employees 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.12 
Log wage 1.56 1.32 1.58 1.36 1.27 1.18 
(0.49) (0.52) (0.48) (0.51) (0.54) (0.53) 
Proportion of entrants 0.07 0.18 0 0 1 1 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6.10 Traditional Wage Equations 
Variable All Men Women FT women PT women 
Constant 0.77* 0.82* 0.78 0.73 1.16* 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) 
Experience 0.87* 0.88* 0.88* 0.97* 0.48* 
(years/10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.15) 
Experience squared -0.43* -0.42* -0.44* -0.47* -0.26* 
(years/10)2 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
Experience cubed 0.086* 0.091* 0.083* 0.093* 0.055* 
(years/10)3 (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024) 
Experience quartic -0.007* -0.0076* -0.006* -0.007* -0.004* 
(years/10)° (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0020) 
Job tenure (years/10) 0.15* 0.07* 0.18* 0.14* 0.19* 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.026) (0.034) (0.040) 
Job tenure (years/10)2 -0.025* -0.011 -0.053* -0.057* -0.039* (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) 
Job changer 0.040* -0.002 0.047* 0.021 0.056* 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.024) 
Degree-holder 0.83* 0.74* 0.84* 0.82* 0.87* 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0,026) (0.035) 
Teaching/nursing qualification 0.47* 0.41* 0.46* 0.44* 0.45* 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025) 
`A' level or equivalent 0.35* 0.28* 0.28* 0.28* 0.26* 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.032) 
`O' level or equivalent 0.17* 0.20* 0.17* 0.18* 0.14* 
(0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) 
White 0.11* 0.12* 0.11* 0.15* 0.04 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Married 0.07* 0.11* 0.03* 0.036* 0.062* 
(0.01) (0.013) (0.01) (0.013) (0.020) 
Number of kids aged below 5 in 0.030* 0.026* -0.039* -0.022 0.010 
household (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021) 
Number of kids aged 5-11 in -0.044* -0.002 -0.102* -0.087* -0.051 * 
household (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) 
Number of kids aged 12-18 in -0.016* 0.008 -0.040* -0.068* 0.015 
household (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) 
Workplace <25 employees -0.34* -0.27* -0.29* -0.26* -0.29* (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028) 
Workplace 25-99 employees -0.15* -0.11* -0.14* -0.13* -0.12* (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.031) 
Workplace 99-499 employees -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.032) 
Number of observations 14559 7020 7539 4180 3359 
R2 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.31 
Notes. I. Regional dummies and wave dummies were also included but these results are not reported. 
2. Standard errors in parentheses. 3. Dependent Variable: Log Wage. 4. Sample: All Workers. 
5. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 6.11 Wage Growth Equations 
Variable All Men Women FT women PT women 
Constant 0.10* 0.13* 0.06 0.06 0.15 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) 
Experience -0.13* -0.19* -0.050* -0.006 -0.131 
(years/10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.005) (0.058) (0.139) 
Experience squared 0.063* 0.098* 0.011 -0.051 0.057 
(years/10)2 (0.025) (0.034) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
Experience cubed -0.013 -0.022* 0.003 0.024 -0.012 
(years/10)3 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.023) 
Experience quartic 0.010 0.017* -0.003 -0.003 -0.0009 
(years/10)° (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.0014) (0.002) 
Job tenure (years/10) -0.007 0.002 -0.017 -0.026 -0.016 (0.011) (0.001) (0.019) (0.021) (0.003) 
Job tenure (years/10)2 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.010 0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) 
Job changer 0.020* 0.028* 0.013 0.017 0.007 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) 
Degree-holder 0.016 0.014 0.028 0.017 0.079 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.030) 
Teaching/nursing qualification 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.017 0.017 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) 
`A' level or equivalent 0.011 0.013 0.019 0.022 0.030 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) 
`0' level or equivalent 0.013 0.021 0.0098 0.025* -0.000 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
White 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.031 -0.030 (0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.045) 
Married -0.006 -0.016 0.002 -0.010 0.013 (0.006) (0.0088) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) 
Number of kids aged below 5 in 0.0046 0.0075 0.0042 0.012 -0.018 
household (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) 
Number of kids aged 5-11 in -0.0041 -0.0012 -0.0048 -0.0035 -0.016 
household (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) 
Number of kids aged 12-18 in 0.0073 0.0023 0.012 -0.003 0.017 
household (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
Workplace <25 employees -0.005 -0.0063 -0.0049 -0.0086 -0.019 (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) 
Workplace 25-99 employees -0.004 -0.0099 -0.0001 -0.0048 -0.0069 (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) 
Workplace 99-499 employees -0.001 -0.013 0.014 0.012 0.007 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) 
Number of observations 13005 6386 6619 3880 2739 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Notes. 1. Regional dummies and wave dummies were also included but these results are not reported. 
2. Standard errors in parentheses. 3 Dependent Variable: Change in Log Wage. 4. Sample: Workers in 
Continuous Employment. 5. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 6.12 Entrant Wage Equations 
Variable All Men Women FT women PT women 
Constant 1.17* 0.96* 0.84* 0.57* 1.01* 
(0.13) (0.20) (0.19) (0.27) (0.25) 
Experience 0.69* 0.49* 0.82* 1.59* 0.09 
(years/10) (0.14) (0.21) (0.02) (0.03) (0.30) 
Experience squared -0.33* -0.14 -0.46* -1.10* -0.02 
(years/10)2 (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.31) (0.20) 
Experience cubed 0.07* 0.016 0.100* 0.298* 0.006 
(years/10)3 (0.03) (0.042) (0.039) (0.102) (0.051) 
Experience quartic -0.0051* -0.0011 -0.007* -0.028* -0.000 
(years/10)4 (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) 
Degree-holder 0.67* 0.61* 0.70* 0.70* 0.76* 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) 
Teaching/nursing qualification 0.37* 0.30* 0.39* 0.41* 0.43* 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) 
`A' level or equivalent 0.31* 0.27* 0.32* 0.47* 0.24* 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) 
10' level or equivalent 0.17* 0.14* 0.17* 0.23* 0.16* 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
White 0.052 0.16 -0.011* -0.099 0.009 (0.069) (0.11) (0.090) (0.151) (0.116) 
Married 0.059 0.092 0.035 0.027 0.043 
(0.031) (0.052) (0.038) (0.064) (0.049) 
Number of kids aged below 5 in 0.064* 0.075 0.046 0.104 0.060 
household (0.026) (0.046) (0.033) (0.065) (0.041) 
Number of kids aged 5-11 in -0.066* -0.062 -0.075* -0.093 -0.035 household (0.020) (0.035) (0.024) (0.056) (0.029) 
Number of kids aged 12-18 in -0.046 -0.072 -0.024 -0.018 -0.017 
household (0.026) (0.042) (0.033) (0.058) (0.041) 
Workplace <25 employees -0.33* -0.32* -0.30* -0.30* -0.25* (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
Workplace 25-99 employees -0.18* -0.21* -0.12* -0.12 -0.06 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
Workplace 99-499 employees -0.07 -0.12 -0.01 -0.11 0.11 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) 
Number of observations 1554 634 920 300 620 
R2 1 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.42 0.27 
Note. 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 2. Dependent Variable: Log Wage. 3. Sample: Entrant 
Workers. 4. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 6.13 Entrant Equations Dependent Variable: Entrant Dummy 
Variable All Men Women FT women PT women 
Constant 0.31* 0.32* 0.26* 0.28* 0.40* 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) 
Experience -0.33* -0.38* -0.33* -0.45* -0.24* (years/10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) 
Experience squared 0.18* 0.22* 0.20* 0.30* 0.09 
(years/10)2 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
Experience cubed -0.044* -0.05 -0.049* -0.081* -0.020 (years/10)3 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) 
Experience quartic -0.0036* -0.004* -0.004* -0.007* 0.002 (years/10)4 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Degree-holder -0.060* -0.040* -0.069* -0.054* -0.071* (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.029) 
Teaching/nursing qualification -0.043* -0.024* -0.054* -0.039* -0.049* (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) 
`A' level or equivalent -0.028* -0.009 -0.045* -0.027 -0.046 (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.027) 
10' level or equivalent -0.030* -0.021 -0.042* -0.033* -0.041* (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017) 
White -0.028* -0.024 -0.037 -0.005 -0.065 (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.043) 
Married -0.029* -0.033* -0.022* -0.023* -0.054* (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) 
Number of kids aged below 5 in 0.089 0.014 0.215* 0.171* 0.170* 
household (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) 
Number of kids aged 5-11 in 0.034* 0.016* 0.053* 0.040* 0.018 
household (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
Number of kids aged 12-18 in 0.015* 0.014* 0.013 0.023* -0.011 household (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
Workplace <25 employees 0.081* 0.081* 0.072* 0.017 0.090* 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) 
Workplace 25-99 employees 0.026* 0.027* 0.022 0.000 0.036 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) 
Workplace 99-499 employees 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.000 -0.004 (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) 
Number of observations 14561 7021 7540 4180 3360 
R2 0.048 0.044 0.089 0.069 0.099 
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An Analysis of Career breaks, Fertility and Women Returners: 
Modelling the Length of Withdrawal and Subsequent Return 
7.1 Introduction 
The evidence presented so far in this thesis, suggests that much of the wage gap 
observed between men and women, and between different groups of women, stems from 
the length of labour market withdrawal and the subsequent low wages on re-entry. In 
general, the longer the time spent out of work, the heavier the wage penalty. The 
previous Chapters have looked at the wage determination process in some detail. This 
Chapter now focuses on the principle features of the duration of time out and the nature 
of the subsequent re-entry, in order to establish the principle factors determining the 
length of time out. 
The study of the rise in female labour force participation in western economies has been 
a central research area for over two decades (see amongst others Mincer (1962), Joshi, 
Layard and Owen (1985) and Goldin (1997)). Chapter 2 has shown that the 
employment rate for women grew by 9 percentage points between 1981 and 1991. One 
key aspect of this development is that women are engaging in work in households 
already supported by other working members (see, for example, Gregg and Wadsworth 
(1996) and Davies, Joshi and Peronaci (1998)). The proportion of married or cohabiting 
couples where both partners are in work has risen from 43 per cent in 1975 to 60 per 
cent in 1992 (Gregg and Wadsworth (1996)). Moreover, as illustrated in Chapter 2, the 
increase in employment rates has been highest for women with young children. Whilst 
rising female participation undoubtedly contributes to rising household income and a 
rising share of total household 
income, (Harkness, Machin and Waldfogel (1995)), there 
remains some tension 
between the roles of women in formal work and in the unpaid 
rearing of children. 
Given the combination of these duties, how do women allocate 
themselves across full-time work, part-time work or no work, and how does this vary 
across women? 
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The introduction of statutory maternity leave in 1979 facilitated the maintenance of a 
foothold in the world of work. However, the law as it stands guarantees only a right to 
return to the previous job and not the right to move from full to part-time work (which 
remains at the discretion of the employer). For women who wish to combine child care 
and formal work, a change of employer may be the only option. Moreover, extended 
leave rights are only available to those satisfying a minimum length of service, 
(currently 2 years). The amount of maternity pay is also conditional on length of service 
and earnings. As such, the opportunity costs of returning to work (either full- or part- 
time) will differ across the population, irrespective of partner's status (if a partner is 
present). 
Whilst some literature exists on the economic fortunes of women on subsequent re- 
entry, (which Chapters 4 and 5 extend), less attention has been given to analysing the 
duration structure of childcare spells. This Chapter quantifies to what extent the route 
back into work differs for a cohort of British mothers and examines the determinants of 
the process of returning to work using information from the National Child 
Development Study (NCDS). Since the NCDS encourages mothers to include maternity 
leave as part of a continuous spell of employment, we concentrate on those women who 
have taken time out of work over and above that considered by respondents to be normal 
maternity leave. These women can be considered as having a more marginal labour 
force attachment. The choice between returning to the workplace on a full- or part-time 
basis in the presence of children will be influenced (as outlined in Chapter 5), by the 
presence of a partner (or support networks) and the nature and the location of the 
previous job. This Chapter quantifies the importance of these factors in the return to 
work. We use Markovian transition matrices to outline the basic movements into and 
out of childcare. We find that the probability of returning to part-time work relative to 
full-time work increases with the age at which women return to work. Probit 
regressions confirm that the age of young children in the household play a pivotal part in 
this process. The Chapter then proceeds to use survival analysis to examine the length 
of spells of childcare when the exit routes differ and to investigate the determinants of 
the lengths of time out. 
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7.2 Introduction to the Previous Literature 
Recent Work 
Within the public arena, the overriding view is that, although the activities associated 
with the birth and raising of children are crucial to societal stability, there needs to be an 
underlying process which encourages women back into work following the advent of 
motherhood. Why should this be so? The answer most often provided by policy 
analysts is that some groups of mothers, especially those who are single heads of 
households, may remain outside formal work for several years in the absence of suitable 
pressure for them to re-enter the labour force. The empirical link between lone 
motherhood, unemployment and poverty is so well established (see Bryson, Ford and 
White (1998) for recent evidence) that the common held view is that a return to paid 
work, and thereby a move off state benefits, provides an escape from this process. 
Indeed recent government policy initiatives (the introduction of the Working Family 
Tax Credit, for example) are in line with this view. Further, there exists pressure for 
women in dual income households to remain in work after a break for childrearing. The 
quicker women return to work following a gap, the less likely it is that a break adversely 
affects earnings through the loss of valuable work experience. Also, the less likely it is 
that there will be a substantial re-entry penalty in the manner documented in Chapter 5. 
Here, we analyse whether female spells of childcare are different when the exit routes 
differ. We think of work as divided into part- and full-time states. According to Blank 
(1989), female labour market activity in the United States comprises essentially two 
groups of female workers. The first crudely consists of mainly continuous, full-time 
workers, who interrupt their labour market experience minimally in order to have 
children and who then return to the labour market as soon as possible. The second 
group is seen to have less involvement in the world of work and members drop out of 
the labour force for between three and five years upon the birth of the first child. These 
women subsequently return to the labour market on a part-time basis, combining formal 
work with child-rearing. This latter group is behaviourally quite different from the first 
group. This Chapter tries to assess the validity of this hypothesis for the latter group of 
women in Britain. Can it 
be said that women who take more time out are more likely to 
return to work on a part-time 
basis? 
196 
Chapter 2 showed that, despite recent changes, part-time work is still taken up by the 
majority of women with young children. Does part-time work form merely a brief stage 
in the move to more secure full-time work? Blank (1989) uses the US Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics data and a competing risks framework to analyse the stepping stone 
view of part-time work. Blank's findings do not support the hypothesis that women use 
part-time work as a bridge between non-work and full-time work. Although it is found 
that part-time work spells are more likely to end than spells of non-work or full-time 
work, part-time work is just as likely to generate an exit into non-work as it is to 
produce an exit into full-time work. The determinants of spell length vary across labour 
market states and most women are seen to have a high degree of inertia with respect to 
change from the current state in which they are found. Blank finds that over three- 
quarters of her sample of women remain for the most part in the same labour market 
state over a nine-year period, which is indicative of a large amount of inertia. Similarly, 
Giannelli (1996) shows that, for women in Germany, the length of spells of part- and 
full-time work is very similar. Moreover, as in the United States, part-time work in 
Germany does not appear to be a step towards full-time employment. 
As yet, there is little evidence whether this dichotomy holds in Britain. In this Chapter, 
we are able to study women who return to either full- or part-time work, along with their 
marital, fertility and employment histories. We are in a position to assess whether 
simple family characteristics, such as the age and presence of children in the household, 
the opportunity cost of not being in work (as measured by a potential wage variable) and 
the household income overshadows other effects such as the age and level of 
educational attainment of women in the process of returning to work. If the two groups 
of women are essentially distinct, then a policy that encourages low paid part-time 
workers into full-time work as a means of increasing job security is misplaced. Rather, 
attention should be given to ensuring part-time work carries the same rights and 
conditions as does full-time work. 
To begin to analyse these issues further, this Chapter seeks to understand fully the 
dynamic choices of the group of women with a more marginal attachment to the labour 
force. We incorporate information on the preferences and employment history of 
women who take more than the statutory minimum maternity leave after child birth to 
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examine the dynamics of transitions back to work, focusing on the distinction between 
re-entry to full- and part-time work. Our sample of data allows us to analyse precisely 
the characteristics of these women and the pattern of transitions back into work that they 
subsequently make. As we are primarily interested in those women who have a more 
marginal attachment to the labour market, we exclude women who have taken statutory 
maternity leave, as these are grouped in the NCDS data along with continuous female 
workers. 
Some complementary evidence of this for Britain may be found in Ermisch and Wright 
(1991 (b)). Using the 1980 Women and Employment Survey, they find that married 
women with comparatively lower observed skills and other human capital 
characteristics are much more likely to be employed part-time. According to the 
authors, these women select themselves into part-time jobs that have associated lower 
wages. Although as we have shown, Chapter Five offers a different explanation for the 
full-time - part-time wage gap. 
If the undertaking of part-time work is not a transitional phase, are we able to categorise 
the workers who occupy this state? Tables 2.6 and 2.7 of Chapter 2 demonstrate the 
trend of part-time work to be more associated with older women and young workers. 
Part-time work is not uniquely associated the mothers of young children perhaps using it 
as a stepping-stone into full-time work. One important feature of British part-time work 
is that some 87.3 per cent of part-time jobs were held by women at the end of our 
sample period (Labour Force Survey (1991)). Some 50.2 per cent of part-time jobs were 
held by mothers (ibid). The studies which have highlighted differences between the 
labour market behaviour of mothers and non-mothers, and full-timers and part-timers, 
have usually been based upon cross-sectional data (for example, Levine and Moock 
(1984), and Groot, Schippers and Siegers (1990)). The NCDS data set, which we use in 
this Chapter, provides us with the opportunity to perform a far richer analysis of the 
dynamics of female labour force participation, as we have the comprehensive 
retrospective work histories for all cohort members. Much of the previous work 
suggests an increase in the probability of entry to full-time employment for mothers as 
the age of the youngest child increases ( see Ermisch and Wright (1991 (b)), as an 
example). 
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Joshi, Macran and Dex (1996) also document the increased attachment to the labour 
force of the 1958 NCDS cohort of British mothers. When NCDS mothers reached the 
age of 33 in 1991, they were among the first generation of women to enjoy statutory 
maternity leave. In stark contrast to other European countries, British women have been 
noted for their intermittent participation in the labour market (perhaps due to inadequate 
provision of childcare). Dex et al (1993), for example, gives evidence of the less 
marginal attachment of French women. Gaps in female employment in Britain have 
historically been linked to the birth of the first child. Dex has also found that the 
subsequent return to work has been characterised by various part-time posts. Nakamura 
and Nakamura (1994) show that in the US and in Canada, the effect of children on 
female participation is reduced when controlling for previous labour market experience. 
Joshi, Macran and Dex (1996) draw upon their depth of knowledge about female labour 
force participation acquired through previous work using the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) data on a birth cohort of 1946 (Joshi and Hinde (1993)). Females born in the 
NCDS cohort (twelve years after the MRC cohort) had a much higher propensity to 
minimise on their time away from the formal labour market following childbirth. 
However, within this changing framework, socially differentiable patterns of 
participation are distinguishable. More specifically, it would seem that for the 1958 
cohort, the attachment of highly qualified, middle class mothers to the labour force was 
reaching levels hitherto only observed in countries such as France. Joshi et al use a 
multinomial model to predict the probability of being in full-time or part-time work. 
This analysis includes the calculation of an imputed wage for some 723 women (of the 
3597 women) for whom a market wage was not observable. (This information was 
missing for women not employed at the time of the last interview or for those who did 
not report the information. )' The explanatory variables include childbearing history, 
partnership history, partner's income, housing type, imputed earning power, social 
attitudes, health and employment patterns. The majority of NCDS women without 
children were engaged 
in full-time employment (86 per cent) whilst those with pre- 
nursery children were more 
likely to be outside the labour force (53 per cent). In line 
1 Here, the log wage was generated from a regression of the total years of work experience, an ability 
score attained at seven years, a 
living in the south east dummy and educational qualifications. 
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with previous work (Joshi (1994)), partnership history was included in the analysis, as 
females in less long-term relationships have been found to be more likely to be engaged 
in formal paid work. Joshi et al find that when children are of primary school age, 
females have positive probabilities of being in part-time employment. Further, women 
have a higher probability of being employed full-time if they are in a relationship with a 
partner who is not their first. There is a clear, positive association of the probability of 
being employed either full- or part-time if a female chooses not to have a gap in 
employment upon the birth of her first child or if that gap is of less than nine months. 
The NCDS data set provides detailed information on cohort members' attitudes to 
various social phenomena. Joshi et al (1996) select two questions which indicate beliefs 
known to impact upon the probability of an individual participating in the labour 
market. These attitudes were ranked out of five indicating strong agreement through to 
strong disagreement. On average, those women who were sceptical about equal 
opportunities issues at the age of 23 were found to be amongst those in the full-time and 
so-called better jobs at the age of 33. 
One way of viewing the results of this work is in terms of simulated probabilities for 
chosen cases. Joshi et al use the example of a married woman who has mean values for 
all continuous regressors and who belongs to the default category for all others. Such a 
woman's predicted participation rate of being in full-time work, should she be childless, 
would be . 79. 
However, if she had one child aged less than 3, her predicted probability 
of being in full-time work would be . 39. Her predicted probability of being in part-time 
work would be . 29. 
A woman with two children (the youngest of which is in the 5- 10 
year age band) would have a predicted probability of being in part-time work of . 57. 
Joshi et al conclude that their work provides additional support for the observation that 
there is increased polarisation in the labour market. Their evidence suggests that 
females characterised by short maternity breaks and full-time employment records have 
low probabilities of being subsequently found in part-time work. However, females 
living in social housing with a partner in receipt of means-tested state benefits have a 
low probability of being in either full- or part-time employment. Such elongated 
withdrawal from the labour market results in thither human capital depreciation and 
mechanisms, which reinforce their separation from full-time work. Such depreciation 
and negative impact of withdrawal on wages were discussed at length in Chapter Five. 
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In what follows, we extend the work of Joshi et al, using the same data set, but by 
modelling the transition process explicitly using continuous time analyses and, more 
importantly, tracking the relative entry rates in to full- and part-time work as the cohort 
ages. We provide evidence of the differences in the labour market attachment of women 
given the age at which the various labour market states are occupied. The first half of 
this Chapter investigates the transitions into and out of different labour market states for 
NCDS women and how these evolve between the ages of 23 and 33 years. We then 
develop the study to include the specific modelling of the duration of the childcare spell 
whilst controlling for other observable characteristics. We also assess the impact of 
these various characteristics. We show that the chances of returning to part-time work 
relative to full-time work increase with the age at which women return to work. This 
process is heavily influenced by the age of the youngest child in the household unit. 
Other Developments 
The pattern of female labour force participation changed dramatically over our sample 
period. In Britain, more women in the 25-45 age group are to be found economically 
active than ever before. However, significant numbers of women still experience 
discontinuities in their employment history at the time of childbirth (see evidence in 
Chapter 2). During this time period, real wages have increased (see Chapter 2 for 
Britain, and Juhn and Murphy (1996) for the United States). This has made the 
opportunity to stay at home throughout the childbearing period an affordable option for 
large numbers of women, thereby reducing female labour supply. However, this 
negative income effect on supply has been offset through the substitution effect of an 
increase in the opportunity costs of female non-participation. Additionally, an increase 
in real female wages has made the purchase of quality childcare affordable for some 
groups of women, thereby offsetting a substantial fixed cost of labour supply. Given an 
expansion in post-war female job possibilities, the proportion of female entrants to the 
labour market has also risen. An increase in job opportunities has occurred alongside an 
increase in educational possibilities for women and these have been subsequently 
rewarded in the market. 
Medical advances have led to far greater female control over 
fertility. Technological progress has seen the advent of a huge array of labour saving 
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devices in the typical household. These factors, too, may have led to increases in the 
labour supply of women. 
The applied economic literature on participation in this field falls roughly into two 
groups. First, that which adopts the structural dynamic programming approach, (see 
Wolpin (1987)) which seeks to model the complexities of employment behaviour in a 
life-cycle context. A common feature of the first approach is to model female 
participation across multiple labour market states in the context of maximising an inter- 
temporal utility function, which incorporates state dependence. 2 The solution to the 
optimisation problem is obtained by dynamic programming techniques. This structural 
form approach is not what we follow here, although we acknowledge the work of 
authors in this area, such as Francesconi (1995), as having made much progress, partly 
as a by-product of the recent advances in computing power. 
Instead, rather than rely on explicit parameterisation of labour market choices, we adopt 
a reduced-form approach. We investigate the duration of time spent in the home using 
models developed with convenient forms with which to estimate transition hazard rates, 
(see Lancaster (1990), for a survey of these techniques). We develop our analysis by 
allowing for the possibility of multiple exit states within this reduced-form approach in 
the second part of this Chapter. A woman may enter any one of a number of labour 
force states upon the termination of a childcare spell, thus a competing risks framework 
is appropriate here. After the choice of hazard function is made, the probability of a 
female spending any particular amount of time in any labour market state is estimated. 
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis is primarily about the labour market fortunes of 
women. The justification for the focus in this Chapter arises from the feature that 
women show a higher propensity to move between labour market states than men and 
that they exhibit a greater range of labour supply choices than have traditionally been 
associated with men. In what follows, we concentrate solely on our sample of women 
and focus principally on those women who have spent time engaged in the home. The 
instructions in the collection of the NCDS data state that women who have taken 
2 Blank (1989) amongst others, find positive state dependence: that is, women who participate in the 
labour market at one age are more likely to participate at subsequent ages. 
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statutory maternity leave are not to indicate this as a break from continuous 
employment. Those who are on maternity leave should be classed as continuously 
employed and not as returners. 
7.3 Work Experience Profiles 
The evidence in Chapter 2 shows that women, especially older and younger women, use 
part-time work as an alternative to full-time work. Women may then become locked 
into part-time work. Conversely, the view that women use part-time work as a stepping 
stone into a full-time job has not been well explored in Britain. This section analyses in 
some detail the transition profiles for our sample of women. 
Breaks in continuous full- or part-time work might be viewed as a profitable 
phenomenon if women are using their time out of the labour force to review their career 
paths and to make informed labour market decisions. If workers re-enter the labour 
force from childcare on a part-time basis at a lower wage and continue to take time to 
search for a better paid job, then switching between labour force states is consistent with 
a well-functioning labour market. However, the evidence of Blank cited above suggests 
that this is not the case in the US. This section looks at the transitions in to work for our 
sample of British women in more detail. The duration of time spent out of the labour 
force in childcare (hereafter, CC) was shown to have an important negative effect on 
wages in Chapter Five. 
7.3.1 Labour Market Flows 
We begin by summarising the pattern of labour market dynamics amongst the cohort by 
analysing the various transitions women make in between the years 1981 to 1991 for 
which we have NCDS information. The cohort member interview and questionnaire in 
Sweep 5 of the NCDS was designed to obtain in-depth information about both the 
individual's and their partner's jobs, unemployment, education and training, 
qualifications, cohabitation, children, housing, health, income and citizenship. By 
cross-referencing each individual's account of in-work and not-in-a-job dates obtained 
from the questionnaire, we have built up a month by month account of the work history 
for each woman who indicated a spell of childcare or domestic duties. 
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When considering the transitions in and out of a period of childcare, it is important to 
assess the whole range of exit states. The NCDS questionnaire provides the opportunity 
to record up to five possibilities for non-work activity. These cover the categories of 
unemployment, training, full-time education, full-time childcare or housework, and 
sickness or handicap. Annual outflow rates from childcare into unemployment, training, 
education and sickness were on average 0.003,0.001,0.001 and 0.0002 respectively 
over the sample period. Due to these relatively small number of transitions, we combine 
these states into one state (OTHER) to be analysed alongside full-time (FT) or part-time 
(PT) employment. Participation in work is defined as part-time in the NCDS if it 
represents employment of less than 30 hours a week. Some of the survey information 
was unfortunately incomplete for this question. For example, where an individual 
worked but was unable to disclose whether she was part- or full-time, we class these 
answers as missing. In addition to the data on monthly labour market status, we use 
information on household composition, marital status, educational attainment and 
demographic characteristics to analyse the differences in transitions between non-work, 
and full-time and part-time work for different age groups of women. This then permits 
a study of the post-childcare period of re-entry into either full- or part-time work or one 
of the other activities discussed above. In this section, we present evidence on this in 
both graphical and tabular form. 
We select those mothers who have taken at least one childcare break between the years 
of 1981 and 1991. This represents an age range from 23 to 33 years of age. With 
eleven years of data, ten cross-year comparisons can be made. From this group of 2510 
women, we retain the information on the labour market state from which they exited and 
the state to which they return after a break. For this reason, we do not include women 
for whom we do not have information on activity type before their childcare break. The 
sample does, however, include those women who have completed a childcare spell and 
those for whom a spell is still in progress. Over the entire sample period, 1419 women 
re-enter to a part-time job whilst 353 return to full-time employment, leaving 738 
women with incomplete spells. Due to the nature of the NCDS data set, all these 
censored spells are for women aged thirty-three. 
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To begin, we summarise the dynamic history by looking at labour market states 
occupied in the life-cycle twelve months apart, leaving monthly transitions to the 
survival analysis that follows. We construct simple one-year Markovian transition 
matrices in the fashion of, amongst many others, Clark and Summers (1979). Here, the 
probability of subsequent movement depends only on the labour market states currently 
occupied. 
We calculate the annual transition probability, pif, of moving from state i to state j as 
pit = j, / s, , the number of women 
in state i and then in state j twelve months later (6), 
divided by the stock of women in state i initially (s; ). This, of course, ignores any 
"round-tripping" (the moves out of and back into a state) that occur within the 12-month 
windows. We identify four labour market states: childcare, other out, full-time work 
and part-time work. Four states yields 16 annual transition probabilities each year, 
which we use to construct a transition matrix of flow probabilities between states. 
Table 7.1 gives the annual transition probabilities out of childcare. Figure 7.1 traces the 
annual transition probabilities out of childcare and into either full- or part-time work or 
the other states as the cohort ages. The overall annual outflow rate out of childcare is 
around 9.4 per cent for women when the cohort is aged 23. This rises as the cohort of 
women ages to around 20 per cent at age 31 and fall back slightly to 17 per cent at age 
33 3 Outflows are dominated by flows into part-time work. The outflow to part-time 
work rises by around 250 per cent over the sample period as the cohort ages. When 
women are between the ages of 21 and 23, the annual transition probability is 6 per cent. 
By the end of the sample period when the women returners are 33, the transition 
probability into part-time work is around 15 per cent. In contrast, the outflow rates into 
full-time work do not appear to vary systematically with age, remaining constant at 
around 3 per cent. That is, as women get older the relative likelihood of returning to 
part-time, rather than full-time work, 
increases. 
3 Since the transitions are proportions, then the standard errors on the transition rates in any year can be 
obtained from the formula 
4(p; ß (1- pi j) / s; . For example, the average standard error for a5 per cent 
outflow rate is around 1.4 percentage points. 
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Table 7.2 outlines the entire matrix of transition probabilities between the four labour 
market states for years at the start, middle and end of the sample period: 1981-82,1985- 
86 and 1990-91, together with the average annual transition matrix over the 10 year 
window. This is for the entire sample of women with information on labour force status 
in March of each year, (around 5000 in each year). On average, there is a great deal of 
stability in labour market behaviour across years. Over 75 per cent of women remain in 
the same labour market state over the time period. Around 7 per cent of women leave 
and enter the labour market each year. 
4 However, the individual year matrices show that 
the pattern of labour market flows do change as our sample of women age. The 
matrices indicate that employment becomes more stable over this time period (the 
probability of remaining in either full- or part-time work rises over time), which is 
consistent with the rise in employment rates documented in Chapter 2. The PT to PT 
probability rises from .8 to .9 over the period despite the advent of the recession in the 
early 1990's. 5 The FT to FT probability rises by only 3 percentage points. 
On average, the inflow rate into child care is around 15 per cent of the population of 
women in childcare over the 10 year window. The inflow rate into childcare is higher 
from part-time work than full-time work (by 4.7 percentage points) at the start of the 
sample period. The inflow into childcare remains higher from part-time work than full- 
time work as the women age, although the inflow rates from both states fall steadily. By 
the age of 33,2 per cent of women in full-time work enter childcare over the year 
compared with 4.6 per cent of women entering child care from part-time work. In 
passing, we note that few women seem to move from part-time work to full-time work, 
and the transition rate falls as women age. At the start of the sample period, only 7.8 per 
cent of women in part-time work do so and just 3.3 per cent make this move by the end. 
Neither do many women move in the opposite direction (from full- to part-time work). 
This seems to be consistent with Blank's (1989) findings for the US that, for women of 
this age group, part-time work does not act as a stepping stone back to the world of full- 
time work. 
These figures are very similar to those of Blank (1989) who uses a sample of all women of working age 
in the US. 
5 Aggregate female employment did not suffer unduly in the last recession. 
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In the previous Chapter, in Section 6.5, we took a long run view of the steady-state 
gender wage gap. We now use a similar long run equilibrium approach to gain insight 
into the expected proportion of women in each labour force state at each age level when 
the system converges to a steady state. In a steady state, the inflows to each of the four 
states (FT, PT, OTHER and CC) are equal to the outflows. So the matrix of transition 
probabilities, T, when multiplied by the proportions in each state equals the vector of 
steady state proportions, Tx = x. Rearranging this yields 
(T-A, )x=0, for , %=1 (7.1). 
Given T, the vector of steady state proportions can be found as the eigenvector 
corresponding to the unit eigenvalue, A, in (7.1). Using estimates of the inflow rates and 
the outflow rates for the four states to calculate T, for each year, we calculate the steady 
state proportions given in Table 7.3. Consistent with the transition rates in Table 7.2, as 
the NCDS women get older, the proportion located in the childcare state can be seen to 
be falling. When these women return to the labour market, they have a greater 
propensity to return to part-time work. The age-specific steady state full-time 
proportions are little changed over the sample period at around 34 per cent. For this 
cohort, child care and part-time work appear to be close substitutes. The steady state 
share of those in childcare falls from 45 per cent when the sample is aged 23 to 17 per 
cent when the sample is aged 33. The steady state share of those in part-time work rises 
from 17 to 41 per cent. 6 
This finding is currently unreported in other studies of the labour market behaviour of 
women following childbirth. The way we have developed our analysis here enables us 
to investigate the experiences of women at the age that they re-enter the labour market. 
In contrast, Joshi et al use information on gap length for the first birth to study full- and 
part-time participation at age 33. This is not what we do here. By virtue of the way we 
have organised the data, we are able to analyse transitions at the point of re-entry. Via 
the precise location of the month at which a female makes the transition back to work, 
we are able to identify marital, fertility and other characteristics at that point, and to 
follow subsequent behaviour. In what follows, we analyse why, as the age at which 
--- - --------- 
6 The sample proportions of 
full-time work, part-time work and child care in the respective years are: . 
66, 
. 07,. 
20 in year 81/82,. 47,. 18,. 28 in year 85/86, and . 40, . 19, . 21 in 1990/91. 
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women return to work increases, the probability of returning to part-time employment is 
higher. 
7.4 Subsequent Re-entry: Full- or Part-time? 
The previous section showed that women who have children are more likely to return to 
work part-time, the older they become. Why might we expect that a woman nearing, or 
in, her thirties, who takes an extended period of childcare is less likely to return to the 
labour market on a full-time basis? Simple labour supply theory would suggest that the 
presence of a working partner, assuming that this is exogenous, would increase 
household income and reduce female labour supply. This could be manifested as an 
increased chance of returning on a part-time basis. The receipt of a partner's income 
may also spread the fixed costs of childcare, making the return to full-time work less 
necessary. The undertaking of part-time work also lends itself to the combination of 
work and domestic responsibilities for these women. As the female's partner ages and 
gains experience, we would expect that the income from his work to rise 
correspondingly. This may then be consistent with the pattern detailed above. The non- 
pecuniary benefits of time spent with children and hence of part-time work may propel 
mothers in their thirties into part-time work. In the case of single mothers, without 
access to income from another source, the fixed costs of childcare and the nature of the 
benefit system are such that either full-time work or non-work are the two viable 
options. Ermisch and Wright (1991 (b)) argue that younger children, and more children, 
make more demands on the mother's time and thereby increase the utility from not 
being in work. They also find that older single mothers are less likely to re-enter full- 
time work compared to never to returning to work. (However, they ignore the 
possibility of returning to part-time work. ) 
Certainly, the age of the mother and the age of children are positively correlated. Blank 
(1991) documents this, and the number of children, as "the major correlate of changes in 
labour market status for women. " As the decision to have a child is delayed, it may be 
that the arrival of a first child is a more significant event and raises the utility from being 
at höme. For the older mother, with a continuous work record before childbirth, the 
decision to have children is based upon the ability to both economically provide for 
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them, and to maintain a link, through either custom or habit, with economic activity. 
We would expect the probability to return to work upon a full-time basis to be lowered 
with the number of children, as the mother balances time spent in work and time spent 
at home. 
The availability of childcare is also pivotal to the return to work but, when modelling, it 
is potentially endogenous. The type of childcare chosen may be heavily dependent upon 
whether a full- or part-time job is taken. Childcare type is therefore excluded from the 
subsequent regressions. Table 7.4 does, however, document the different types of 
childcare used by NCDS women as they age, across full- and part-time work status. 
Most women, whether full- or part-time use informal types of childcare. For the most 
part, this involves the use of grandparents or spouse. Women in part-time work tend to 
make more use of their spouse than grandparents, but the difference is not large. Formal 
childcare as represented by the employment of a parental assistant, is used more by full- 
time workers, although this never amounts to more than 16 per cent at any age. Rather 
than estimate a predicted childcare cost variable, as, for example, Blau and Robins 
(1991), we use the number and age of youngest child as a proxy for the potential 
childcare cost. 
A spell out of work has less impact on re-entry wages in part-time jobs. This is because, 
as Chapter 5 shows, the returns to experience are lower in part-time work. Chapter 6 
also shows that the full-time - part-time entry pay gap has risen since 1985. As the 
cohort of NCDS women ages, then the penalty for returning to work part-time (as 
reflected in the loss of experience) is less significant compared to the loss for full-time 
women. The faster that women return to work after childbirth, the nearer their actual 
labour market experience to their potential experience. Given the strong impact of 
experience in the determination of wages, the smaller the wage penalty for time out for 
women who minimise on hometime. The NCDS Sweep 5 has information on the 
current or last wage at point of interview, not at the point when the individual 
necessarily returns to work. In order to capture the opportunity cost of not working, we 
include an imputed wage. In this analysis, the wage offer is imputed from a regression 
of hourly re-entry wages on a set of human capital variables, as indicated by educational 
qualifications and the amount of work experience. We use entry wages rather than an 
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average wage variable as used in most studies, (see Joshi, Macran and Dex (1996), for 
example), due to the gap in entry wages and average wages documented in Chapter 6. 
This is because women who return to work after a break do not typically receive the 
average hourly wage. The mean hourly entry wage is estimated using the General 
Household Survey (GHS) data set described in Chapter 3. For each year covered by our 
NCDS sample, the GHS has information on earnings, personal characteristics and 
labour market status (one year earlier). Following Chapter 6 and Gregg and Wadsworth 
(1996), we define an entry job as one which was taken up at some point in the preceding 
year conditional upon not being in work one year ago. Due to issues of sample size, we 
estimate these entry wage equations conditional on age, by pooling consecutive years of 
data. Unlike the NCDS, the GHS has no information on actual work experience, so we 
use entry wage equations matched by age instead. For women aged 23 to 24, the entry 
wage is estimated on the years 1981-1982 and so on. We restrict our GHS sample to 
women only. The predicted earnings from these regressions are used to form the 
imputed likely wage offer for the female returners. The hourly wage is indexed to a 
base of January 1992. The regressions are reported in Table A 7. l. a. 
We choose to use a single predicted wage rather than split the wage into two different 
wages pertaining to full- and part-time work, because of concerns of the potential 
endogeneity that splitting the wage would create. For the same reason, we choose to use 
hourly rather than weekly wages, since weekly wages are more obviously correlated 
with full and part-time working. The imputed wage is identified by the presence of 
industry variables in the wage equation. 7 Several studies (such as Krueger and 
Summers (1988)) have shown the importance of industry in the determination of wages. 
Compensating wage differentials, efficiency wages or union effects are usually invoked 
to explain these industry effects. However, the industry is not likely to affect the 
decision to return to work (other than through the wage rate). Thus, the industry 
variables do not appear in the set of explanatory variables in the return to work 
equations that follow. 
7 Joshi, Macran and Dex (1996) use ability at age 11 to identify their imputed wage variable. Our use of 
industry does not imply that women look for work in only specific industries, merely that female wages 
differ across industry. 
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7.4.1 Estimation 
The probability of participation in either full or part-time work by all women who have 
experienced a childcare break is modelled in this section as a probit. We restrict the 
sample to the 1690 subset of returners to work of which 1364 have completed a child 
care period and returned to part-time employment, and 326 have returned to full-time 
employment. Although the information on this rests on a female's perception of whether 
or not she was in full- or part-time work, the instructions of the interview encourages 
women who work less than 30 hours per week to classify themselves as part-time. 8 The 
dependent random variable, Y, is dichotomous, taking on the value 1 if the female has 
taken up a full-time post and 0 if a part-time job has been taken. So we have 
P(Y =1IX) = (D(I: 13kXk) 
(7.2) 
where the parameters ß6k are the parameters of interest and 0 is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. Using maximum likelihood estimation, we find the 
estimates of /3k that maximise the probit likelihood. In order to contrast the behaviour of 
women of different ages at return, we split our sample into mothers above and below the 
age of 28. This cut off is the point at which the gap between the relative chances of 
moving into part-time (rather than full-time) work are maximised whilst retaining a 
tractable sample size for estimation. Relatively small sample size prevents us from 
running separate estimates of the model at each age. 
Table 7.5 gives the sample means of the explanatory variables used in the subsequent 
regressions for the three groups. All variables are calculated at the point of re-entry 
using the information contained in the NCDS life histories. This restricts the set of 
variables that can be used somewhat, as only certain variables can be traced through the 
NCDS over time. The sample mean probability of returning to full-time work drops 
from 23 per cent to 17 per cent across the two sub-groups. Women over the age of 28 
tend to be more likely to have left a part-time job before their break and to have more 
children with the youngest child more likely to be over the age of 4 years. 
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The results from the estimation procedure are presented in Table 7.6. Since the 
coefficients from a probit regression are not immediately intuitive, we give the marginal 
effects for each variable along with their standard errors (adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity). So we have dP/dx, =ß; *0 (ß, iß for a continuous variable x; where 
the standard normal probability density function 0 is evaluated at the sample mean. For 
dummy variables, the marginal value of a variable x, is calculated by adding ß; to the 
sample mean, and calculating the new cumulative distribution function, 0; . In effect, 
we estimate the probability of being in full-time work, with and without, the particular 
characteristic holding all other variables constant. 
7.4.2 Probit Results 
The impact of the age of the female returner on the probability of returning to full-time 
work not controlling for any other factors is shown in Table 7.6 (column I). Women 
under the age of 28 are 5 percentage points more likely to return to full-time work. This 
should be viewed as the raw difference in difference between the relative entry rates 
above and below the age of 28. The average gap below the age of 28 is around 7 points 
whilst the average gap above this age is around 12 points (see Figure 7.1). Hence, the 
difference in difference of 5 percentage points. The subsequent columns introduce a set 
of controls for observable characteristics that seek to explain the difference between 
women below and over the age of 28. For the most part, the difference is accounted for 
by the additional explanatory variables. The coefficient on age becomes smaller and 
statistically insignificant. 
From Table 7.6 column II, we observe that the age of the youngest child in the 
individual's family appears to have the largest impact on the probability of returning to 
full-time work. The younger the child, the less likely the mother is to return full-time. 
Across the whole sample, mothers with a youngest child under one year are some 9 
percentage points less likely to return full-time. This is in line with previous work that 
suggests an increase in the probability of entry to full-time employment for mothers as 
the age of the youngest child increases (for instance, Ermisch and Wright (1991 (b)) 
8 We prefer to use this self-reported part-time variable as there are fewer missing values for this in contrast 
to the responses to the questions asked on the usual hours worked. 
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using Women and Employment Survey). The total number of children in the household 
has a negative, but not significant impact on the probability of returning to full-time 
work lowering the probability by some 2.4 percentage points for each additional child. 
This is consistent with the findings of Joshi et al (1996). The greater the number of 
children, the greater the burden of obtaining and paying for quality childcare. 
Another interesting feature of Table 7.6 is that being married at the point of re-entry to 
work (married) is positive and significant. Thus, for the group of all mothers as a 
whole, being married on return to the labour market is positively associated with 
returning full-time: raising the probability by almost 7 percentage points, other things 
equal. For all mothers, the duration of time spent in the provision of childcare appears 
mainly negative but not significant in the process of returning to full-time work 
(compared to the reference group of more than 3 years time out). The length of pre- 
break work experience appears to be small and generally insignificant. Having had a 
spell of work before taking a break appears to have no effect on the return to full-time 
work for mothers once the type of job held is controlled for. The possession of 
educational qualifications does not in general affect the outcome. 
The effect of the imputed wage is negative and significant only at the 10 per cent level. 
A ten per cent increase in the wage offer, (increasing the log hourly wage by 0.1), 
reduces the probability of returning to full-time work by around 1.6 percentage points. 
As the potential wage rises, women substitute childcare hours for work hours, so we 
observe the reduced probability of returning full-time. This result is in contrast to that 
found in Joshi et al (1996). This may reflect differences in the construction of the 
imputed wage between the two studies. On average the predicted entry wage rises with 
age and age is negatively correlated with the return to full-time work in our data. The 
other variable used to capture household income effects is the occupational status of the 
partner at point of re-entry. 
This variable is never significant. 
Whether a female worked part-time before exit to childcare appears to have a 
significantly positive 
impact on the likelihood of returning to part-time work. Having a 
history of part-time jobs makes it far more likely that a female will continue to work 
part-time. 
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Columns III and IV split the sample by age to highlight any differences in the effects of 
given characteristics between the two groups? Whilst the sample split is not accepted, 
there are a few differences in the effects of individual coefficients that are noteworthy. 
The negative effect on returning to full-time work of the age of youngest child is more 
pronounced for younger workers, (and significantly different between the two groups for 
youngest aged 1-2 and youngest aged 2-3). How does that effect change with an 
increase in the age of the youngest child and the number of children? As children 
become of school age, their impact on female labour supply becomes less crucial. Most 
of the positive married effect is generated amongst the older returners. For the group of 
mothers who have delayed family formation until after the age of 28, being married at 
the point of re-entry to work is associated with a higher probability of returning to full- 
time work. One of the most difficult times of the day to organise formal childcare is 
early in the morning. For dual partner households, the burden of childcare at these times 
can be shared, making a return to full-time work easier. The negative effect of the 
expected wage is also more pronounced for the younger group. There is also some 
evidence that longer spells of time out result in differential exit states across the two age 
groups, though we return to this issue in Section 7.5. 
To summarise these results, Table 7.7 presents predicted probabilities of returning to 
full-time and part-time work respectively, conditional on a set of characteristics, using 
the estimated coefficients from Table 7.6 to construct the predicted probabilities for 
each type. 1° The table confirms that the probability of returning to full-time work rises 
with the probability of being in full-time work previously and the age of the youngest 
child. However, there are significant differences in the estimated probabilities across the 
two age groups. The estimated probability of returning to full-time work for Group C is 
The likelihood ratio test for the sample split across age groups is given by -2 In (alb) where a is the 
restricted and b is the unrestricted 
likelihood. Taking the restricted likelihood from a probit on the whole 
sample excluding the age variable, we 
have -2 (( -737.7) - (305.9 + 411.8)) = 41.0 - x2 (34) This is not 
accepted at the 10% level of significance 
(44.8). Alternatively using the Akaike information criterion to 
discriminate between the non-nested models, AIC =-2 (ln L) +2 (k+l ) 
where k is the number of covariates, then again the sample split is not accepted. 
'0 For example, the predicted probability of being in full-time work for a married woman aged 25 is given 
by 
c(b[cons] + b[Age 25] + b[married]) 
where c is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution function and b[. ] are the estimated coefficients 
from Table 7.6. 
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more than twice as high for those aged 28 and over. In contrast, the estimated 
probability of returning to full-time work for those with children under the age of one, 
Group B, is nearly zero for those over the age of 28 compared with around 4 per cent for 
those under the age of 28. 
So what would appear to explain the difference in the transition rates of mothers who 
return to full- and part-time work across age groups? The results above suggest that 
differences in characteristics rather than the different effects of given characteristics 
tend to explain the observation. Women who are older on return are more likely to 
return to part-time work because they have more children and their potential earnings 
are higher. This allows them to combine the roles of carer and part-time worker. 
7.5 Analysis of Childcare Duration 
7.5.1 Introduction 
The section above catalogued the experience of moving from childcare to full- or part- 
time work for a group of British women. The issue centred on the dynamics of these 
transitions, given information on individual and household characteristics. More 
women leave childcare for part-time work than leave for full-time work at each age. 
Thus, the duration of a spell in childcare will be longer if the ultimate destination is full- 
time work. This section contributes to our understanding of the dynamic process by 
analysing the duration of time spent in childcare before exit to other states in more 
detail. We again concentrate on the exit states of full- and part-time work. 
Before looking at the return to work conditional on duration in more detail, we outline 
the NCDS evidence on the distribution structure of the principal labour market states for 
the full sample of women. Using the NCDS work history data, we can calculate the 
duration in months of any spell and sum the spells for each individual woman. Table 
7.8 illustrates the frequency distribution for each state. We count the number of times 
each individual occupies each state. Most women only experience one spell in any 
state. " Of those women who ever have a part-time job, for approximately two-thirds 
that one spell is their only experience of part-time work throughout the sample period. 
11 This could, of course, include contiguous moves (that is, job to job, for example) in the same state. 
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However, part-time work is the most transient of all the states observed. Roughly three 
quarters of the sample of women experience one spell of childcare, unemployment or 
full-time work. 12 Education and training are usually only ever experienced once. 
Table 7.9 presents the mean completed duration and the associated standard deviation in 
the main states, whilst Figures 7.2 to 7.5 graph the completed spell distributions. The 
average mother by the age of 33 will have spent nearly 2 and a half years out of work in 
childcare: more than her individual experience of full-time and part-time work. The 
mean duration of unemployment spells in Figure 7.4 is 9.5 months, whilst the median 
length is 6 months, indicating the presence of a small number of long-term 
unemployment spells in the sample. The central 50 per cent of unemployed workers 
experience spells ranging from 3 months to 11 months. The distribution of the 
completed duration of spells in childcare is spread up to and just over 8 years in length. 
The mean duration of childcare spells is 29 months whilst the median length is 22 
months (Figure 7.5). The distribution of child care is less skewed and the inter-quartile 
range is much broader, from 10 months to 43 months. Figure 7.3 shows how part-time 
spells of work are clustered around the range 1 to 2 years duration. Figure 7.2 shows 
that, excepting the peaks in the data at spells of 6,12 and 18 months (which may be due 
to rounding by individual respondents), the distribution of full-time work spells is less 
rightward skewed than that of part-time work. The mean duration of full-time spells is 
25.8 months whilst the median length is 19 months. (In contrast, the mean duration of 
part-time spells is 19 months whilst the median length is 13 months. ) The inter-quartile 
range contains the central 50 per cent of employees and, in the case of full-time work, 
the central 50 per cent exhibit spell lengths between 8 and 36 months. The spells of 
full-time work are spread more evenly in terms of spell length than those of part-time 
work, with some women in our sample experiencing nearly as much as 10 years of full- 
time employment. The inter-quartile range for part-time spells ranges from 6 to 25 
months. 
Table 7.10 compares the completed duration of the childcare state with the age at which 
the female returns to the labour market for the group of childcare women as a whole 
(All), for women who return to full-time work, (FT), and for women who return to part- 
i2 Women who do enter childcare have more than one childcare spell, typically two. 
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time work, (PT). There is a clear trend for completed outspells to become longer as the 
age at return rises. This holds for returns to both full-time and part-time jobs, with little 
difference in the average out duration at any age between the two states, apart from the 
final two years of the cohort. Whilst the average duration of the childcare spell may be 
similar for entrants into full-time and part-time work, it may be that the determinants of 
that spell length differ. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
7.5.2 Competing Risks Models of Duration 
A key characteristic of the data under study in the Section 7.3 is the multiple exit states 
for each NCDS female who takes a break in employment for childrearing purposes. The 
group of models which encompass such multiple exits have received much recent 
attention in the competing risks literature. 
Most of the economic research dealing with hazard functions assumes a single process 
that produces the termination of a spell. Ermisch and Wright (1991 (b)), for example, 
analyse periods of childcare which end with the commencement of a full-time job, 
ignoring exits to other states. However, in most situations, it is incorrect to assume that 
there is only one way of terminating a spell. A woman may adopt any one of a number 
of labour force states upon the termination of a childcare spell, and so a competing risks 
framework is more appropriate. In this section, we give a brief introduction to 
competing risks models, (see Lancaster (1990), or Pudney (1992), for more details). 
Suppose there are M possible labour market states to enter on termination of a childcare 
spell. Envisage up to Mindependent random variables, TJ,..., TM. These may be thought 
of as the latent durations to enter each destination state. T,  is the waiting time that 
elapses before the episode ends via risk m: in the absence of all other risks that might 
cause the interval to end. Which destination state is actually selected depends on which 
of the T,,, is the smallest. It is this duration which we observe in our data set. 
TM has a hazard function h(t, x; 0), at some duration, t. This indicates the probability of 
an interval ending conditional on the interval not being ended prior to t. That is, the 
hazard function represents the probability at which a spell will be completed during time 
t+dt (where At is some small interval) given that it has lasted until time t. Here, x is a 
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vector of values taken by a set of potential explanatory variables and 0 is the vector of 
parameters requiring estimation. The hazard function may be defined in our notation as, 
h(t) =tim 
Pr(t S T. <t+ At I T. >_ t) (7.3) 
nr-ºo At 
The distribution for t can be characterised by a probability density function, 
pdf (t) = g(t I x; 0), and a conditional distribution function of the form, 
Pr (t < T) =G (T I x; 0). For given x, the conditional distribution function represents 
the proportion of observed durations that are expected to be less than some duration T. 
Its complement, I-G (TIx; 0), represents the expected proportion of durations greater 
than T (the so-called survivor function. ) Given a particular hazard function, it is 
possible to derive go and Go and the survivor function, S(. ) . It is assumed that the 
hazard function has a special form that makes modelling tractable, such as the following 
Proportional Hazards (Cox) specification: 
h(t, x; 6)=h1(x; y)h2(t; a) where 0=(y, (x ). (7.4) 
This representation lends itself to a variety of functional forms, but always implies that 
the explanatory variables influence the scale of the hazard rate, but not the nature of its 
dependence on time. That is, in the Proportional Hazards (Cox) model, the baseline 
hazard is multiplied in proportion to the associated characteristics, but it remains 
independent of the duration of the spell. The function, h2(t; a), is the baseline hazard 
function and, in one of its most simplest forms, the baseline hazard may be normalised 
to unity. 
Assuming h2 (t; a) = 1, and hl follows an exponential distribution, the Proportional 
Hazard representation yields the following hazard 
h(t, x; 0) = exp (yo +x' y) (7.5) 
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One reason for the popularity of the Proportional Hazard assumption is the tractability 
of the semi-parametric approach. It is possible to estimate the parameters of h1 (x; y) 
without the specification of a parametric form for the baseline hazard function, (that is, 
h2 (t; a)). Moreover, Kiefer (1988) shows that in this case 
dLnh(t, x; 6)/dx=d(yo+x'y)/dx=y 
so the coefficient can be the (constant) proportional effect of x on the conditional 
probability of completing a spell. The common specifications for the Proportional 
Hazard functions are used for analytical convenience, as they lead to simple closed-form 
expressions for the probability density and conditional distribution functions. 
Parametric assumption of proportional hazard models simply requires an explicit 
parameterisation of the baseline hazard function. One possible disadvantage of relying 
solely on an exponential distribution above is that this is indicative of so called 
memoryless models. That is, the hazard rate does not vary over time. It is possible to 
relax this assumption according to the following (Weibull) specification where now 
h(t, x; 0) =ptp"lexp(yo+x'y). 
Notice that the Weibull specification exhibits positive duration dependence for p>1, 
that is, the derivative of the hazard function with respect to time is positive (dh/dt>O). It 
exhibits negative duration dependence for p<1, and no duration dependence for p=1. 
This group of parametric models are simple, but they do impose a structure on the data, 
so as a counter to this we initially also estimate the Proportional Hazards (Cox) model 
described above. 
Extending the above notation, suppose there are m distinct processes which might lead 
to the ending of the spell of childcare and that each of these separate processes may be 
represented by a hazard 
function, h; (t, xl ; 0) ,i=1,2,..., M. Each destination state 
represents a different outcome, such as full- or part-time employment, or one of the 
other possible exits. Only a small number of women exit to these other states (precisely 
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79 women) and these we remove. 13 Following Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), and 
Dolton and O'Neill (1996), we assume that the competing risks framework maintains 
independence of the underlying stochastic processes describing time to exit to full- or 
part-time work. In the case of independent risks, we need to specify only the marginal 
distribution of each Tm. Also, in what follows, we do not consider any time-varying 
covariates. We consider here only the case that durations of childcare for each female 
are independent across spells. This enables us to specify a tractable model of the 
stochastic process which governs the labour market histories. The last independence 
assumption implies that any unobservable heterogeneity terms are not correlated across 
spells. 14 
We thereby develop a competing risks duration model of the probability of exit to full- 
or part-time work conditional on entry into a preceding state of childcare. The 
contribution of the it' individual with an observed duration d; and exit state K to the log 
likelihood is 
d; -1 j 
1n L; =1nhw(d) +[ln(1-hj1(t))} (7.6) 
t=o j=1 
d; -1 d; -1 
= lnhKj(d; )+Zln(1-hK; (t)+Zln(1-hj; (t)) (7.7) 
t=0 j#K t=0 
The log-likelihood may be partitioned into a sum of terms, each of which is a function 
of the individual cause-specific hazard. The parameters of a given transition may be 
estimated by maximising the likelihood separately with respect to each subset of 
parameters, treating durations which finish in other state as censored. For example, 
conditioning on entry into childcare, the probability of exit to either full- or part-time 
work is parameterised and estimated. Under the assumption of independence of 
hazards, the competing risks model yields separate estimates of hazard rates for each 
exit state. Essentially, the competing risks model conceptualises Tm as the time to 
outcome m if the transition to another outcome is not possible. The two resulting sub- 
13 All estimation was carried out with and without these 79 cases. Results were not altered by retaining 
these women and treating them as censored. 
14 This might be a limitation but it is left to future work. 
220 
samples of data are Ei, the set of returners to full-time work, and E2, the set of returners 
to part-time work. 
Following Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), we do not attempt to model unobserved 
heterogeneity. The authors report that existing techniques to deal with this problem 
produce estimates that are sensitive to the number of competing risks specified and the 
form of the hazard function. For these reasons, allowance for omitted heterogeneity is 
left to future work. As Gianelli (1996), we recognise that any left censored spells 
present complications when assessing the issue of duration dependence. We therefore 
restrict our sample to those observations for which we observe entry into the childcare 
state. 
Our NCDS sample consists of a set of women who enter the childcare state at any time 
in our ten year window, resealed to calendar time t=0 and exits into work, either a full- 
or part-time, at some subsequent time. The precise time of entry to full- or part-time 
work is measured in months. Therefore, our observations consist of the duration of the 
spell, T, a variable j which indicates the destination of the woman at the end of the spell, 
and of a vector of explanatory variables, x. 
7.5.3 Kaplan-Meier Estimates 
As an introduction to this section, the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier product limit 
estimators (Kaplan and Meier (1958)) are used to summarise the duration data set. Let 
dd be the number of individuals with completed spells in the sample with duration tj for 
j= (1,2,... , K) . 
In the competing risks model, exits to other states are treated as 
censored. So nj are the number of spells neither yet completed or still to be censored 
after duration tj such that 
K 




where ml represent the number of censored observations between t, and tr+; . As before, 
the hazard represents the probability of completing a spell at duration tj+er , conditional 
on the spell reaching duration tj . The hazard function may be estimated by 




This is essentially the number of failures (here, the number of exits from childcare) at 
duration tj , divided 
by the number at risk at duration tj. The Kaplan-Meier survivor 
function is then given by, 
JJ 
S(t; )=fJ(n; -d; )/n; =fJ(1-h(t; )) (7.10) 
In what follows, we use only those observations with completed spells. Due to the 
nature of the data set, the only censored observations in our sample have to occur at age 
thirty-three. As we are investigating the impact of age on the process of returning to 
work, including age variables and allowing for censoring generates collinearity 
problems. 15 We therefore drop all returners aged thirty-three and leave the 
consideration of these women to future work. This gives a final sample of 1406 women 
with information on both the dependent and explanatory variables. The only censored 
observations remaining are those exits to either part- or full-time work in the competing 
risks framework. 
It may be that even discarding those women returners aged thirty-three that the age 
variable is still highly correlated with the dependant variable. Due to the nature of the 
data set (namely, that the cut-off occurs at age thirty-three), women who start a spell of 
child care in their early thirties are more likely to have had a shorter completed spell 
than women who began a spell in their early twenties. However, the inclusion of an age 
variable may be justified on the grounds that it may capture the impact of a life-cycle 
intensity of participation effect. That is, the decision to return part-time, according to 
the human capital model, may rise with age, if workers have less time left to recoup the 
returns from investing in human capital investment. In this case full-time work may be 
less preferable to part-time work. 
11 Some 868 women are censored in this way. (Some 36 % of the total number of women. ) 
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For these reasons, we include an age variable in what follows, but we use the age at 
which the childcare spell finishes in preference to the age at which it started. The 
former age variable is less correlated with the duration of childcare spell than the latter. 
In our data set, spells that finish when women returners are in their thirties are more 
likely to contain a mixture of short and long spells, than those which begin when women 
are in their early thirties. 
16 We also present estimates from which the age variable has 
been removed. 
Tables 7.11 to 7.12 report the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rate and the 
survivor function for our sample for the group of women as a whole, for women who 
return full-time and for those who return part-time, respectively. Figure 7.6 graphs the 
hazard rate for two destination states (FT and PT). The first table makes no distinction 
whether the exit is into full- or part-time work, whilst the other two tables treat exits in 
to part-time and full-time work respectively as additional censored observations. The 
hazard functions for both types of destination states are very similar. In the case of all 
female returners to work, Table 7.11 gives the hazard rate estimates, which are broadly 
flat, remaining roughly at the same level, between 2 and 4 per cent, for all durations 
under 72 months. It rises thereafter when there exist relatively fewer spells to be 
completed. Approximately 14 per cent of the total stock of female returners leave 
childcare within the first six months. Some 11 per cent of the total stock of returners to 
part-time work leave childcare within the first six months. Table 7.12, gives the 
Kaplan-Meier estimates by destination, where exits into the other state (full-time or 
part-time work) are treated as censored. The Kaplan-Meier hazard function for exits to 
full-time work rises more steeply in the period between month 61 and month 100. Prior 
to this, the average monthly hazard into full-time work is around 1 per cent and the 
hazard into part-time work is around 3 per cent. Consistent with the findings in Section 
7.3, the hazard rates into full-time work are always around half the size of those to part- 
time work at every duration. The standard errors on the two survivor functions indicate 
that the two processes are significantly different from each other. '7 
16 Witness the correlation coefficient between the length of childcare spell and the age at end (0.34) and 
the correlation between the length and the age at start (-. 50). That is, the negative sign confirms that 
spells that start when women 
in the data set are older are more likely to be shorter. 
17 The two survivor functions are greater than two standard deviations apart throughout. 
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7.5.4 Competing Risk Model Estimation 
In this section, we consider how the woman returner chooses to exit from childcare or 
domesticity into either part-time or full-time work depending on various family 
characteristics, the level of local labour market activity and her own human capital 
characteristics. Is there evidence that the number of children and the age of the 
youngest child have a positive impact on the duration of the childcare state, as well as 
on the probability of exiting to a particular work state? Is it more or less likely that a 
worker will exit to a full- or part-time job, the longer the time spent in the childcare 
state? 
Table 7.13 presents maximum likelihood estimates of the Proportional Hazard (Cox) 
model of the duration of the childcare state for all mothers who have returned to work in 
our sample period of 1981-1991. Results are presented in terms of the impact of a unit 
change of each characteristic on the log of the relative baseline hazard of exit from 
childcare (effectively, ex"' in Equation 7.5). 
18 This representation makes it easier to 
compare the results across the Cox and Weibull models. A coefficient greater than 
unity would increase the probability of leaving childcare and therefore reduce the spell 
duration. Conversely, a coefficient less than one would decrease the probability of 
leaving. The smaller the coefficient the longer the spell. Column I gives the results from 
combining all exit states. Columns II and III allow the parameters to vary across exit 
states according to the competing risks framework. 
19 
From Column I, we observe that the age of the youngest child of less than 1 year raises 
the hazard rate of ending a period of homecare relative to the reference category, 
(youngest aged 1-2 years), by around 43 per cent for the group of women returners as a 
whole. Thereafter, the older the youngest child becomes, the lower the relative hazard 
and the longer the duration spent at home. This may be picking up differences in labour 
18 The standard errors relate to the log of these relative hazard coefficients. 
19 Following Narendranathan and Stewart (1991), we calculate the LR test statistic that the cause-specific 
hazards are proportional to one another (that is to say all coefficients except the intercepts are equal) as 
LR =2 {Ln Unrestricted - (Ln 
Restricted + Q) } where Q= Ej NjLn(NJEk Nk) j, k= full, part-time 
and the NN are the sample number of exits to each state. This gives 
2 ((-7043.4 - 1348.0) - 
(-8441.5 + 224*ln[224/1406] + 1182*1n[1182/1406])) = 1333.4 - x2 (41), 
so that the split into full and part-time exit states is easily accepted. 
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market attachment within our sample of women. Some women return quickly after child 
birth, others do not. The number of children also prolongs the period of time out. 
Women with four children have time out some 75 per cent longer than the default 
category of women with one child. Being in a part-time job before the time out spell 
began reduces the time out spell by around 170 per cent relative to those previously in a 
full-time job. This may reflect the female's need to resume earning. However, the 
presence of a working partner also raises exit times, and this effect is more pronounced 
the higher up the occupational scale the partner is. This is not consistent with a 
household income effect and it may be capturing the rise in multiple earner households 
observed by Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) and Davies, Joshi and Peronaci (1998). The 
other variable that affects duration significantly is age at exit. The older the female, the 
longer the period of time out. This effect may be because we are observing completed 
spells only, so that there is more chance of observing long spells as the cohort ages. It is 
notable that the effect of age is flat after the age of 26, so that this cannot account for all 
of what we observe. Mothers of young ages take shorter periods of time out for reasons 
that may have to do with the need to augment the existing stock of human capital and 
income. The removal of the age dummies (Table 7.13 (b)) makes little difference to the 
estimated impact of most variables. The exception is that the local unemployment rate 
dummies now become more significant and have a larger impact. The lower the 
unemployment rate, the longer the spell of childcare. The recession of the early 1980's 
was associated with high local unemployment rates that occurred when the returners 
were in their early twenties. This negative correlation between age and unemployment 
20 
explains the increased significance of the latter when the age variable is removed. 
Columns II and III of Table 7.13 contain the competing risks estimation which enable us 
to separate out the contribution of any variable into the effects relevant to part- and full- 
time returners. We observe that the negative effect on duration of having a young child 
is fuelled by the behaviour of those who leave for part-time work. The youngest child 
age profiles are much steeper and more significant for this group. Likewise the positive 
effect on duration of more children is stronger for those who return to part-time work. 
Similarly, having had a job before exit to childcare which was part-time in nature triples 
the hazard rate of exit from childcare to part-time work, whilst the impact on duration of 
20 The correlation coefficient between the unemployment rate and age at the end of spell is -. 68. 
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having had a part-time job for full-timers is only-50 per cent relative to those previously 
in full-time work. 
In contrast, being married raises the hazard rate of full-time workers exiting from 
childcare by around 60 per cent, whilst there appears to be no impact on the hazard rate 
of part-time workers. Given the paucity of public provision of childcare, this result 
provides further evidence of the benefit of being in a relationship with a spouse or 
partner in the process of returning to work full-time. The rise in duration of time out 
with age is also more pronounced for those who return to full-time work, though again 
the profile is reasonably flat after the age of 26 for both groups. Local economic 
conditions, as measured by the regional unemployment rate, are also stronger for those 
who return to full-time work. Those in low unemployment regions tend to have longer 
durations before returning to full-time work. This result may suggest those in low 
unemployment regions can afford to be more selective over when to return to work. The 
effect is not significant however for the majority who enter part-time work. 
Table 7.14 reports Weibull estimates of the same events. The results are practically 
identical in size and significance to the Proportional Hazards model above. The 
Weibull specification confirms the existence of positive duration dependence in the 
sample, which is stronger for those who leave for part-time work. 
In order to summarise the impact of these estimated parameters on the length of time 
out, Table 7.15 reports the predicted values of time out, in months, using a basket of 
characteristics and a transformation of the Weibull parameter estimates from Table 7.14. 
Kiefer (1988) shows that it is possible to recast the parameter estimates into a form 
which makes the log of duration a linear function of each variable, 
21 
-Ln Ho = x' y+E, where 
Ho is the integrated baseline hazard rate. For the Weibull case, 
Ha=fhodt= fpt"''dt=t', so that -pLnt== x'y+r, and the effect of a unit 
change in a variable on the log of duration is given by dLnt/dx = -y/p. This specification 
also belongs to the class of accelerated failure time models, since the duration of time 
21 Kiefer (1988) shows that the random variable e= -Ln Ho - x' y has an extreme value distribution, 
where Ho is the integrated baseline hazard function. Hence any proportional hazard model can be written 
in the form -Ln Ho = x' Y+ E. 
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out is then accelerated or decelerated according to whether the set of variables increase 
or reduce exit times relative to the baseline hazard, (the constant term in the linear 
specification). Since Table 7.14 reports coefficients, b, in relative hazard form rather 
than the y, the appropriate transformation is -exp(b)/p. 
The estimated mean durations in Panel B of Table 7.15 indicate that, relative to the 
sample means, the models tend to underpredict the duration of return to part-time work 
and over predict the length of return to full-time work. For given characteristics, those 
returning to full-time work are always predicted to have a longer period of time out of 
work than those returning to part-time work. The estimated durations also reflect the 
dominating impact of age and age of youngest child on the return to work. 
7.6 Conclusion 
Several features stand out here from our earlier Chapters. Not only do women who take 
time out to look after children experience significantly lower earnings than those who do 
not but the longer the length of time out, the longer the earnings penalty. This penalty is 
magnified if the woman returns to part-time, rather than full-time, work. This Chapter 
set out to identify the principle features of the duration of time out and the nature of the 
subsequent re-entry. We have shown that the relative propensity to return to part-time 
work rises with age of the mother. For our sample of women who return to work before 
the age of 33, women who experience childcare breaks that end relatively early in their 
careers spend less time out of work and are more likely to re-enter to full-time work. 
The age and number of children appear to be the most important factors behind this 
observation. Women are more likely to return to full-time work, the fewer the number 
of children they have and the older the children are. There appears to be less difference 
in the length of time out according to education, region, local economic conditions, or 
predicted income for this group of women. There also seems to be little evidence that 
women in the age range covered by the NCDS cohort use part-time work as a stepping 
stone to full-time work. If policy makers are concerned about these effects then it may 
be that greater provision of child care facilities may make the return to work easier for 
those women more marginally attached to the workforce, thereby reducing the length of 
time out and hence earnings loss. However this alone may be insufficient to encourage 
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women back into full-time rather than part-time work. Despite the fact that part-time 
work is relatively low paid, the majority of women continue to use this type of work in 
order to combine the worlds of home and work. As this is the outcome of the inter- 
relationship of the various socio-economic forces at work, perhaps one way forward 
would be to improve conditions in part-time work. 
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Figure 7.1 Outflow Rates from Childcare by Age 
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Figure 7.6 Hazard Rates out of Childcare 
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Table 7.1 Annual Transition Rates from childcare among adult women, 1982 -91 
Destination Year CC-FT CC-PT CC-OTHER Total Outflow 
(Age) Rate 
1982 (24) . 028 . 062 . 004 . 094 
1983 (25) . 030 . 059 . 006 . 095 
1984 (26) . 030 . 081 . 006 . 117 
1985 (27) . 030 . 081 . 005 . 116 
1986 (28) . 021 . 096 . 010 . 127 
1987 (29) . 030 . 119 . 005 . 154 
1988 (30) . 031 . 128 . 006 . 165 
1989 (31) . 040 . 157 . 009 . 206 
1990 (32) . 028 . 
120 
. 030 . 178 
1991 (33) . 013 . 152 . 005 . 170 
Average . 028 . 111 . 007 . 146 
Sample: All female returners 
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Table 7.2 Labour Market Transition Matrices by Age 
23 - 24 
1982 
1981 
Full-Time Part-time Child Care Other 
Full-Time . 902 . 014 . 063 . 021 Part-Time . 068 . 800 . 110 . 022 Child Care . 028 . 062 . 906 . 004 Other . 277 . 042 . 049 . 632 
Age 27 - 28 
1986 Full-Time Part-time Child Care Other 
1985 
Full-Time . 902 . 021 . 057 . 020 Part-Time . 043 . 849 . 083 . 025 Child Care . 030 . 119 . 841 . 01 Other . 141 . 081 . 048 . 73 
Age 32 - 33 
1991 Full-Time Part-time Child Care Other 
1990 
Full-Time . 935 . 
024 
. 022 . 019 
Part-Time . 033 . 
901 
. 046 . 02 Child Care . 013 . 
152 
. 830 . 005 Other . 101 . 
101 
. 032 . 766 
Annual Average 




Full-Time . 912 . 
019 
. 049 . 020 Part-Time . 047 . 
856 
. 074 . 023 Child Care . 028 . 111 . 854 . 007 Other . 167 . 
083 
. 042 . 708 
Table 7.3 Estimated Steady State Proportions 
Using data from: Age Full-time Part-time Childcare Other 
1981-82 23 0.345 0.171 0.449 0.035 
1985-86 27 0.322 0.296 0.279 0.102 
1990-91 32 0.349 0.414 0.170 0.067 
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Table 7.4 Proportion of Female Returners using Childcare Types by Age at 
Return to Work 
% using Childcare Ty pe 
Age Job type Grand parents Spouse Friends Nanny School Other 
23 PT 24.5 39.7 4.6 4.3 18.5 8.4 
FT 25.6 33.7 6.9 9.4 15.0 9.4 
24 PT 17.4 39.1 6.5 0.0 19.6 17.4 
FT 14.3 42.9 7.1 7.1 14.3 17.4 
25 PT 39.1 30.4 8.7 0.0 13.0 8.7 
FT 20.0 40.0 5.0 0.0 25.0 10.0 
26 PT 26.3 34.2 6.6 4.0 19.7 9.2 
FT 19.2 26.9 7.7 11.5 23.1 11.5 
27 PT 27.1 43.0 6.5 2.8 11.2 9.4 
FT 31.6 31.6 5.3 5.3 10.5 15.8 
28 PT 31.8 37.1 3.8 3.8 16.7 6.8 
FT 16.1 35.5 9.7 16.1 12.9 9.7 
29 PT 25.5 43.3 2.8 5.0 19.9 3.6 
FT 25.0 21.4 10.7 10.7 25.0 7.1 
30 PT 24.2 37.9 5.0 3.7 19.9 9.3 
FT 23.1 30.8 5.1 7.7 20.5 12.8 
31 PT 19.8 46.0 2.7 5.4 18.0 8.1 
FT 26.7 50.0 3.3 10.0 3.3 6.7 
32 PT 24.5 35.0 4.2 4.9 22.4 9.1 
FT 36.0 36.0 8.0 12.0 8.0 0.0 
33 PT 16.8 43.7 4.2 6.6 19.8 9.0 
FT 57.1 21.4 7.1 7.1 0.0 7.1 
Total PT 24.5 39.7 4.6 4.3 18.5 8.4 
FT 25.6 33.7 6.9 9.4 15.1 9.4 
Sample: All female returners 
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Table 7.5 Sample Means of Variables in Probit of Return to Full-Time Work: 
Variable Total A e<=28 Age>28 
Mean St dev Mean St dev Mean St dev 
Share return Full-Time . 19 . 40 . 23 . 42 . 17 . 37 Age < 28 . 39 . 49 Childcare <12 months . 19 . 39 . 16 . 36 . 21 . 41 Childcare 12-18 mths . 17 . 37 . 14 . 35 . 18 . 39 Childcare 18-24 mths . 11 . 32 . 08 . 27 . 14 . 34 Childcare 24-30 mths . 20 . 29 . 07 . 25 . 11 . 32 Childcare 30-36 mths . 07 . 26 . 05 . 23 . 08 . 28 No. of Children 1.87 . 81 1.64 . 75 2.02 . 81 Youngest child <1 . 05 . 22 . 07 . 25 . 04 . 19 Youngest child 1-2 . 21 . 40 . 27 . 44 . 17 . 37 Youngest child 2-3 . 20 . 40 . 23 . 42 . 17 . 38 Youngest child 4-5 . 25 . 43 . 22 . 41 . 27 . 45 
Degree . 05 . 22 . 04 . 20 . 06 . 24 A level . 14 . 34 . 13 . 34 . 14 . 35 O level . 05 . 22 . 06 . 24 . 04 . 20 No qualification . 64 . 48 . 63 . 48 . 64 . 48 Married on return . 25 . 43 . 25 . 43 . 25 . 43 North . 08 . 27 . 09 . 29 . 07 . 25 Midland . 08 . 27 . 07 . 26 . 08 . 28 North West . 13 . 34 . 14 . 35 . 13 . 33 Yorkshire . 07 . 26 . 07 . 25 . 07 . 26 E Anglia . 07 . 26 . 07 . 25 . 08 . 27 S West . 06 . 24 . 06 . 24 . 06 . 25 Wales . 05 . 22 . 06 . 24 . 05 . 21 S East . 18 . 38 . 16 . 37 . 18 . 39 
Old Job Part-Time . 13 . 33 . 08 . 27 . 15 . 36 Old Job Full-Time . 15 . 35 . 18 . 39 . 12 . 32 Last Job spell<2 year . 06 . 23 . 08 . 28 . 04 . 20 Last Job spell 2-5 yrs . 20 . 40 . 23 . 42 . 18 . 39 Last Job spell 5-10 yrs . 50 . 50 . 50 . 50 . 50 . 50 
Ln predicted hourly wage 1.23 . 17 1.18 . 17 1.27 . 16 
Professional partner . 04 . 19 . 03 . 18 . 04 . 19 Intermediate partner . 18 . 39 . 20 . 40 . 17 . 38 Skilled non-man. partner . 10 . 30 . 10 . 31 . 10 . 30 Skilled manual partner . 17 . 38 . 20 . 40 . 16 . 36 Missing status partner . 32 . 47 . 27 . 44 . 36 . 48 
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Table 7.6 Probit Estimates of the Return to Full-Time Work, (Marginal Effects) 
Variable Total Total Age<=28 Age>28 
dP/dx S. Error dP/dx S. Error dp/dx S. Error dP/dx S. Error 
I II III IV 
Age<28 . 050* . 020 . 031 . 023 Childcare 
<12 months -. 018 . 028 . 010 . 047 -. 030 . 034 12-18 mths -. 025 . 028 -. 033 . 046 -. 015 . 035 18-24 mths . 007 . 033 -. 062 . 056 . 038 . 041 24-30 mths -. 017 . 033 . 035 . 069 -. 026 . 037 30-36 mths -. 004 . 038 -. 128 . 049* . 046 . 049 Education 
Degree . 057 . 078 . 036 . 134 . 066 . 103 A level . 014 . 041 . 096 . 075 -. 034 . 045 O level . 009 . 052 . 009 . 084 . 022 . 069 No Quals. -. 004 . 030 -. 028 . 050 . 011 . 037 Married . 068 . 024* . 020 . 038 . 099 . 031* Region 
North . 001 . 039 . 006 . 064 . 007 . 052 Midlands . 007 . 039 -. 006 . 065 . 008 . 045 North West . 039 . 035 . 005 . 056 . 061 . 045 Yorkshire -. 048 . 034 -. 053 . 061 -. 047 . 039 E. Anglia -. 086 . 031* -. 053 . 063 -. 107 . 029* S. West -. 038 . 038 -. 040 . 066 -. 037 . 045 Wales . 027 . 048 . 107 . 085 -. 033 . 
052 
S. East -. 036 . 028 -. 049 . 048 -. 018 . 034 
No. Children -. 024 . 015 -. 032 . 028 -. 017 . 
018 
Youngest <1 -. 096 . 034* -. 109 . 052* -. 108 . 
035* 
Youngest 1-2 -. 059 . 026* -. 137 . 042* -. 020 . 
035 
Youngest 2-3 -. 054 . 026 -. 129 . 040* -. 005 . 
036 
Youngest 4-5 -. 044 . 024 -. 065 . 044 -. 041 . 
028 
Old Job PT -. 065 . 026* -. 069 . 053 -. 061 . 
028* 
Last Job Spell 
<2 year . 042 . 053 . 035 . 078 . 004 . 
067 
2-5 yrs . 053 . 036 . 016 . 055 . 080 . 
048 
5-10 yrs . 014 . 025 . 007 . 044 . 020 . 
031 
Predict. Wage -. 162 . 090 -. 185 . 136 -. 
148 . 128 
Partner . 
Professional. -. 057 . 046 -. 034 . 091 -. 061 . 
049 
Intermediate -. 014 . 031 -. 018 . 050 -. 012 . 
038 
Oth NonMan. -. 020 . 035 . 031 . 067 -. 
047 . 037 Skilled Man. -. 004 . 031 -. 016 . 049 . 002 . 
040 
Occup miss -. 006 . 028 . 009 . 047 -. 007 . 
033 
N 1628 1628 631 997 
Pseudo RZ . 039 . 040 . 059 . 063 Sample mean . 180 . 180 . 210 . 160 Log L -764.1 -736.8 -305.9 -411.8 
X2(df) 6.6(l) 60.3(35) 35.8(34) 53.0(33 
Note 1. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 2. Asterisk denote significance at the 5% level. 
3. Specification III: all mothers. Specification III: mothers who completed a childcare spell before the 
age of 28 years. Specification IV: mothers who completed a childcare spell after the age of 28 years 
4. Dependent variable equals one if return to full-time work. 5. Sample: All females with a completed 
childcare spell 
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Table 7.7 Predicted Probabilities of Returning to Full-Time Work 
Characteristics Total Age<=28 Age >28 
A: Sample Mean 







qualification, E Anglia with 2 kids (youngest age less 
than 1) previous job PT, pre-gap spell <2 yrs, 
professional partner, predicted hourly earnings, £7.40 . 
C: As default, but married between 24-30 months in 
CC, degree qualification, S West with 1 kid (age 1- 2) 
previous job FT, pre-gap spell 2-5 yrs, manager 
partner, predicted hourly earnings, £2.70 . 
D: As default, but < 12 months in CC, degree 
qualification, E Anglia with 3 kids (youngest aged less 
than 1 year) previous job PT, pre-gap spell less than 2 
yrs, professional partner, predicted hourly earnings, 
£7.40 . 
E: As default, but married between 30 - 36 months in 
CC, degree qualification, S East with 1 kid (age 2-3) 
previous job FT, pre-gap spell 5-10 years, unskilled 
non-manual partner, predicted hourly earnings, £4.50 . 
. 254 . 242 
. 003 . 020 





Table 7.8 Frequency Distribution of Labour Market States Experienced 1981-91 
Frequency ('016) 
Spell no Full-time Education Part- Training Unemploy- Child- 
time ment care 
1 71.5 89.7 66.1 96.5 77.2 75.7 
2 21.3 9.2 25.2 3.5 17.1 19.0 
3 5.4 1.2 7.0 3.4 4.4 
4 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.8 
5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.2 
6 0.0 0.1 
7 0.1 0.1 
Sample: All women in NCDS sample 
Table 7.9 Average Completed Duration of Spell Types 
Duration (months) 
mean standard deviation 
Full-time Work 25.7 22.7 
Part-time Work 19.1 17.9 
Education 17.4 13.1 
Training 8.0 5.0 
Unemployment 9.5 12.1 
Childcare 29.4 24.6 
Other 26.9 31.8 
Sample: All women in NCDS sample 
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Table 7.10 Mean Completed Duration, (in Months) of Child Care Spell by Age 
at Return 












Mean length Mean length Mean length 
5.1 4.3 5.4 
9.6 10.6 9.5 
13.2 12.7 13.7 
19.7 17.2 20.8 
24.0 21.3 24.9 
26.4 26.6 27.0 
33.5 35.6 33.5 
34.1 32.2 35.0 
36.0 37.6 35.7 
40.6 21.2 43.2 
52.4 34 111.0 
Sample: All female returners from childcare 
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Table 7.11 Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Duration of Child Care 
Duration (months) Fails Hazard Survivor St Errors 
1 36 . 025 . 
975 . 004 
2 42 . 029 . 
947 . 006 
3 37 . 027 . 
921 . 007 
4 26 . 019 . 
903 . 008 
5 29 . 022 . 
884 . 008 
6 36 . 028 . 
859 . 009 
12 43 . 041 . 688 . 
012 
18 30 . 035 . 571 . 
013 
24 22 . 032 . 461 . 
013 
30 19 . 033 . 387 . 
013 
36 22 . 046 . 311 . 
012 
42 9 . 023 . 260 . 
012 
48 8 . 025 . 211 . 
011 
54 5 . 019 . 177 . 
010 
60 4 . 018 . 151 . 
009 
66 10 . 058 . 111 . 
008 
72 5 . 041 . 081 . 
007 
78 4 . 043 . 061 . 
006 
84 2 . 038 . 035 . 
005 
90 2 . 067 . 019 . 
004 
96 2 . 111 . 011 . 
003 
102 1 . 100 . 006 . 
002 
107 1 . 250 . 002 . 
001 
114 1 1 0 
Note. Sample: All female workers with childcare spell who return to Employment 
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Table 7.12. a. Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Duration of Child Care for Women who 
Return to Full-Time Work 
Duration (months) Fails Hazard Survivor St Errors 
1 10 . 007 . 993 . 
002 
2 9 . 006 . 987 . 003 
3 9 . 007 . 980 . 004 
4 10 . 007 . 973 . 004 
5 4 . 003 . 970 . 005 
6 5 . 004 . 966 . 
005 
12 5 . 005 . 934 . 007 
18 7 . 008 . 899 . 
009 
24 2 . 003 . 863 . 011 
30 3 . 005 . 836 . 
012 
36 6 . 012 . 808 . 
013 
42 3 . 008 . 790 . 014 
48 0 .0 . 770 . 
015 
54 1 . 004 . 754 . 016 
60 0 .0 . 742 . 017 
66 0 .0 . 702 . 020 
72 1 . 008 . 682 . 022 
78 0 .0 . 664 . 024 
84 0 .0 . 619 . 030 
Note 1. Intermediate months not shown. 
2. Sample: All female workers with childcare spell who return to Full-Time Employment 
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Table 7.12. b. Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Duration of Child Care for Women 
who Return to Part-Time Work 
Duration in months I Fails Hazard Survivor St Error 
1 26 . 018 . 982 . 004 
2 33 . 023 . 960 . 005 
3 28 . 020 . 940 . 006 
4 16 . 012 . 929 . 007 
5 25 . 019 . 911 . 008 
6 31 . 024 . 889 . 008 
12 38 . 036 . 738 . 012 
18 23 . 027 . 637 . 013 
24 20 . 029 . 536 . 014 
30 16 . 027 . 465 . 014 
36 16 . 034 . 388 . 014 
42 6 . 015 . 331 . 013 
48 8 . 025 . 276 . 
013 
54 4 . 015 . 237 . 012 
60 4 . 018 . 206 . 012 
66 10 . 058 . 160 . 011 
72 4 . 033 . 120 . 010 
78 2 . 021 . 097 . 009 
84 2 . 038 . 057 . 007 
90 2 . 067 . 034 . 006 
96 2 . 111 . 023 . 005 
102 1 .1 . 014 . 004 
107 1 . 25 . 005 . 003 
114 1 1 0 
Note 1. Intermediate months not shown. 
2. Sample: All female workers with childcare spell who return to Part-Time Employment 
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Table 7.13. a. Cox Proportional Hazard Model - Duration of Childcare 
Variable Total Part-Time Full-Time 
I II III 
St Error Coeff St Error Coeff St Error Coeff 
Age at return 25 
Age at return 26 
Age at return 27 
Age at return 28 
Age at return 29 
Age at return 30 
Age at return 31 











Previous job PT 
Unemp. Rate <5% 
Unemp. Rate 5-8% 
Unemp. Rate 8-10% 




Total No. Children =2 
Total No. Children =3 
Total No. Children >=4 
Youngest child age<1 
Youngest child age 1-2 
Youngest child age 2-3 
Youngest child age 3-4 
Youngest child age 4-5 
Partner Professional 
Partner Intermediate 
Partner other non-manual 
Partner Skilled manual 
Partner Occup miss 
Ln predicted hourly wage 
N 


























































































. 228* 1.593* 
1.274 
. 745 















. 663 1.101 
. 800 
. 501 * 
. 758 
. 953 1.233 








Note. 1. Sample: All female workers with childcare spell. 2. Default categories age<25, single, living in 
South-East, qualifications less than 0 level, 1 child aged 5+, non-working spouse, area 



























. 276* 1.429* 
. 623 * 
. 455* 
. 301 * 




































































. 866 1.001 





. 230* 1.496* 
. 589* 
. 441 * 
. 242* 










Table 7.13. b. Cox Proportional Hazard Model - Duration of Childcare 
(No Age controls) 
Variable Total Part-Time Full-Time 
I II III 
Coeff St Error Coeff St Error Coeff St Error 
Married 1.098 . 065 1,024 . 067 1.551* . 223 Spouse works 1.582* . 161 1.680* . 190 1.270 . 310 North . 859 . 104 . 875 . 117 . 815 . 239 Midland . 896 . 097 . 903 . 108 . 849 . 218 Scotland . 928 . 137 . 871 . 143 1.164 . 402 North West . 832 . 080 . 818 . 087 . 907 . 204 Yorks . 823 . 098 . 883 . 112 . 516* . 183 E Anglia . 897 . 113 . 953 . 127 . 537 . 221 S West . 993 . 125 1.045 . 140 . 706 . 259 Wales 1.167 . 170 1.100 . 179 1.437 . 468 Previous Job PT 2.742* . 176 3.070* . 214 1.533* . 256 Unemp. Rate <5% . 654* . 078 . 733* . 094 . 346* . 114 Unemp. Rate 5-8% . 685* . 063 . 742* . 074 . 449* . 108 Unemp. Rate 8-10% . 882 . 072 . 914 . 081 . 773 . 155 Unemp. Rate 10-12% . 809 . 082 . 794* . 089 . 920 . 214 Degree 1.185 . 204 1.124 . 231 . 853 . 396 A level . 996 . 087 1.067 . 101 . 692 . 164 0 level . 808 . 144 . 895 . 174 . 501 . 223 Total No. Children =2 . 393* . 027 . 391* . 030 . 391* . 066 Total No. Children =3 . 225* . 025 . 197* . 025 . 411 * . 105 Total No. Children >=4 . 249* . 050 . 204* . 045 . 634 . 290 Youngest child age<1 1.474* . 113 1.546* . 128 1.129 . 220 Youngest child age 1-2 . 596* . 056 . 565* . 058 . 724 . 163 Youngest child age 2-3 . 436* . 040 . 423* . 042 . 475* . 112 Youngest child age 3-4 . 279* . 032 . 228* . 029 . 668 . 164 Youngest child age 4-5 . 144* . 040 . 088* . 030 . 837 . 405 Partner Professional 1.278 . 166 1.302 . 184 1.232 . 415 Partner Intermediate 1.128 . 098 1.164 . 109 . 907 . 212 Partner Skilled non-manual 1.136 . 114 1.129 . 124 1.151 . 286 Partner Skilled manual 1.005 . 088 1.010 . 096 . 964 . 216 Partner Occup miss 1.774* . 188 1.751 * . 204 1.978 . 522 Ln predicted hourly wage 0.981 . 277 1.079 . 333 . 
664 . 468 
N 1406 1406 1406 
No of exits 1406 1182 224 
Log L -8462.6 -7055.7 -1363.3 
X2 (32 704.3 653.2 138.1 
Note. 1. Sample: All female workers with childcare spell. 2. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 7.14. a. Weibull Model - Duration of Child Care 
Variable Total Part-Time Full-Time 
I II III 
St Error Coeff St Error Coeff St Error Coeff 
Age at return 25 
Age at return 26 
Age at return 27 
Age at return 28 
Age at return 29 
Age at return 30 
Age at return 31 











Previous job PT 
Unemp. Rate <5% 
Unemp. Rate 5-8% 
Unemp. Rate 8-10% 




Total No. Children =2 
Total No. Children =3 
Total No. Children >=4 
Youngest child age<1 
Youngest child age 1-2 
Youngest child age 2-3 
Youngest child age 3-4 
Youngest child age 4-5 
Partner Professional 
Partner Intermediate 
Partner other non-manual 
Partner Skilled manual 
Partner Occup miss 
Ln predicted hourly wage 
P 
N 






















































































. 233 * 
. 297* 
. 263 * 
. 224* 1.583* 
1.321 
. 745 















. 689 1.111 
. 787 
. 487* 
. 781 1.024 
1.242 









Note. 1. Sample: An rema, e workers wim ctuldcare spell. 2. Default categories age<25, single, living in 
South-East, qualifications less than 0 level, I child aged 5+, non-working spouse, area 









. 360* 1.099 
1.670* 
. 904 














. 309* 1.476* 
. 623 * 
. 482* 
. 367* 



























































. 408* 1.025 
1.760* 
. 947 
. 944 1.009. 
. 866 





. 913 1.012 




















Table 7.14. b. Weibull Model - Duration of Child Care (No Age controls) 
Variable Total Part-Time Full-Time 
I II III 











Previous job PT 
Unemp. Rate <5% 
Unemp. Rate 5-8% 
Unemp. Rate 8-10% 




Total No. Children =2 
Total No. Children =3 
Total No. Children >=4 
Youngest child age<1 
Youngest child age 1-2 
Youngest child age 2-3 
Youngest child age 3-4 
Youngest child age 4-5 
Partner Professional 
Partner Intermediate 
Partner other non-manual 
Partner Skilled manual 
Partner Occup miss 
Ln hourly predicted wage 
P 
N 
No of exits 
log L 
x2 (32) 
1.079 . 064 1.007 . 066 1.534* . 219 1.615* . 167 1.714* . 196 1.298 . 318 
. 904 . 109 . 919 . 122 . 846 . 247 
. 904 . 098 . 907 . 109 . 869 . 223 1.008 . 147 . 957 . 156 1.199 . 414 
. 863 . 083 . 851 . 091 . 918 . 206 
. 876 . 104 . 944 . 120 . 537 . 190 
. 922 . 114 . 980 . 129 . 542 . 223 
. 935 . 117 . 987 . 133 . 652 . 240 1.222 . 178 1.157 . 189 1.469 . 479 2.628* . 167 2.930* . 202 1.511* . 250 
. 783* . 089 . 880 . 109 . 404* . 128 
. 781 * . 071 . 852 . 083 . 491 * . 115 
. 934 . 076 . 969 . 086 . 806 . 161 
. 866 . 087 . 857 . 096 . 943 . 218 1.396 . 241 1.469 . 275 . 985 . 458 1.041 . 091 1.121 . 105 . 704 . 167 
. 787 . 139 . 869 . 168 . 509 . 226 
. 396* . 027 . 395* . 030 . 387* . 065 
. 248* . 027 . 221* . 027 . 416* . 105 
. 279* . 055 . 232* . 051 . 659 . 299 1.515* . 115 1.599* . 132 1.136 . 221 
. 592* . 055 . 567* . 058 . 701 . 157 
. 462* . 041 . 458* . 044 . 459* . 107 
. 345* . 037 . 293 * . 035 . 695 . 164 
. 183* . 050 . 117* . 040 . 913 . 435 1.290 . 167 1.306 . 184 1.253 . 422 1.144 . 099 1.178 . 110 . 933 . 218 1.139 . 113 1.129 . 123 1.168 . 290 1.000 . 087 1.004 . 095 . 966 . 216 1.882* . 200 1.854* . 216 2.089* . 551 
. 767 . 215 . 819 . 252 . 558 . 393 













Note. 1. Sample: All female workers with child care spell. 2. Asterisk notes significance at 5% level. 
248 
Table 7.15 Predicted Duration of Returning to Employment 
Characteristics Total Part- Full- 
time time 
A: Mean 
B: Predicted at means 
C: As default, married, degree qualification, North 
with 1 kid (youngest aged 1- 2) previous job PT, 
partner missing occupational status and not in work, 
unemployment rate 10 - 13 %, age 23, predicted 
hourly earnings, £7.40 . 
D: As default, married, no qualification, Wales with 
3 kids (youngest aged less than 1) previous job FT, 
partner in work in skilled manual job, unemployment 
rate 8-10 %, age 29, predicted hourly earnings, £3.70 
E: As default, married, A level qualification, S West 
with 2 kids (youngest aged 1-2) previous job FT, 
partner unskilled non-manual status but not in work, 
unemployment rate 10 - 13 %, age 26, predicted 














Table A'7.1. a. Predicted Entry Wage Equation 
11981-82 1983-85 1986-88 1989-91 






































































-. 035 . 177 
. 042 . 031 
. 256* . 160 
-. 065* . 028 
. 311* . 141 
. 054 . 060 
. 030* . 004 
-. 0007* . 0001 
-. 060 . 049 
-. 168* . 040 
-. 039* . 041 
-. 088 . 048 
-. 056* . 040 
-. 153* . 056 
-. 125* . 049 
-. 079 . 057 
. 454* . 047 
. 114* . 035 
. 072 . 046 
-. 029 . 030 
-. 020 . 054 
. 866* . 054 
920 
0.240 
-. 018 . 128 
. 066* . 032 
. 038 . 092 
-. 088* . 026 
. 162* . 050 
. 099* . 047 
. 019* . 004 
-. 0005* . 0001 
-. 072* . 034 
-. 166* . 047 
. 002 . 047 
-. 116* . 040 
-. 164* . 050 
-. 098 . 051 
-. 099* . 038 
-. 169* . 049 
. 417* . 042 
. 102* . 029 
-. 012 . 031 
-. 043 . 029 
















































Source: General Household Survey. Note. 1. White adjusted standard errors. 2. Asterisk denotes 




8.1 Main Findings 
The results obtained in this thesis provide a rationale for policy-makers and employers to 
aid women to regain their pre-interruption earnings profile during a comparatively short 
period after re-entry to work. It is clear that the loss of skills and knowledge during periods 
spent outside the labour force have a permanent effect on earnings. Alongside the move to 
minimise home time periods via flexible working patterns, ' there is a case to be made for 
ensuring that the worker's skills and wages rebound to a level which eventually tends to 
those from before the break. If we assume that an individual's pre-interruption profile is 
clearly linked to her productivity schedule, it makes little sense for intermittent workers to 
be locked into wages which are below their marginal revenue product. The investigation of 
the issues associated with intermittent behaviour is vitally important and the implications of 
such discontinuous work patterns need to be fully explored in the public arena in order that 
workers may operate with more complete information sets. 
The evidence presented in Chapter 2 formed an overview of the main labour market events 
in Britain over the last two decades suggesting that women have experienced improvements 
in workplace fortunes, as measured by employment rates and wages. More women are in 
work than ever before and their wages have improved in real terms and relative to men. 
Women also seem to be returning to work after childbirth much sooner than before. 
However, it is clear that not all women have benefited equally from these changes. It seems 
that women in part-time work have not enjoyed relative wage gains to the same extent as 
their full-time counterparts. 
Chapter 5 analysed the effect of work interruptions on earnings. We take advantage of a 
data set that allows us to construct an actual measure of work experience, rather than rely 
1 Dex and McCulloch (1997) report that, in 1994, one half of women of working age held non-standard jobs. 
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on the usual proxy of potential work experience. We show that use of potential experience 
in wage equations may seriously overestimate the returns to work experience. The average 
wage gain to actual work experience is between 1 to 2 per cent a year. We showed that this 
return is confined to women with full-time work experience. Additional years of part-time 
work experience do not appear to add to earnings. This may help explain why the gender 
earnings gap has not narrowed for women in part-time work. We find that time out of work 
has an additional negative effect on re-entry wages. Women who take time out experience 
lower earnings than those who work continuously. The average earnings loss is around 2 
per cent a year. The size of this penalty is similar to existing results for the United States. 
The magnitude of the earnings penalty varies with the type of out of work spell. Those who 
are unemployed suffer the highest earnings penalty. There is evidence that women who 
return to work may make up some of their lost earnings, but this is confined to those who 
are out for reasons other than unemployment or home production. This is consistent with 
the Mincer and Ofek (1982) view of the restoration period: but only for specific types of 
time out. The stylised single-peaked lifetime earnings profile is inappropriate in the context 
of female intermittent workers and the work above provides conclusive evidence for this. 
Chapter 6 presented a new decomposition of the gender pay gap which used panel 
information on employment transitions and wage changes. On entry into the labour market 
after leaving full-time education, the earnings of men and women are very similar. As 
earnings growth while in continuous employment shows no significant gender differences, 
male and female earnings will follow each other closely as long as there are no breaks in 
paid employment. Differences in wages start to emerge once there are breaks in 
employment. When returning to the labour market after a break, both men and women do 
so at lower wages than before, but men return at higher wages than women, with the re- 
entry gender pay gap rising with age. This, combined with the fact that women are more 
likely to have breaks in paid employment, is the explanation of why women's pay 
increasingly falls behind the pay of men over the life-cycle. Women who work part-time 
are paid less than their full-time counterparts because, first, they are much more likely to be 
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entrants and, because, second, they have slightly lower wage growth when in paid 
employment. 
As the bulk of the pay gap can be put down to the result of higher numbers of women 
having breaks in employment and the pay penalty associated with these breaks, this 
suggests that it is labour market interruptions that are the main cause of women's labour 
market disadvantage. 
Chapter 7 modelled the duration of time spent in childcare more explicitly. As the majority 
of the interruptions to the labour market careers of women are caused by having children, 
which is largely a voluntary choice, some might be inclined to. interpret the results as saying 
that a substantial part of the wage gap can be ascribed to the choices of women. We would 
prefer to interpret this another way. Women are still often forced to choose between career 
and children, and given this choice, often choose children. However, such a stark choice is 
not inevitable: maternity leave entitlements can give women some opportunity to have a 
family and retain their pre-childbirth job. Some 10 per cent of female entrants indicate that 
they have had a period of maternity leave, but the'entry wages seem to be much higher for 
those who have had leave. So, maternity leave can seem to reduce both the entry pay gap 
and the share of entrants, which is consistent with a view that it can reduce, or even 
eliminate, the fall in wages generally experienced when returning to the labour market after 
childbirth. 
Not only do women who take time out to look after children experience significantly lower 
earnings than those who do not but the longer the length of time out, the larger the earnings 
penalty. This penalty is magnified if the woman returns to part-time, rather than full-time, 
work. Chapter 7 identifies the principle features of the duration of time out and the nature 
of the subsequent re-entry. The average mother by the age of 33 will have spent nearly 2 
and a half years out of work in childcare. We have shown that the relative propensity to 
return to part-time work rises with age of the mother. Women who take child care breaks 
relatively early in their careers spend less time out of work and are more likely to re-enter to 
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full-time work. The age and number of children appear to be the most important factors 
behind this observation. Women are more likely to return to full-time work, the fewer the 
number of children they have and the older the children are. There appears to be less 
difference in the length of time out according to education, region, local economic 
conditions, or predicted income for this group of women. There also seems to be little 
evidence that women in the age range covered by the NCDS cohort use part-time work as a 
stepping stone to full-time work. 
8.2 Further Research 
This work provides a starting point for further debate. Some of the results in this thesis, 
regarding earnings penalties and the duration of childcare, were for a specific age cohort of 
women. It would be beneficial to establish whether these results hold across the sample of 
women as a whole; whether these results change over the period when the gender pay gap 
has narrowed; whether the pay penalty for resuming part-time work has risen over time; 
whether the gender pay gap decomposition used in Chapter 6 has changed over time; or 
how the time spent in child care has altered. Such questions can only be answered with a 
long run of panel data representative of the population as a whole (as is currently only 
available for the United States). In time, the BHPS may be able to address some of these 
questions, but doubts remain as to whether its sample size is sufficiently large to warrant 
detailed disaggregation. 
On more technical matters, because our hourly wage measure is computed by dividing 
weekly earnings by weekly hours, it is vulnerable to problems caused by measurement error 
and division bias. Given that very few people seem to move between full-time and part- 
time status, a high percentage of those who are classed as having moved may be the result 
of mistakes in coding hours in one of the years. This can then account for the patterns of 
wage growth seen among those making the transitions. The alternative is that these are 
manifestations of the part-time/full-time wage gap in Chapter 6. More work on the effects 
of measurement error on these issues for Britain (in the manner of Brown and Light (1991) 
for the United States) is needed. 
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Following Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), we did not attempt to model unobserved 
heterogeneity in the competing risks framework of Chapter 7. The authors report that 
existing techniques to deal with this problem produce estimates that are sensitive to the 
number of competing risks specified and the form of the hazard function. For these 
reasons, allowance for omitted heterogeneity was left to future work. As with Gianelli 
(1996), we recognise that any left censored spells present complications when assessing the 
issue of duration dependence. We therefore restricted our sample to those observations for 
which we observe entry into the childcare state. In Chapter 7, we used only those 
observations with completed spells. Due to the nature of the data set, the only censored 
observations in our sample have to occur at age thirty-three. As we are investigating the 
impact of age on the process of returning to work, including age variables and allowing for 
censoring generates collinearity problems. Again this issue would not arise in a data set 
containing women of different ages. 
8.3 Policy Implications 
If policy makers are concerned about the negative effects of withdrawal from work that we 
have observed in this thesis, then it may be that greater provision of childcare facilities may 
make the return to work easier for those women more marginally attached to the workforce, 
thereby reducing the length of time out and hence earnings loss. However this alone may 
be insufficient to encourage women back into full-time, rather than part-time, work. 
Despite the fact that part-time work is relatively low paid, the majority of women continue 
to use this type of work in order to combine the worlds of home and work. As this is the 
outcome of the inter-relationship of the various socio-economic forces at work, perhaps one 
way forward would be to improve conditions in part-time work. Improving the rights and 
opportunities of women returning to the labour market after childbirth may be the most 
practical and effective way to further reduce the gender pay gap. 
As Jacobsen (1994) indicates, the expectation that female workers should adhere to a 
traditional pattern of full-time and continuous work is only appealing if such a pattern were 
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prevalent in other groups. As the world of work has changed significantly over the past two 
decades it would seem absurd that such a role for women should be assumed. It may be 
that combining child care with part-time work should be recognised as an end it itself rather 
than a transitory state. Attention then needs to be given to ensure that conditions in part- 
time jobs do not give rise to the penalties witnessed in this thesis. 
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